













































































RESTftieTfO 


T. I. D. C. Project 


Study of the FEA Drafting Committee 

on the 



Separation from Germany 
of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
Territory 


as a Disarmament Measure 




Copy 


OCTOBER 15, 1945 


COORDINATED BY THE 
ENEMY BRANCH 

l FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 

•- 

Q£,C T Dll' TEH 

“tv rru 






ft*** 










T. I. D. C. Projects on German Industrial and Economic Disarmament 


NUM¬ 

BER 


TITLE 


DELEGATED TO 


1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 
9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 
15a 
15b 
16 

17 

18 
19 

20/27 

21 

22 * 

23 

24 

25 

26 
28 

29 

30 

31 

32 


Implements of War_ 

Aircraft.. _ 

Scientific Research_ 

Secret Weapons_ 

Light Metals_ 

Petroleum_ 

Rubber--.- 

Electronics_ 

Bearings____ 

Common Components_ 

Machine Tools_ 

Automotive____ 

Shipbuilding and Shipping_ 

Machinery_ 

Iron and Steel_ 

Ferro Alloys_ 

Chemicals_ 

Solid Fuels_ 

Power_ 

Nonferrous Metals and Strategic Minerals 

Import and Trade Controls_ 

Permanent Disarmament Commission_ 

Territorial Separation_ 

Agriculture_ 

Development of Safe Industries_ 

External Economic Security_ 

Cartels_ 

Governmental and Economic Institutions. 

Historical Background_ 

Forest Resources_ 

Scientific Equipment_ 

Transportation and Communications_ 


War and Navy Departments. 
War and Navy Departments. 
OSRD—NACA. 


War and Navy Departments. 
TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

WSA—Maritime. 

FEA Engineering Staff. 
TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

TIDC. 

FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
FEA Drafting Committee. 
TIDC. 

TIDC. 

FEA Drafting Committee. 


Preface 

This preliminary TIDC report is one of a series prepared in response to a directive to Mr. Crowley by the late Presi¬ 
dent Roosevelt (in a letter dated September 28, 1944) to “accelerate” studies of “what should be done after the surrender of 
Germany to control its power and capacity to make war in the future.” 

This study is presented as a report by the individuals who served on the FEA Drafting Committee speaking out of their 
own knowledge and point of view, rather than as representing FEA. Hence, in using this document for its own informa¬ 
tion, and distributing it for the advice and information of U. S. officials; FEA does not necessarily endorse officially the 
views stated herein. 

The recommendations in this report are presented with but superficial regard to the recommendations which will 
emerge simultaneously from comparable studies on other projects. Hence, the cumulative impact of the total of all recom¬ 
mendations on the German economy and its war-making power could not be taken into account in the preparation of each 
report. 

In line with the Yalta Declaration and subsequent statements by the President, FEA favors a firm program for dis¬ 
arming Germany industrially to the end of international security. It is expected that this report and the other TIDC 
reports will be used in formulating a precise United States program covering the whole field of German economic and indus¬ 
trial disarmament for discussion with the Allies, which may have to be both selective and cumulative in character. 

Henry H. Foivler, 

Director, Enemy Branch, 
Foreign Economic Administration. 













































r 7 C 

* « 


T. I. D. C. Project 22 

Study of FEA Drafting Committee 
on the 

Separation from Germany of the 
Ruhr Rhineland Territory 

as a Disarmament Measure 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


Page 


Letter of Transmittal_ 1 

Summary_._ 2 

Recommendations_ 3 

Map Showing Territory Designated for 

Possible Separation_ 6 

Chapter I. Separation of Territory as 
a Disarmament Measure: 

Area Designated for Possible Separa¬ 
tion_ 5 

Economic Resources and Characteris¬ 
tics of the Area_ 6 

Natural resources_ 6 

Industrial facilities_ 7 

Communications_ 7 

Trade relations_ 7 

Agricult ure_ 8 

Population_ 8 

Significance of the Area to a German 

War Potential_ 8 

Territorial Separation as a Disarma¬ 
ment Measure_ 8 

Chapter II. Program for Treatment of 
Detached Area: 

Interim Control_ 10 

Permanent Detachment_ 10 

Transfer of Separated Area to an In¬ 
ternational Body_ 10 

Advantages of trusteeship by 

United Nations_ 10 

Disadvantages of annexation_ 11 

Trusteeship by individual nation 

or nations_ 12 


Chapter II.—Continued. 

Administration by United Nations 

Authority_ 

International Governing Commis¬ 
sion _ 

Powers and duties__ 

Laws and regulations_ 

Bill of Rights_ 

Courts_ 

Organization of administration_ 

Further safeguards_ 

Right of Option_ 

Property Management_ 

Industrial disarmament of the 

area_ 

Reparations_ 

Confiscation of property_ 

Public Corporation_ 

Other property problems_ 

Public property_ 

Private property_ 

Trade Relations_ 

Chapter III. Economic Consequences of 
Territorial Detachment: 

Effects on Detached Area_ 

Effects on Europe_ 

Effects on Germany_ 

Chapter IV. Social and Psychological 
Aspects of Internationalization: 

Appendix_ 

Bibliography_ 

Minority Statement__ 

Maps_ 


Page 


12 

12 

13 

14 
14 
14 

14 

15 

15 

16 

16 

16 

17 

17 

19 

19 

19 

21 


21 

23 

23 


27 

44 

45 
49 


670737 


46 - 


1 




















































FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 
BUREAU OF AREAS 
Washington 25, D. C. 

Memorandum 


to: Henry H. Fowler. Director. Enemy 

Branch. FEA . 

from: Philip M. Kaiser. Acting Chief. Plan¬ 

ning Staff. Enemy Branch.. FEA. 
subject: TIDC Project No. 22 —Separation of 
Territory. 

I am herewith transmitting the following pre¬ 
liminary report on “The Separation from Ger¬ 
many of the Ruhr-Rhineland as a Disarmament 
Measure.” 

This report has been prepared by an FEA 
Drafting Committee consisting of the following 
members and personnel: 

Mr. Philip M. Kaiser. Chairman. 

Mr. Martin T. Bennett. 

Mr. David Levitan. 

Dr. Sol Ozer. 

Mi ss Margaret Stone. 

Dr. Sarah Wambaugh. 

Dr. George M. Wunderlich. 

Mrs. Thelma Lewis, Executive Officer. 

Mrs. Miriam Bright, Executive Secretary. 

The Committee has given consideration in thi> 
report to the detachment of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
at the western border of Germany as a possible 
disarmament measure. It should be emphasized 
that the report does not recommend the separation 
of this territory. It attempts, rather, to evaluate 
the part it could play in the total disarmament 
program, the problems that would be involved in 
executing such a policy, and the effects upon the 
economies of truncated Germany, the area itself, 
and Europe as a whole. It. further, presents a 
program for the treatment of the territory—in 
the event of detachment—which is believed to 
offer the best means of safeguarding the interests 
of the detached area and the security of the world. 

The report concludes that separation of this 
territory would become a powerful measure for 
the post-occupation control of a disarmed Ger¬ 
many if accompanied by the safeguards proposed. 
This viewpoint was concurred in by the majority 
of the Committee members. Dr. Wunderlich sup¬ 
ports the majority report in so far as it relates to 


October IS, 191+5. 

the evaluation of separation as a disarmament 
measure. He dissents, however, with the point of 
view that retention of the German population 
would be feasible under an international adminis¬ 
tration and advocates, instead, complete removal 
of the German population and recolonization of 
the area with the nationals of non-German coun¬ 
tries. 

A minority statement, supported by Miss Stone 
and Mr. Bennett, is appended at the end of the 
report. This statement questions the desirability 
of separation as a part of the disarmament pro¬ 
gram because of the problems and risks attendant 
upon such a policy and doubts the necessity for 
separating this territory if an over-all plan of mil¬ 
itary. scientific, industrial, institutional, and ex¬ 
ternal security controls is accomplished. It sug¬ 
gests that separation might be considered as a 
sanction to be put into effect if Germany later 
violates the terms of the final peace treaty. 

It is believed that this report will be helpful in 
contributing to the thinking on the subject of han¬ 
dling this area which contains a major concentra¬ 
tion of German industrial resources. Other ways 
than separation of the total area may be found 
preferable if it is decided that, though special 
treatment is necessary, separation of the whole 
area is not required. The plan as proposed in this 
report might be applied to smaller parts of the 
area, such as the Saar and or the Ruhr. Or, if 
separation is finally deemed inadvisable, control 
and operation of the coal mines and other im¬ 
portant productive facilities might be turned over 
to a public corporation responsible to the United 
Nations Security Council. That there are other 
possibilities was recognized, but they were con¬ 
sidered outside the scope of the present report. 

I want to express my appreciation to the mem¬ 
bers of the Committee who gave this complicated 
subject the benefit of their expert knowledge. I 
would particularly like to acknowledge our debt to 
Mrs. Thelma Lewis, the Executive Officer, who un¬ 
dertook the difficult task of consolidating into the 
final report the various contributions of members 
of the Committee. Her tireless energies were in¬ 
dispensable to the completion of this study. 


1 


SUMMARY 


Separation from Germany of the Ruhr-Rhine- 
land territory on the western border of the Reich 
has been considered in relation to the program for 
the economic and industrial disarmament of 
Germany. 

This area has provided the principal economic 
foundation for the German war potential. It con¬ 
tains a large percentage of the reserves of Ger¬ 
many’s major industrial resource, coal, upon which 
are based her iron and steel, chemical, and other 
industries. It also contains a large proportion of 
the plant capacity of many of the basic industries 
essential to the development of the war potential 
of a modern industrial nation. It is, in addition, 
the most important communications area of West¬ 
ern Europe, linking north and south and east and 
west by means of a complicated system of rail¬ 
roads, highways, and inland waterways. Because 
of this concentration of economic resources, its 
separation might afford the most important single 
opportunity permanently to reduce the war-mak¬ 
ing power of Germany. 

Although detachment of this territory would in 
itself greatly diminish the German war potential, 
separation alone could not be relied upon to 
achieve (he economic disarmament of Germany. 
It would be an acceptable disarmament measure 
only as part of a total program designed to re¬ 
duce, both in the rest of Germany and in the area 
itself, the broad economic base upon which Ger¬ 
many’s military establishment has been built. Fol¬ 
lowing upon the deindustrialization of Germany 
prescribed for the period of occupation, and ac¬ 
companied by adequate safeguards to prevent Ger¬ 
man repenetration, separation of this area would 
become a powerful measure for post-occupation 
control of a disarmed Germany. Inclusion of this 
measure in the total program would mean that the 
period of occupation could be shortened, that 
fewer and simpler controls over truncated Ger¬ 
many would have to be imposed in the peace treaty, 
and that, even if Germany were able to evade such 
controls, her ability to wage war would be con¬ 
siderably lessened. Furthermore, it would be 
possible to utilize the valuable resources of the 
detached area for the benefit of Europe as a whole. 

Unquestionably, the separation of this area 
would raise problems of a serious nature. It would 
incur the resentment of the German people and 
might intensify their resistance to the disarma¬ 
ment program as a whole. Separation of this area 


would create a German irredentum and, because of 
strong nationalistic sentiment among the Ger¬ 
mans, retention of the German population might 
give rise to continual irredentist agitation. On 
the other hand, removal of the population to trun¬ 
cated Germany might make impossible the estab¬ 
lishment of a stable economy there and would raise 
perplexing questions in regard to repopulation of 
the detached area with sufficient labor to permit 
utilization of the resources of the area. The ad¬ 
justment of the conflicting economic interests of 
the area and of adjacent non-German countries 
might also prove difficult. The treatment of the 
detached area outlined in this study is proposed 
as offering the best possibility for solution of these 
problems. 

It is proposed that the Ruhr-Rhineland be des¬ 
ignated as a strategic area and placed under inter¬ 
national administration as a trust of the Security 
Council of the United Nations. Internationaliza¬ 
tion will be more acceptable to the people of Ger¬ 
many and the United Nations than annexation by 
an individual nation or nations. For this reason 
and because the individual rights and economic 
opportunities of the population would be assured 
protection by an international administration, re¬ 
tention of the German population of the area is 
more feasible than under annexation, and reten¬ 
tion of the population offers the best promise for 
the establishment of a sound economy within trun¬ 
cated Germany and the utilization of the resources 
of the detached area. Internationalization would 
thus further the dual purpose of reducing the Ger¬ 
man war potential while providing an adminis¬ 
tration under which the productive facilities and 
communications of the territory could be used to 
the greatest advantage in strengthening the Euro¬ 
pean economy as a whole. 

International administration would be ineffec¬ 
tive, however, if the major economic resources and 
organizations of this area remained in the control 
of the present German corporations, syndicates, 
and cartels. It is, therefore, proposed that the 
major industrial properties be taken over and ad¬ 
ministered by an international public corporation 
chartered by, and responsible to, the administra¬ 
tive authority of the United Nations. 

Other safeguards would also have to be taken. 
The detachment from Germany must be perma¬ 
nent with the United Nations Security Council 
guaranteeing the boundaries of the separated area. 


2 




All Germans who have held responsible positions 
in the Nazi system of control and those who be¬ 
came residents later than lOo-t should be removed 
from the area. All other German inhabitants 
would be given the choice of remaining in the 
territory or being moved back to Germanv. Those 
who chose to remain would be required to take an 
oath of allegiance to the administrative authority 
of the United Nations. Every form of organiza¬ 
tion in the area, such as trade unions and educa¬ 
tional. political, cultural, religious and scientific 
institutions, should at the outset be severed from 
connection with parent or associate organizations 
within rump Germany. Trade with Germany 
would be regulated to prevent German acquisition 
of materials proscribed by the over-all disarma¬ 
ment program as contributing toward the rede¬ 
velopment of the German war potential and to 
prevent German economic and political repenetra¬ 
tion. Inclusion of the area in any customs union 
or trade agreements established by the countries 
to the west would safeguard the prosperity of the 
area and facilitate its integration into the economy 
of the region. 

The FEA Committee has been primarily con¬ 
cerned with the economic significance of separation 
of territory as a measure of disarmament. The 
disarmament aspect, however, is so closely related 

RECOMMENDATIONS 


While no determination has been made regard¬ 
ing the possible separation from Germany of the 
territory considered in this report, the Committee 
is of the opinion that territorial separation would 
be a powerful means of contributing toward the 
permanent disarmament of Germany if accom¬ 
panied by the safeguards and accomplished accord¬ 
ing to the broad general policies outlined below. 

1 

The specific territory to be considered for 
separation is the Ruhr-Rhineland, the “Rhine¬ 
land" comprising the Rhenish Hesse, the 
Pfalz, and the Saar; and the “Greater Ruhr 
including that part of the Rhine Province 
east of the Rhine and most of Westphalia. 

2 

The separation of territory should not be 
relied upon as the sole means of accomplishing 
the industrial disarmament of Germany. It 


to the social and political implications of terri¬ 
torial separation that they cannot be ignored. 

The placing of such an important territory under 
international control would permit the United Na¬ 
tions to take positive action and not confine its 
functions to the negative role of reducing the Ger¬ 
man industrial economy. 

The Ruhr-Rhineland. removed from Prussian 
domination, has indigenous traditions which are 
favorable to the development of a “good Euro¬ 
pean" type of social and cultural attitudes. Wisely 
administered, this territory could serve as a center 
of influence for the reshaping of German society. 
The economic and political institutions which have 
proved dangerous to the peace should be replaced 
by others adapted to the area but based upon prin¬ 
ciples acceptable to the United Nations. A civil 
service less rigidly hierarchical and authoritarian 
than the Prussian could be built up. and local self- 
government could be encouraged. 

The international public corporation set up to 
exploit the resources of the area might play a con¬ 
structive role in the coalescence of the interests of 
the European nations. If internationalization is 
successful, it could also do much to shift the em¬ 
phasis of the European political system away from 
a competition of national units for power in the 
direction of a system of order sustained by joint 
responsibility. 


should, rather, be considered as a part of the 
total disarmament program adjusted to allow 
for the effects of the separation of territory. 

3 

Interim control of this area should follow 
the specific lines established for the interim 
program of occupation of Germany. Removal 
or destruction of industrial plant in line with 
the policy established for the reduction of in¬ 
dustrial capacity and the satisfaction of rep¬ 
arations claims should be carried out in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland as in other parts of the Reich. 
Separation should then be undertaken as a 
post-occupation measure of control. 

4 

Because of the great contribution that this 
territory can. and has. made toward the de¬ 
velopment of a German war potential, it is 


3 




recommended that it be designated a “strate¬ 
gic area," and permanently separated from 
Germany under the international trusteeship 
system as provided in the United Nations 
Charter and in accordance with the purpose 
expressed therein : “To further international 
peace and security.” 

5 

The territory should be placed under the ad¬ 
ministering authority of the United Nations, 
and all the functions relating to the area, 
including the guarantee of its boundaries, 
should be exercised by the Security Council, 
which may avail itself of the assistance of the 
Trusteeship Council, as provided by the 
Charter. 

6 

The basic document establishing the trus¬ 
teeship should provide for administration of 
the territory by an international governing 
commission of ten or eleven members ap¬ 
pointed by the Security Council and compris¬ 
ing representatives of the Great Powers, the 
adjacent interested non-German states, and 
one from the territory itself. Administration 
of the territory should follow, in general, the 
procedures and principles set forth in this 
study. 

7 

It is assumed that all Nazi war criminals 
will have been taken into custody by the occu¬ 
pying authorities. All others having held 
responsible positions in the Nazi system of 
control and Germans who have become resi¬ 
dents since 1934 should be removed from the 
area. 

8 

Other German nationals who have been resi¬ 
dents of the territory for at least five years 
prior to 1939 should be given the choice of 
remaining in the territory, being transferred 
to Germany, or being moved to other areas 
willing to receive them. Any German na¬ 
tional choosing to remain in the area should 
be required to take an oath of allegiance to the 
administering authority of the United Na¬ 
tions, thus becoming a citizen of the trust area. 

9 

Provision should be made by law for dis¬ 
position of those Germans who later do not 


demonstrate a willingness to support and ad¬ 
here to the laws of the new regime. 

10 

Every form of organization in the area, 
such as trade unions and educational, political, 
cultural, religious, and scientific institutions, 
should be severed from connection with parent 
or associate organizations within rump Ger¬ 
many. 

11 

In the interests of disarmament it would be 
advisable to destroy or remove all plants of a 
strategic character located at the German 
boundaries or forming part of complexes ex¬ 
tending into Germany. 

12 

If the reparations demands upon coal and 
other production are not satisfied at the end 
of the occupation period, a special body should 
be designated to adjust these claims with the 
Governing Commission of the territory. This 
body should also decide whether any surplus 
in favor of Germany proper from the proceeds 
of the sale of shares and stocks and physical 
properties belonging to citizens of the trust 
area, as provided in this study, is to be applied 
as reparations. 

13 

The basic document establishing the trustee¬ 
ship should provide that title to all property 
in the territory belonging to the German or 
the Prussian or Bavarian states, or to munici¬ 
palities of the territory, including subsoil de¬ 
posits, mines and their subsidiaries, transpor¬ 
tation systems and equipment, electric, gas and 
water works and lines, buildings, etc., shall 
pass to the United Nations. 

14 

Remaining strategically significant produc¬ 
tive resources and facilities privately owned 
by German nationals, residing within or out¬ 
side the territory, should be confiscated in the 
name of the United Nations. These would 
include all privately owned mines and their 
subsidiaries, transportation systems and 
equipment, all electric, gas and water works 
and equipment, all heavy industry, etc. 


4 


15 


18 


The personal property of German war crim¬ 
inals and other Nazis removed from the terri¬ 
tory for security reasons should be confiscated 
by the Governing Commission. Other Ger¬ 
mans who cannot establish prior residence or 
choose to leave the territory should be per¬ 
mitted to take with them all movable personal 
belongings and the cash realized from the sale 
of other personal and real property. 

16 

The coal mines and other major industries 
should be placed under the control of an inter¬ 
national public corporation chartered by the 
Governing Commission of the territory with 
approval of the Security Council, and subject 
to the basic laws of its charter, to specific laws 
pertaining to its regulation, and to the general 
laws of the territory. 

17 

German managers of all productive facili¬ 
ties placed under the Public Corporation 
should he removed and new non-German 
managing personnel appointed. 


CHAPTER I 

SEPARATION OF TERRITORY AS A 


Area Designated for Possible Separation 

The area considered in this study for possible 
separation from Germany is the region at the 
western border of Germany, herein designated as 
the Ruhr-Rhineland. The “Rhineland'’ is de¬ 
fined as the entire left bank of the Rhine that was 
included in the German boundaries of 1937, com¬ 
prising the Pfalz, the part of Hesse west of the 
Rhine, and the Saar. The Ruhr takes in the region 
on the right bank of the Rhine known as the 
"Greater Ruhr.” which has been defined as includ¬ 
ing the Krelse of Rhine Province lving east of the 
Rhine and all of Westphalia except the northern¬ 
most portion and two Kreise at the northeast. 1 

1 It has been suggested that consideration be given to the 
inclusion in the territory to be detached from Germany 
of an area north of the Greater Ruhr which would include 
the port of Emden, the Ems Canal from Dortmund to 
the river Ems, the river itself and a strip of land along 
the east hank. The port of Emden is important for the 
export of Ruhr coal and coke and the import of iron ore 
to the Ruhr. 


The facilities should be operated by the 
Public Corporation in the interest of the 
United Nations, particularly those adjacent 
nations which will be most affected by its 
operations, but with regard for the economic 
welfare of the territory itself and for security 
considerations. 

19 

The territory should be included in any cus¬ 
toms union established by adjacent countries 
to the west and in any regional or interna¬ 
tional trade agreements. 

20 

Trade with Germany should be carried on 
in the same manner as trade with other coun¬ 
tries, subject only to the terms of the peace 
treaty. 

21 

The general trade policy should be directed 
toward the end of assuring the fullest use of 
the resources of the area for the European 
economy as a whole. 


DISARMAMENT MEASURE 


(See map “Territory Designated for Possible 
Separation from Western Germany.’’) These de¬ 
limitations are proposed for the statistical pur¬ 
poses of this study only. No decisions have been 
reached in regard to the possible separation of 
western territory or the extent of the territory 
that might be separated. 

It would be impossible to gauge the effects upon 
Germany of the separation of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
without some consideration of the related effect of 
the separation of the eastern border areas which 
include Upper Silesia, East Prussia, and other 
parts of Germany lying east of the Oder and Neisse 
Rivers. The consequences of the separation of this 
territory are touched upon wherever pertinent in 
the study. The major emphasis of the report, how¬ 
ever. is upon the problems, the procedures, and the 
consequences attendant upon the detachment of 
the Ruhr-Rhineland. 


5 








RESTRICTED 



Flensburf 


$chi«s»ig 


/ 9 N 

'DANZIG 


MEGKLENBURGER 
BUCHT ^ 


Stroltwd' 


MELGOLANDER 




BUCHT 


yHAMBURG 


SUttift 




Pr«n*lou 


Luneburg 1 


VMm 


Tronkf urt 


HolB*f»lod» 


Bernburg 1 


Collbus 


Giogou 


JOuisdfdoO 


LEIPZIG 


Liegml* 


Mubihousan 


Boulien 


JRESLAU 


Allan burg 


Chammlf 


Opptlr 




Fronkfurt-om-Main 


BombergJ 


Wunbufg’ 


Ambarg' 


Antbocb 


Regensburg 


SMIlgon 


A 0 g*bufg o 


JNCHEN 


Tarn lory dasrgnotad for poasibia 
taparoiKsi from Western Germany 


GERMANY 

TERRITORY DESIGNATED FOR POSSIBLE 
SEPARATION FROM WESTERN GERMANY 


FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION 
T I 0 C PROJECT NO 22 


Economic Resources and Characteristics of the Area 2 

Separation from Germany of this area as an 
economic disarmament measure has been proposed 
because the region contains an unusual concentra¬ 
tion of industrial resources. 

Natural resources 

The large coal fields of the Ruhr and the 
smaller, but important, deposits of the Saar and 
Aachen make this the richest and most productive 

: See Appendix for fuller details. 


coal-mining district of Continental Europe. Bet¬ 
ter tTfan 80 percent of total German reserves of 
Steinkohle , the highest grade of coal found within 
Germany, occurs in the area, distributed as 
follows: 



6 










































Iii addition, the lower Rhine brown coal fields, 
west of Cologne contain 34 percent of known Ger¬ 
man brown coal reserves. Other natural resources 
of the area are iron ore. amounting to almost one- 
third of total German reserves, substantial de¬ 
posits of lead and zinc-bearing ores, and almost 
12 percent of the forest area of Germany. 

Indnstrial facilities 

Coal. Germany's one major natural resource, 
has been the basis of the country's industrial 
development, and important segments of German 
industry have grown up near the coal deposits of 
the Ruhr-Rhineland area. The iron and steel in¬ 
dustry and other industries—such a> machinery 
and metal-working, chemicals and synthetic oil. 
and textiles—which are dependent upon coal as a 
material or as a source of fuel and power, have 
been concentrated in the area. It is a heavy pro¬ 
ducer of electric power and also a heavy consumer, 
chiefly of thermoelectric power, the coal deposits 
of the area constituting the major sources of 
energy. 

The production in certain basic industries of 
the Ruhr-Rhineland in prewar years represented 
a substantial proportion of total German produc¬ 
tion. as indicated in the table below. 


Product 

Year 

Ruhr-Rhine¬ 
land produc¬ 
tion as per¬ 
cent of total 
German 
production « 

Steinkohle _ _ _ - - 

1938 

80 

Brown coal 

1938 

30 

Coke. - 

1938 

82 

Iron ore 

1937 

20 

Pig iron 

1938 

72 

Steel. — . - 

1938 

71 

Zinc ore 

1937 

22 

Lead ore_ _ - _ — - 

1937 

35 

Aluminum 

1943 

29 

Sulfuric acid 

1937 

43 

Coal tar_ _ - . - 

1937 

87 

Crude benzol 

1937 

86 

Ammonium sulfate 

1937 

88 


0 Approximate. See Appendix. 

The region is also of importance in electric 
power production. Separation of the Ruhr- 
Rhineland would remove from Germany about 
8,400.000 kw of the total German electric generat¬ 
ing capacity of about 19.400,000 kw in plants over 
10,000 kw. It would, of course, also greatly 
reduce the over-all German power load. 

Information on prewar German industrial facil¬ 
ities indicates that there were important concen¬ 


trations of other manufacturing facilities in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland. including— 

Machines. 

Vehicles. 

Synthetic oil. 

Coal tar products: 

Dyes. 

Pharmaceuticals. 

Other chemicals. 

Some of these industries, such as synthetic oil and 
coal tar, were located in the area because of their 
dependence upon coal as a raw material. Others 
were probably concentrated there largely because 
of the availability of fuel, power, and ample trans¬ 
port facilities. Industries of this latter type could 
operate anywhere in Germany, and information 
that has become available recently indicates that 
many such industries as these were in fact moved 
from their prewar locations as a part of the Ger¬ 
man program of dispersal for greater industrial 
efficiency and protection against attack. Only a 
thorough survey of present conditions could pro¬ 
vide reliable information on the location of Ger¬ 
man manufacturing industries. It appears likely, 
however, that the extent of such facilities in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland is still considerable. 

('ommunications 

This region has the densest transport network 
in Germany and is connected with other parts of 
the country and with neighboring states by compli¬ 
cated road. rail, and water systems. The Rhine— 
one of the greatest commercial inland waterwavs 
in Europe, with its well-integrated system of trib¬ 
utary rivers and canals—flows through the center 
of the area, flanked on both sides by major north- 
south railroads and highways, and inter-connected 
by many east-west routes. Transport facilities 
are engaged principally in bringing raw materials 
into the great industrial districts and carrying 
away their coal and manufactured products. 

Trade relations 

Germany's former export trade consisted pri¬ 
marily of coal and the products of industries heav¬ 
ily dependent upon coal. Because of the concen¬ 
tration of coal and manufacturing facilities in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland. this area contributed over a third 
of the annual export total upon which Germany 
was dependent for the importation of food and raw 
materials. 

There was also considerable trade between thh 
area and other sections of Germany. Coal from 
1 


070737 40 


1 


7 
























the Ruhr was an important part of the traffic going 
into Germany, and iron ore from the Salzgitter 
area a significant part of that going to the Ruhr- 
Rhineland area. The Ruhr, in particular, was 
closely connected in trade with the rest of Germany 
east of the Rhine. 

Agriculture 

In 1937 approximately 3,559,823 hectares, or 
about 59 percent of the total area in the Ruhr- 
Rhineland, 3 were devoted to agriculture. Agricul¬ 
tural activities include viticulture, dairying, and 
the growing of crops of all kinds, notably grains, 
potatoes, sugar beets, fruits, and vegetables. In 
general, high technical standards of farming pre¬ 
vail in the region, and the agricultural produc¬ 
tivity is high, the crop yields surpassing the av¬ 
erage for the Reich. 

As a whole, however, the Ruhr-Rhineland con¬ 
stitutes a food deficiency area, because production 
is not great enough to provide for the unusual con¬ 
centration of population in the industrial centers. 
It is estimated that before the war the region was 
not more than 50 percent self-sufficient in food. 

Population 

The concentration of industry in the area has 
resulted in an accompanying concentration of pop¬ 
ulation, centering in such large industrial cities as 
Diisseldorf, Essen, Duisburg, Cologne, Aachen, 
and the industrial centers of the Saar. This re¬ 
gion, representing about 11 percent of the area of 
the total Reich of 1937 boundaries, in 1939 had a 
population of about 14,789,000, approximately 20 
percent of the total German population. The area 
has been greatly overpopulated, having in 1937 a 
density of population of better than 731 per square 
mile as compared with a density in the total Reich 
of about 381. 

The population of the region is German-speak¬ 
ing and of German nationality. A majority of the 
population of the area as a whole is Catholic in 
religion, though there are Kreise and cities in 
which Protestants predominate. Politically, the 
Catholic Party (Zentrum) was the strongest party 
in the seven voting districts of the region during 
the period 1924 to 1933, as evidenced by the voting 
in Reichstag elections for that period. However, 
the largest vote ever received by a single party 
in one election was that obtained by the Nazis 
(NSDAP) in March 1933. The Nazis became 
strongest in the Palatinate where they obtained 

3 Figures are for Rheinprovinz, Westfalen, Hessen. 
Pfalz, and Saarland, a somewhat larger area than the 
Ruhr-Rhineland as herein defined. 


46.5 percent of all votes in March 1933. In all 
other districts of the region they obtained at that 
time only between 30 and 40 percent as against 
their national average of 45.9 percent for this elec¬ 
tion. The Socialist and Communist parties were 
strongest among the Ruhr workers. 

Significance of the Area to a German War Potential 

The importance of this area to a German war po¬ 
tential is evident. The rich reserves of coal have 
been used to develop such industries as iron and 
steel, chemicals, machinery, and textiles. These 
industries have made a direct military contribution 
by providing the actual implements of war or the 
material for their manufacture. They have been 
of equal importance in supplying the substitutes 
for, or, through exportable surpluses, the means 
of acquiring, such materials as the metal alloys, 
natural fibers, and foodstuffs either lacking in Ger¬ 
many or produced in insufficient quantities to 
maintain a large-scale military establishment. 
Thus, they have served both to lessen German eco¬ 
nomic dependence upon other countries and to in¬ 
crease the dependence of other countries upon Ger¬ 
many for vital supplies. Although the war indus¬ 
tries and the supporting industries are distributed 
throughout Germany, the Ruhr-Rhineland con¬ 
tains a reater concentration of resources and basic 
industries than any other one section. Separa¬ 
tion of this territory from Germany would in itself 
substantially reduce the German war potential. 

Territorial Separation as a Disarmament Measure 

It is the viewpoint of this study, that while sepa¬ 
ration of this territory would have tremendous im¬ 
pact upon the war potential of Germany, it could 
not be relied upon as the sole means of disarma¬ 
ment. 

The remaining area would have left extensive 
resources in brown coal, iron ore. and the major 
German reserves of lead, zinc, and potash—re¬ 
sources which, by determined effort and the de¬ 
velopment of new techniques, might be exploited 
far beyond the levels which appear possible at 
present. There would also remain, if no controls 
other than separation of territory were applied, 
many strategic industries with capacities devel¬ 
oped far in excess of peacetime requirements, as 
well as the technical personnel, the institutions, 
and the business connections by which Germany in 
the past contrived the establishment of a powerful 
military machine. Though the truncated area 
might lack the economic means to support a major 


8 



war, its resources might permit military aggres¬ 
sion on a scale sufficient ti» recover the detached area 
anti other bordering territory. 

If the industrial capacity of the detached area 
were permitted to remain at the over-expanded 
levels developed in preparation for war, the area 
would oiler a tempting target for German repene- 
political, economic, and military means. 
And the incentive for such aggression would he 
ever-present, at least in the early days of separa¬ 
tion, for detachment <>f this territory would most 
certainly meet with strong resistance from the 
German people. 

The efficacy <>f territorial separation a> a dis¬ 
armament measure depend-, therefore, upon its 
inclusion in an over-all industrial disarmament 
Pi •ogram designed to reduce, in it- many facets 
both in truncated Germany and in the detached 
area, the broad economic base which has made pos- 
-ible the development of a high war potential. 
Separation <>f this territory i- proposed, not as an 
alternate or substitute for deindustrialization of 
Germany, but as a measure to follow after the re¬ 
moval or destruction of excess industrial produc¬ 
tive capacity, in line with the policies laid down for 
all of occupied Germany. It would thus become 
an instrument for the post-occupation control 
disarmed Germany. 

As a part of a total program, the separation of 
territory would carry distinct advantages. 

1 

Because of the greater security afforded by 
the detachment of this area from Germany, 
the period of occupation could be shortened. 

2 

Once the period of occupation has ended, 
the maintenance of controls upon the internal 
industrial life of Germany will depend pri¬ 
marily upon Germany's willingness to respect 
the final peace treaty agreements. If thi- ter¬ 
ritory is separated, the controls imposed in the 
final agreements can be fewer and simpler and. 
consequently, more likely to elicit continued 
compliance. 

3 

In the event that Germany’s ag gr essive am¬ 
bitions persisted—and it would be unwise to 
reckon without that possibility—the consid¬ 
erably lessened resources at her disposal would 
limit the war potential she could develop. 


4 

Effectively disarmed and detached from 
Germany, the area itself could contribute im¬ 
portantly to the European economy. So long 
as the resources remained under German con¬ 
trol. they would serve the interests of Germany 
alone, and restriction of production, if it could 
be enforced, would be desirable to prevent 
their exploitation for war purposes. Detach¬ 
ment of the area would permit their utiliza¬ 
tion for the benefit of Europe as a whole and 
to any extent commensurate with the con¬ 
tinued safeguarding of world security. 

It should be emphasized, however, that the sep¬ 
aration of territory will be accompanied by diffi¬ 
culties which must be faced in determining the 
treatment of the area after separation. 

1 

Detachment of this particular territory, rich 
in historical associations as well as resources, 
is certain to incur the resentment of the Ger¬ 
man people and may intensify their resistance 
to the disarmament program as a whole. 

2 

The disposition of the population raises 
critical problems, any po.-sible solution of 
which is sure to draw prote-ts. Separation 
would create a German irredentum. and. be¬ 
cause of the strength of German nationalistic 
feeling, retention of all or most of the popula¬ 
tion might result in continual irredentist agi¬ 
tation within Germany and in the area itself 
and the development in other nations of senti¬ 
ments which would lead to constant pressure 
for return of the territory to Germany. Yet 
if the entire population is removed to trun¬ 
cated Germany, the establishment of a stable 
German economy and the repopulation of the 
detached area with sufficient labor force to 
permit utilization of its valuable resources 
create problems at lea^t equally, if not more, 
serious. 

3 

The economic interests of the adjacent non- 
German countries may courtict with those of 
the detached area. Failure to resolve these 
conflicts could lead to impoverisliment of the 
area and to disagreements among the United 
Nations. 


9 


Separation of territory will be undesirable if 
it results in the creation of a persistent social and 
economic trouble spot in the center of Europe and 
interferes with the establishment of a sound Euro¬ 
pean economy. 

It is the position of this study, however, that 
while separation presents manifold problems, it 
would be a powerful means of contributing toward 
the permanent disarmament of Germany, and it 
could be accomplished in such a way as to (a) 


CHAPTER II 

PROGRAM FOR TREATMENT OF D 


allay the initial resentment of the Germans and 
reduce the possibility of irredentist agitation; (b) 
provide adequate safeguards against German re- 
penetration; and ( c) permit utilization of the re¬ 
sources to strengthen the European economy as a 
whole. 

The program for the treatment of the detached 
area as outlined in the following sections is pro¬ 
posed as being the most likely to achieve these ends. 


ETACHED AREA 


Interim Control 

During the period of occupation this territory 
must be treated as an integral part of Germany. 
Removal or destruction of industrial plant in line 
with the policies established for the reduction of 
industrial capacity and the satisfaction of 
reparations claims should be carried out in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland as in other parts of the Reich. 
Separation should then be entered upon as a post- 
occupation measure of control. 

Permanent Detachment 

In the interests of long-term disarmament, the 
peace treaty, or whatever is to be the basic docu¬ 
ment establishing the Ruhr-Rhineland as a sepa¬ 
rate territory, should provide for its permanent 
detachment from Germany. It would be unwise 
to enter upon separation as a temporary measure 
because such a step would focus German attention 
upon regaining the territory and give impetus to 
campaigns to speed its return. The custodian¬ 
ship of the Saar by the League of Nations from 
1920 to 1935 with provision for a plebiscite on re¬ 
turn to Germany, transfer to France, or main¬ 
tenance under the League regime presents ample 
evidence of the political effects of temporary de¬ 
tachment. Throughout the fifteen years of separa¬ 
tion, Germany was unceasing in her efforts and 
unstinting in expenditures to propagandize the 
Saarlanders and the outside world in favor of 
return of the Saar to Germany. Separation 
designated at the outset as temporary could lead 
only to revisionists tactics and pressures. 


Transfer of Separated Area to an International Body 

Three alternatives are possible for the disposi¬ 
tion of the Ruhr-Rhineland after separation from 
Germany. 

1 


Placement of the area in trust to the United 
Nations; 


2 


Annexation by a neighboring nation or 
nations; 

3 

Placement of the area in trust to a neighbor¬ 
ing nation or nations. 

Any of these alternatives would have the same 
broad general effect of removing from German 
control the resources of the area which have con¬ 
tributed importantly to the development and 
maintenance of the German war potential. They 
are not, however, considered of equal merit as thev 
relate to the problems of administering the de¬ 
tached area. 


Advantages of trusteeship by United Nations 
The United Nations Charter provides for the 
establishment of “an international trusteeship for 
the administration and supervision of such terri¬ 
tories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent 
individual agreements.” It stipulates that the ad¬ 
ministering authority may be “one or more states 
or the United Nations itself,” and provides further 
that certain territories may be designated as 
“strategic areas,” and that all functions relating 
to them shall be exercised by the Security Council 
of the Lhiited Nations. 


10 





Because of the unusual concentration in the 
Ruhr-Khineland of resources and productive fa¬ 
cilities that have contributed largely to the de¬ 
velopment and maintenance of a German war 
potential, it is recommended that this territory 
he designated a strategic area and placed in trust 
to the L nited Nations itself, the functions relat¬ 
ing to the defense and government of the area 
to be performed by the Security Council of the 
United Nations. Internationalization of the area 
with administration along the lines set forth in 
later sections of this report is thought to offer the 
best means of achieving the full advantages of 
separation as a disarmament measure. 

1 

It will be more acceptable to Germany and 
to the peoples of the United Nations than 
annexation. 

2 

It will not be a violation of the principles 
expressed in the Atlantic Charter. 

3 

Defense of the area will be placed where it 
rightfully belongs—since safeguarding of the 
peace is a matter of worldwide concern—upon 
the United Nations. The area can be con¬ 
trolled in the interests of total security rather 
than for the benefit of any area or group of 
nations. 

4 

The production of the area can be more 
readily made available to all of Europe, thus 
serving the double objective of strengthening 
the general European economy while weaken¬ 
ing Germany's capacity to wage war. 

5 

German economic and political repenetra¬ 
tion of the area through the connivance of 
special interests is les> likely under interna¬ 
tionalization than under annexation. 

6 

Retention of the German population is re¬ 
garded as more feasible under international¬ 
ization because ( a) internationalization would 
be less humiliating to Germans than either 
annexation or trusteeship to another nation: 
(6 ) international control would offer greater 


protection of the rights of the German popu¬ 
lation: (c) the economic opportunities in the 
area could be expected to be considerably bet¬ 
ter than in Germany. 

7 

Successful internationalization offers the 
greatest hope of developing democratic insti¬ 
tutions and attitudes in the people of the area, 
a development that may act as a lever upon 
the rest of Germany. 

8 

It could be expected to exert an influence in 
diverting the political structure of Europe 
away from a system of national states com¬ 
peting for power. 

Disadi 'ar<tage's of annexation 

Annexation of the territory bv a neighboring na- 
tion or nations is opposed for a number of reasons. 
The democratic nations, including France. Bel¬ 
gium. and the Netherlands—the logical annexing 
nations—have eschewed "territorial aggrandize¬ 
ment" as a war aim. A reversal of this policy 
would be difficult to justify to the people of the 
democracies, and more particularly to the Ger¬ 
mans. even though it were presented as necessary 
to the disarmament of Germany. It is. further- 
more, doubtful that the adjacent western nations 
desire to attach German territory. 

One of the major objections to the annexation 
of the separated area is connected with the prob¬ 
lem of the population. It is generally agreed that 
attachment of the territory by a neighboring na¬ 
tion or nations would not be tenable without re¬ 
moval of most, or all. of the German population. 
Even though the surplus drawn into the area for 
wartime production were automatically dimin¬ 
ished by industrial capacity reductions during the 
period of occupation, the population would still 
amount to many millions. Assimilation by 
France. Belgium, and the Netherlands of a popu¬ 
lation of this >ize is seen as impossible, and it is 
believed that its retention under the governments 
of those nations would lead inevitably to intense 
irredentist campaigns. 

Removal of most or all of the population, on 
the other hand, raises economic problems of a 
crucial nature. Recolonization would be required 
to keep the productive resources of the area in 
operation. It is doubtful that adequate repopula¬ 
tion could be accomplished from the peoples of the 
adjacent non-German nations. While sufficient 


11 


numbers might be drawn from the over-populated 
areas of Southern and Eastern Europe, their inte¬ 
gration into the society of the annexing nations 
would be as problematical as the absorption of a 
similar number of Germans. 

More serious would be the effect upon the econ¬ 
omy of truncated Germany if the millions of Ger- 
mans from the west, along with those from Po¬ 
land, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary—to whose 
transfer the United Nations are already com¬ 
mitted—were returned to the truncated area. 
After these evacuations Germany proper, with a 
territory reduced by an estimated 25 to 30 per¬ 
cent, would contain the entire population of its 
former area, some 65 or 66 million persons. The 
condition of Germany under these circumstances 
would certainly not be favorable to the establish¬ 
ment of a stable economy or to the “re-education” 
of the German people. It is, in fact, the opinion 
of authorities on various phases of. German eco¬ 
nomic life that such an increase in population, oc¬ 
curring simultaneously with the problems of ad¬ 
justing to extensive war damages and the restric¬ 
tions imposed for the purposes of disarmament 
and reparations, would sentence a large propor¬ 
tion to starvation. With the territory and re¬ 
sources remaining, it is considered doubtful that 
even over a long period of years Germany would 
be able to develop domestic agriculture and ex¬ 
portable industrial surpluses sufficient to maintain 
such a population at a minimum subsistence level. 

Trusteeship by individual nation or nations 

It is believed that to place the Ruhr-Rhineland 
in trust to another nation or nations would be 
in many respects equivalent to straight annexa¬ 
tion. Inasmuch as this region has not existed be¬ 
fore as a separate state, it would be necessary to 
establish it as such with laws and regulations de¬ 
signed to serve the purposes of that state, or to 
provide for its government according to the laws 
of the nation or nations accepting it in trust. In 
the latter situation, the trust would amount to 
annexation. 

The Germans would probably consider trustee¬ 
ship to another nation as even more humilitating 
than annexation, and, as with annexation, there 
would seem to be little hope of tranquility unless 
the present population were removed and the 
region recolonized. 

Administration by the United Nations Authority 

There has already been an example of inter¬ 
national administration in the Saar Territory 


from 1920 to 1935 under the League of Nations. 
As this international administration was most 
successful, it provides a pattern adaptable to the 
needs of the area under discussion even though 
this is much larger in extent and would have a 
population probably fifteen times more numerous 
than that of the Saar. Against the disadvantage 
of greater size may be balanced the absence of any 
suggestion of a plebiscite for return of the terri¬ 
tory to Germany. The most troublesome factor 
in creating problems for the Saar Governing Com¬ 
mission was the certainty that at the end of fifteen 
years the inhabitants would be called on to choose 
between France. Germany and the maintenance of 
the League regime. As the press and the political 
leaders in the Saar, heavily subsidized by Berlin, 
were determined to secure a 99.9 percent vote for 
Germany and their only fear was the possibility 
of a considerable vote for the League regime, the 
attacks on the Governing Commission in the Saar 
and in the Reich were unfair, bitter and constant. 
In the territory here under discussion there would 
certainly he criticism of the international regime, 
but as the incentive of a plebiscite would be absent, 
and for some time to come there could be little 
from Germany in the way of subsidies for propa¬ 
ganda, the odds in favor of the international 
administration would be considerably greater than 
they were in the Saar. 

International Governing Commission 

The basic document should provide that sover¬ 
eignty over the territory should pass to the United 
Nations authority and that the nationality of the 
inhabitants should be that of citizens of this 
internationalized state. 

The treaty should further provide that the 
United Nations Security Council, with the assist¬ 
ance of the Trusteeship Council, should be respon¬ 
sible for the government of this strategic area 
and that the Council should entrust the adminis¬ 
tration to an international governing commission 
of ten or eleven members whom it will appoint 
for one year, and may reappoint, or may remove. 
The members of the Governing Commission will 
be entitled to a salary which will be fixed by the 
United Nations Council and charged on the local 
revenues. To lessen the chance for criticism 
from the inhabitants, and from the liberals of all 
countries, the responsibility of the Commission to 
the Council should be given greater emphasis in 
the basic document than was that of the Saar 
Governing Commission to the League Council in 

the Treaty of Versailles. 

«/ 


12 


The Security Council, through a special com¬ 
mittee. aided by a section of experts in the Secre¬ 
tariat and by the advice and assistance of the 
Trusteeship Council and of the Social and Eco¬ 
nomic Council, should keep a careful and continu¬ 
ous supervision over the policies and acts of the 
Governing Commission and over the administra¬ 
tion of the various public services. All decisions 
of the Security Council concerning the trusteeship 
area should be by majority vote. 

On netting up the Governing Commission the 
Council should i>-ue to it a set of directives which, 
in order to lessen the chances of later disagree¬ 
ment in the Commission, should be elaborated in 
all possible detail. The Commission should be 
required to make regular quarterly reports to the 
Council, and special reports on any matters of 
unusual interest. While the Security Council, like 
the old League Council, should not intervene 
except in cases of major importance, it should be 
in closest touch, and obviously so. with the Com¬ 
mission. Otherwise, the inhabitants will feel 
abandoned and will be swept by fear of annexation 
or oppression. 

It would be most desirable, if it were politically 
possible, that all the members of the International 
Governing Commission should be chosen from 
states not immediately concerned in the territory. 
As. however, it is certain that at least some of the 
Great Powers, and all of the neighboring >tates 
will insist on representation on the Commission, 
the basic document should provide that six (or 
seven) of the Commissioners should be chosen 
from among the citizens of France. Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union, the United States. Belgium, and 
the Netherlands (and Luxembourg?) and one 
from among the native inhabitants of the terri- 
tory itself, not a citizen of any neighboring coun¬ 
try. All must be able to speak German, in addi¬ 
tion to French and or English. The Chairman of 
the Commission should be designated by the Coun¬ 
cil from among the members of the Commission. 
To prevent charges of veiled annexation he should 
not be from any of the neighboring countries. 
It i- noteworthy that in the Saar so long as the 
French member of the Commission was Chair¬ 
man there wa> constant resistance to the Commis¬ 
sion. and that when he was replaced by a British 
subject the situation greatly improved. This was 
partially because of the prospective plebiscite, but 
in this case it would probably be true also, for the 
fear of annexation would die slowly. 


It would make the new regime more palatable 
to the inhabitants if the native member were ap¬ 
pointed on nomination of the representative assem¬ 
bly of the territory. (See "Organization of Ad¬ 
ministration.'*) The Saar leaders repeatedly and 
fruitlessly insisted that the Saar member of the 
Governing Commission should be elected by the 
people or by the Landesrat (the representative 
advisory council). This was never granted but 
in 1924 the League Council appointed as the Saar 
member the leader of the Centre Party who had 
been elected by the Landesrat as its president 
when it had been set up by the Commission in 
1922. He proved to be an admirable choice and 
remained on the Commission until its dissolution 
in 1935. 

Powers and duties 

The basic document should provide that within 
the territory the Governing Commission shall have 
all the powers of government hitherto belonging 
to the German Empire. Prussia or Bavaria, in¬ 
cluding the appointment and dismissal of all offi¬ 
cials—bringing in qualified men and women from 
outside the territory, if it should so desire—and 
the creation of such administrative and representa¬ 
tive bodies as it may deem necessary. Germany 
should be required to place at the disposal of the 
Governing Commission all official documents and 
archives under the control of Germany, of any 
German State, or of any local authority, which 
relate to the Territory or to the rights of the in¬ 
habitants thereof. 

The Governing Commission should in the first 
instance decide all questions arising from the in¬ 
terpretation of the provisions of the basic docu¬ 
ment but must report any important question in 
full to the Security Council and abide by its deci¬ 
sion. All decisions of the Governing Commission 
shall be arrived at by majority vote. 

The Governing Commission should be directed 
to establish its seat at Cologne (or whatever city 
the United Nations might choose for the capital 
of the territory), to organize as a cabinet, and to 
divide among its members all of the public service', 
each Commissioner placing over the services under 
him directors and assistant directors who should 
be qualified men and women carefully selected from 
among his own countrymen or other non-Germans. 
In every case the official should be able to speak 
German. 

The Chairman should take over the ministries 
of Foreign Affairs. Interior and Public Order. 


13 


The other Commissioners might divide the remain¬ 
ing public services as follows: 

Economic Affairs; the Public Corporation. 

Finances. 

Justice; Education. 

Public Information. 

Labor. 

Religious Matters. 

Transport and Communications. 

Public Works; Reconstruction; Welfare. 

Food and Agriculture; Price Control and Ra¬ 
tioning. 

Laws and regulations 

Laws and regulations in force in the area on 
January 1,1933 (i. e. before the coming into power 
of Hitler), should be observed until changed by 
the Governing Commission with the advice of an 
advisory council elected by the inhabitants in such 
a manner as the Commission may determine and 
the United Nations authority may approve. As the 
international regime is being set up in place of 
the former German regimes with the specific pur¬ 
pose of protecting organized society from war, the 
Governing Commission should change any provi¬ 
sions in the laws and regulations which are incom¬ 
patible with this end, or which do not serve the 
true interests of the inhabitants. After the pro¬ 
mulgation of the new body of laws the Governing 
Commission should thereafter make further 
changes or introduce new laws only after consul¬ 
tation with the Advisory Council. 

Immigration should be under the control of the 
Governing Commission. 

Provision would have to be made for the estab¬ 
lishment of a banking system and currency for 
the area and, in the initial period, for financial as¬ 
sistance. 

In fixing the conditions and hours of labor for 
men, women and children, the International Gov¬ 
erning Commission should take into consideration 
the wishes expressed by the local labor organiza¬ 
tions, as well as the principles adopted by the In¬ 
ternational Labor Office. 

Bill of Rights 

The basic document should contain a Bill of 
Rights of the inhabitants, reciting that under the 
control of the Governing Commission the inhabi¬ 
tants shall retain their religious liberties, their 
language, their schools and local assemblies, and 
shall enjoy the right of habeas corpus, that there 
shall be no discrimination as to race, religion or 


sex, and that the Governing Commission shall have 
the duty to do all in its power to promote the eco¬ 
nomic and social welfare of the territory and its 
inhabitants, as well as to integrate the territory 
in the new international system to prevent war and 
to secure international cooperation in economic, 
social and cultural fields for the welfare of all. 

Courts 

The civil and criminal courts existing in the 
territory should be denazified and retained. To 
hear appeals from the decisions of the said Courts 
and to decide matters for which these courts are 
not competent, a civil and criminal court or courts 
should be established in the territory by the Gov¬ 
erning Commission, the judges being appointed 
from among jurists of the United Nations. Justice 
should be rendered in the name of the United Na¬ 
tions. (In the Saar it was in the name of the 
Governing Commission.) 

Organization of administration 

All the officials, state as well as local, must be 
able to speak German and, preferably, French and 
English, and in principle, it would be desirable that 
all of them should be citizens of the territory. 
Nevertheless, it would seem advisable at the out¬ 
set, and perhaps permanently, for the Governing 
Commission to replace the Oberprdsidenten , the 
Regie rungsprdsidenten. and possibly the Land rate 
by qualified persons from the United Nations and 
to do the same for key positions in the educational 
system, and in that of the police, even down to the 
towns of 20,000 inhabitants. The Commission 
should reestablish the system of local administra¬ 
tion as it existed under the Weimar Republic and, 
in so far as they are loyal, should retain the local 
officials. The local committees, councils and as¬ 
semblies should be reestablished with the author¬ 
ity they possessed before the introduction of the 
Fuhrerprinzip under Hitler. All the officials, state 
and local, and all the members of these local bodies 
should be required to take an oath of loyalty to 
the United Nations and to the Governing Commis¬ 
sion. Reformation of Civil Service to eliminate 
rigid Prussian hierarchical practices should be 
undertaken as soon as possible. 

The Commission should establish a representa¬ 
tive assembly for the whole territory to be con¬ 
sulted on all proposed changes in the legislation 
which will have been promulgated by the Commis¬ 
sion on its taking over power or on any new laws 
or regulations proposed. The suffrage should be 


14 



given to every citizen of the territory over the age 
of '20 years without distinction of sex. This should 
be the rule also for elections to the local bodies. 

This representative assembly should be purely 
advisory and have no power of initiative or veto. 
The inhabitants will bitterly resent this lack of 
legislative power in spite of the fact that the Ger¬ 
man." have had no representative government 
whatever during the Hitler regime. Nevertheless, 
the weakness is inevitable. To give full legislative 
power> to the inhabitants who. both spontaneously 
and because of propaganda, will for years resent 
the very existence of the regime and the sepa¬ 
ration from Germany, would be to reduce dan¬ 
gerously the authority of the Governing Com- 
mission. 

Obviously there must be a check on the Com- 
mission but this should come from the constant 
supervision by the United Nations Security Coun¬ 
cil. through the Trusteeship Council. Before be¬ 
ing handed to the Council the reports of the Com- 
mission should be scrutinized with meticulous care 
by the Trusteeship Council secretariat set up for 
the purpose. The chief of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
Section and all the members of this section of the 
secretariat should have had thorough training and 
experience in law. finance, economics, and prob¬ 
lems of heavy and light industry. 

Further safeguards 

To promote loyalty to the international regime 
and to save it as far as possible from constant or¬ 
ganized propaganda from the Reich, every form 
of organization in the territory, even the cultural 
ones such as the Gesangrereine. should be both le¬ 
gally and actually severed from those in the Reich. 
The labor unions should be autonomous, and their 
funds should be deposited in local banks, under 
the inspection of the Governing Commission. The 
Chambers of Commerce and their funds should 
similarly be placed under inspection and regula¬ 
tion by the Governing Commission, as also the 
banks themselves. The newspapers should be care¬ 
fully reorganized and the editorial boards sub¬ 
jected to constant regulation by the Ministry of 
Public Information which should see to it that 
the activities of the Governing Commission and 
of the international authority are continually pre¬ 
sented in a true light and that any misstatements 
of fact regarding the regime are promptly cor¬ 
rected. on the front page of the offending journals. 
Not only should the schools and universities be cut 
off completely from the system of education in the 


Reich, but. to prevent inculcation of disloyalty, 
any visiting lecturers coming to speak to any audi¬ 
ence whatever should be subjected to careful inves¬ 
tigation before being allowed entry into the 
Territory. 1 

Finally, the Vatican should be requested so to 
rearrange the episcopal diocese that no Catholic- 
in the territory would be under any bishop whose 
seat is outside. 

No funds should be raised for charity except by 
permission of the Governing Commission and un¬ 
der its regulation. 

Right of Option 

The application of the principle of self-deter¬ 
mination in the area placed in trusteeship to the 
United Nations will be possible, for reasons of 
security, in a limited sense only. A plebiscite on 
the question of separating this area from Germany 
is not to be considered. Since separation is pro¬ 
posed as a disarmament measure and since the 
disarmament of a nation must be accomplished, 
obviously, without regard for the wishes of that 
nation, it would be unrealistic to offer such a choice 
to a German population. 

On the other hand, it has become a truism that 
the forced placement of large populations under a 
government with which they are not in sympathy 
is disruptive of the peace of the world. Respect of 
the wishes of the population of the designated area 
is, therefore, also a security consideration. 

The way through the horns of this apparent 
dilemma lies in the generous application of the 
right of option. The citizens of the detached 
area cannot be consulted in relation to the neces¬ 
sity of separating this territory from Germany. 
They can. however, be permitted to choose whether 
or not they shall remain as citizens of the trust 
area, and those who choose to leave can he given 
the right to take with them all of their movable 
property and to receive the value of their immova¬ 
ble property after liquidation. 

It is assumed that all war criminals will be taken 
into custody during the interim period. After 
transfer of the territory, it is recommended that 
all participants in the Nazi system of control be 
removed from the area and that all other indi¬ 
viduals over 20 years of age who can establish that 
they were residents of the area for a period of five 

1 The organization before which he speaks should be 
penalized if the speaker has. directly or indirectly, spoken 
against the new regime. Within the territory this freedom 
should be allowed only to citizens. 


070731 — 10 — 


15 




years prior to 1939 be permitted the right of op¬ 
tion. Displaced Germans who can establish their 
reliability and prior residence in the area should 
also be extended this right. Residents of the area 
who cannot establish residence prior to 1934 should 
be removed. 

A choice of this kind made on an individual ba¬ 
sis should require no more elaborate or extensive 
organization than that required for a rationing 
system, a census, or the registration of citizens in 
the Saar for the plebiscite of 1935. No vote would 
be needed. An individual would appear before the 
properly designated authorities and register for 
himself and for minor dependents as wishing to 
remain in the territory or being transferred to 
Germany. The oath of allegiance to the Governing 
Commission could be administered at a later 
period, thus allowing time for any investigation 
of the registrant that seems necessary. 

Rather more extensive effort should be expended, 
however, in preparing the population to make this 
choice. The registration should be preceded by a 
period of education in which such information as 
the following should be placed before the public 
with clarity and objectivity: 

1 

The permanence of the separation of the 
areas. 

2 

The reason for the separation; i. e., disarm¬ 
ament, not punishment. 

3 

The nature of the trusteeship and the ad¬ 
ministering authority. 

4 

The basic objectives of the trusteeship sys¬ 
tem. 

5 

The character of the laws by which the 
trustee areas will be governed. 

6 

The rights and privileges of citizens under 
these laws. 

7 

The necessity for ensuring the allegiance 
of the population to the administering au¬ 
thority. 


8 

The disposition to be made of the real and 
personal property of those wishing to return 
to Germany. 

9 

The procedure for removal of that part of 
the population wishing to be transferred to 
Germany. 

10 

The economic program contemplated for the 
trustee area. 

11 

A fair statement of conditions existing in 
Germany. 

No propagandizing from within rump Germany 
should be permitted at any time preceding or dur¬ 
ing the period of registration. This applies to 
radio broadcasting as well as other forms of 
propaganda. 

The basic law of the territory should provide 
for the disposition of those citizens who do not sup¬ 
port and adhere to the laws of the new regime. 
It should also establish regulations for admission 
to citizenship of desirable immigrants in the 
future. 

Transfer of that part of the population unable 
to establish prior citizenship or expressing a 
desire for removal should be administered by au¬ 
thorities responsible to the Security Council and 
according to directives that might be prepared by 
the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations with regard for human rights and the 
experience gained in other population transfers. 

Property Management 

Industrial disarmament of the area. 

The industrial disarmament of this area will 
have been accomplished before it is separated from 
Germany. At the time of separation it might be 
well to consider, if it has not already been done, 
the removal of major plants located at the German 
boundaries or forming part of complexes extend¬ 
ing into truncated Germany. 

Reparations. 

Plants and equipment removed in line with the 
policies established for total German disarmament 
will have been considered a part of German repa¬ 
rations to the recipient countries and credited to 
Germany on her reparations accounts with those 
countries. 


16 




Extensive reparations claims will undoubtedly 
have been made upon the area for coal and per¬ 
haps for other production. If the reparations 
claims upon production are not satisfied at the time 
of separation of this territory, a special body 
should be designated to adjust these claims with 
the newly constituted governing authority. This 
body might also decide whether any surplus in 
fav<>r i>f (Germany pn>]>er fn»m the j >r<>ceeds <»f the 
sale of shares and stocks and physical properties 
belonging t<> citizens <>f the trust area, as described 
in later sections, shall be applied as reparations. 

After completion of the transfer to the United 
Nations, the major extractive and manufacturing 
industries should be operated in accordance with 
the principles set forth in following sections. 

Confiscation of property 

Tht- basic document establishing the interna¬ 
tionalized territory should provide that title to 
all property possessed by the German, Prussian, 
and Bavarian states in the territory shall pass to 
the United Nations. The major German privately 
owned industrial resources and productive facili¬ 
ties that remain after destruction or removal of 
plants for disarmament purposes should be con¬ 
fiscated in the name of the United Nations. Such 
resources and facilities would be, for example, 
mines and their subsidiaries and equipment, trans¬ 
portation systems and equipment, electric, gas and 
water work' and lines, heavy industries, and other? 
that may seem advisable. 

Public Corporation 

The Governing Commission should establish a 
Public Corporation similar to that of the TYA for 
the purpose of taking title to and administering 
such properties as the Governing Commission, 
with the approval of the Security Council, may 
determine. The instrument of incorporation 
should not attempt to define rigidly the categories 
of property to be held by the Public Corporation 
but should, rather, leave it to the discretion of 
the Security Council, which would lie advised by 
the Governing Commission. 

This corporation, which for the sake of brevity 
will be called herein "the Public Corporation." 
would be chartered by the Governing Commission. 
It would be supervised by the Governing Commis¬ 
sion which, in turn, would be subject to the policy 
decisions of the Security Council. The device of 
a public corporation would seem to be best - 
for achieving the purposes for which the above- 
named resources and production facilities are to 


lie taken over by the United Nations. It would 
be operated in the interest of the United Nations, 
particularly those adjacent nations which will be 
most affected by its operations, but with regard 
for the economic welfare of the territory itself and 
for security considerations. While the Public 
Corporation should not be operated primarily for 
profit, it should, however, have “much of the es¬ 
sential freedom and elasticity of a private busi¬ 
ness corporation" in the conduct of its business 
operations and for security reasons should be under 
supervision of the government of the territory. 

The basic law of the Public Corporation would 
be its charter, drafted by the Governing Commis¬ 
sion and approved by the Security Council. In 
addition, it would be governed bv such laws and 
regulations as would be specifically issued by the 
Governing Commission and, in the absence of spe¬ 
cial regulations, bv the ordinarv law of-the terri- 
tory. i. e.. by the general law concerning contracts, 
property, bills of exchange, etc. 

The Corporation could be granted the following 
powers: 

1 

To acquire, hold and convey real and per¬ 
sonal property of any kind whatsoever, sub¬ 
ject to necessary restrictions concerning the 
disposal of natural resources and production 
facilities; 

2 

To enter into contracts and to undertake ob¬ 
ligations; 

3 

To sue and be sued in its corporate name; 

4 

In general to perform any legal act appro¬ 
priate to its objects and purposes; 

5 

To make and repeal its by-laws; 

6 

To exercise the right of eminent domain in 
the name of the United Nations for the pur¬ 
pose? which the Corporation is to serve. 

In order for the Public Corporation to function 
effectively, including the rebuilding of such facili¬ 
ties as remain, it might be authorized to take over 
the liquid assets of businesses now located in the 
territory, part or all of whose production facilities 


17 


are removed for reparations, or of businesses which 
do not fall into the category to be taken over by 
the Corporation but which were owned by war 
criminals or leading Nazis. The Corporation 
might also be authorized to float a bond issue, using 
the facilities as collateral. This would serve as a 
revolving fund. 

The Public Corporation should have a self-con¬ 
tained financial balance-sheet. Appropriate pro¬ 
visions should be made for periodical financial 
reports to the Governing Commission and for an 
accounting and auditing system best adapted to 
the nature and purpose of the Corporation. 

The question of how to handle any profits which 
the Corporation would realize might be solved in 
various ways. 

1 

The Corporation might be authorized to 
hold and use any excess of revenues over ex¬ 
penses for investment in new operations. 

2 

The excess might be used for reparation 
payments. 

3 

The excess might be designated as a con¬ 
tribution toward defraying the cost of admin¬ 
istration of the territory. 

The third method would seem to be preferable. 
The first would hardly be in accordance with the 
program for the internationalized territory which 
is not directed toward continual expansion of pro¬ 
duction. If the second were followed, the gain in 
reparations would be outweighed by the fact that 
if the costs of administration were to be defrayed 
by taxation alone, the tax burden on small business 
and on wage earners in the territory would prob¬ 
ably be excessive. It would seem logical that the 
Corporation, which would take over the most im¬ 
portant sources of production from private owner¬ 
ship, should help finance the budget of the ter¬ 
ritory. 

The Public Corporation would be managed by a 
Board of Directors or Managing Board appointed 
by the Governing Commission. Since national rep¬ 
resentation would in all probability be insisted 
upon by the states adjoining the territory and at 
least some of the great powers as well as other 
members of the United Nations, membership in 
the Board would have to amount to 10 or 11 (simi¬ 
lar to the membership in the Governing Commis¬ 
sion). While permanent representation would be 


secured for the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Great Britain, (perhaps China), France, Belgium 
and the Netherlands, the representation of the 
other members of the United Nations would have 
to rotate. It would be desirable that representa¬ 
tion in the Managing Board of these other mem¬ 
bers should not duplicate that in the Governing 
Commission during a given period. 

In order to achieve efficient management, the 
appointment should be for a reasonably long pe¬ 
riod, preferably five years. Some of the initial 
appointments should be for shorter terms so that 
a complete change of directors after five years may 
be avoided. 

The Board might be authorized to elect its chair¬ 
man, but the chairmanship should rotate among 
the nations represented. 

The Board would remove German management 
from the enterprises operated by the Public Cor¬ 
poration if such management has not already been 
eliminated, and would appoint its own managers. 
In the interests of efficiency, it would be advisable 
for the Board to appoint a General Manager for 
the Public Corporation who would be its chief 
executive officer. 

The transfer to an international organization of 
the major productive facilities would raise some 
difficult questions regarding policies to be pursued 
by the Public Corporation with respect to prices, 
wages, and its relations with privately owned con¬ 
cerns outside of the territory. 

It is assumed that adjustments regarding the 
extent of reparations to be taken in the form of 
production from the resources of the area will be 
settled by the time the Corporation takes over, and 
that commodities produced under the Corporation 
will be marketed according to policies that pre¬ 
sumably will be established by the proper agencies 
of the Security Council. 

It would seem advisable that prices set for the 
commodities produced in the area should be estab¬ 
lished at the lowest possible level consistent with 
the maintenance of the prevailing economies in 
the surrounding territory. The aim should not 
be to undersell the producers located outside of the 
territory but, rather, to make possible competition 
by outside private producers. 

It will be necessary for the Public Corporation 
to comply with the laws and regulations estab¬ 
lished for the government of the territory in re¬ 
spect to labor. Liberal policies in labor matters 
will not only be desirable on general principles 
but will probably help either to hold German 
labor within the territory or to draw in labor from 


18 


other countries to fill the gap in the event that 
there should be a great exodus of Germans from 
the area. 

Such matters as these, however, would have to 
be settled at the time of chartering the corpora¬ 
tion and adjusted as circumstances demand. It 
appears that all the problems that confronted the 
United States with regard to the policies to be 
followed by TV A would have to be resolved, plus 
additional ones arising from the fact that this 
organization would be on an international basis, 
and would have to be operated in a way best to 
suit the needs of conflicting economies and con¬ 
flicting economic policies. 

It is suggested that to ensure effective admin¬ 
istration of the resources and efficient manage¬ 
ment of operations, the Governing Commission, 
with the advice and approval of the Security 
Council, should, at the time of chartering the 
Public Corporation, issue a statement setting 
forth the economic objectives for the area in suffi¬ 
ciently specific terms that the document can serve 
to guide the Corporation in establishing policies. 
This statement of objectives should be made avail¬ 
able to all managers as they are appointed. 

Other property problems 

As regards the property which will not be re¬ 
moved from the territory for reparations and not 
be taken over by the Public Corporation, it is 
assumed that 

1 

The basic policy with regard to property 
settlement will be one that severs economic 
interests and relationships between the terri¬ 
tory and Germany proper. This is essential 
for security reasons as well as to enable the 
territory to develop into a distinct political 
and economic unit. 

2 

The task of the government of the terri¬ 
tory will not be made more difficult by the 
creation of a pauperized group within the 
population and that, consequently, the popu¬ 
lation which is permitted to remain will not 
be deprived of all its property. 

3 

The policy of severance will depend for its 
success upon coordination between the acts 
of the Control Council in Germany proper 
and the measures of the government of the 
territory. 


Accordingly, any discussion of the property 
problems involved will have to examine both sides 
of the coin in every instance. 

PUBLIC PROPERTY 

Public debt. —The economy of the territory as 
well as of Germany proper will be vitally affected 
by the manner in which the public debt of the 
German Reich is disposed of. The problem is 
fundamentally the same as in the case of annexa¬ 
tion by an individual nation. If the German pub¬ 
lic debt is not to be entirely cancelled, the question 
of whether the territory should assume a propor¬ 
tionate share of that debt must be examined. 

Public assets. —Another problem of public 
finance will be that of assigning to the territory a 
proportionate share of such public assets as were 
held centrally by the government of the Reich. 
In this respect, the question of distribution of the 
assets of the Reich Railroad ( Reiclisbahn) and of 
the funds of the social insurance institutions of 
the Reich is of greatest importance. 

PRIVATE PROPERTY 

Property belonging to former residents of the 
territory. —The personal property of German war 
criminals and other Nazis removed from the terri¬ 
tory for security reasons should be confiscated by 
the Governing Commission. It is recommended 
that those other persons who are forced, or who 
choose, to leave the territory shall be permitted 
to take with them their movable personal belong¬ 
ings and all cash realized from the sale of their 
other personal and real property. Persons whose 
sole reason for remaining in the territory is an 
economic one (that is, fear of loss of all property 
in case they chose German citizenship) would be 
apt to constitute an undesirable and disturbing 
element in the territory. Hence they should be 
encouraged to leave the area by permission to take 
with them this kind of property. 

If this suggestion is carried out. restrictions 
should be imposed on the potential purchasers of 
such property, in order to avoid an excessive accu¬ 
mulation of property in the hands of former Ger¬ 
man citizens who remain in the territory. 

Shares and stocks. —The principle of severance 
of property interrelationships between the terri¬ 
tory and Germany proper will require a study of 
the question of how to handle the numerous cases 
where a corporation is headquartered in Germany 
proper and part (or all) of its shares are held 
by residents of the territory and vice versa. 

It is suggested that a settlement should be 
worked out between the Governing Commission 


19 


and the German authorities, subject to the ap¬ 
proval of the Security Council or any other au¬ 
thority designated to supervise the internal af¬ 
fairs of Germany in the post-occupation period. 
The following plan for concerted action is sub¬ 
mitted. 

1 

All shares in corporations headquartered in 
Germany proper that are held by residents 
of the territory shall immediately be vested 
in the Governing Commission. 

2 

All shares in corporations headquartered 
in the territory owned by residents of Ger¬ 
many proper shall immediately be vested in 
German authorities or in a body designated 
for supervision of Germany. 

3 

The government of the territory and the 
supervisory body or the German authorities 
shall each appoint a public trustee for its 
respective area, in whom these shares and 
stocks shall be officially vested. 

4 

The trustees shall exchange the shares with 
which they have been vested on the basis of 
an evaluation which they will determine. 

5 

Each trustee shall issue trust certificates 
in the corporations in his own area to resi¬ 
dents in his own area as a consideration for the 
vested shares which those residents originally 
held in a corporation in the other area. 

6 

The owners of such trust certificates shall 
be entitled merely to dividends. The shares 
themselves should continue to be represented 
by the trustee. 

7 

The trust certificates shall be saleable on 
the stock exchange. 

8 

These trust certificates shall be convertible 
into shares only on certain conditions such as 
the following: A certificate shall be convert¬ 


ible into shares of stocks if it had been sold 
by a resident of the territory to a national 
of one of the United Nations who had not 
been previously a German citizen and if it 
had been in the possession of such national for 
a period of, say, 5 years. This condition 
would minimize the opportunity for the con¬ 
centration of economic control in the hands 
of former Germans now resident in the ter¬ 
ritory, and would also provide a safeguard 
against cloaking, at least for the immediate 
period. Trust certificates held by residents 
of Germany proper shall not be convertible 
into shares of stocks for a defined period. 
This will, to some degree, prevent the resti¬ 
tution of centralized economic power in Ger¬ 
many proper and also permit control of such 
corporations to be retained in the hands of a 
public trustee in Germany proper. 

9 

If it should be found that a surplus exists 
in favor of Germany proper, this surplus 
might be utilized for general reparations pur¬ 
poses. If it should be found, on the other 
hand, that a surplus exists in favor of the 
detached territory, that surplus might either 
be utilized for reparations or as a contribution 
toward the cost of administration of the ter¬ 
ritory. 

Physical properties. —This category comprises 
real estate held by individuals, industrial proper¬ 
ties not taken for reparations, and the tangible 
assets of corporations, in cases where the owner 
is a resident of the territory and the property is 
located in Germany proper and in the reverse 
situation. It is suggested here that an adminis¬ 
trator or the public trustee suggested for the dis¬ 
posal of shares and stocks be appointed by the au¬ 
thority in each area for the eventual sale of such 
properties in order to prevent overlapping of 
property relationships between the territory and 
Germany proper. The government of the terri¬ 
tory may secure revenue from such an arrange¬ 
ment by imposing taxes on the proceeds of the sales 
as they are realized. 

Combines .—In accordance with the general pol¬ 
icy of breaking up concentrations of economic 
power in Germany, all combines will be dissolved. 
When this is done, the problem of combine prop¬ 
erty will be resolved into a problem of the prop¬ 
erty of individual firms. Procedures similar to 
those established for shares of stock and physical 


20 


properties could be established for the disposition 
of the property of such individual firms where 
there are overlapping property relationships. 

Property of commercial and savings banks .— 
The technical problems of severing the relationship 
between the parent banks and their branches 
and or subsidiaries are of a highly complex na¬ 
ture because the German banking system was a 
centralized system headquartered predominantly 
in Berlin. The guiding principles here too should 
he the complete divorce of the relationships and 
interests between the territory and Germany 
proper. 

Mortgage bank prop < rty .—The disposal of the 
property of mortgage banks is believed to be more 
simple than that of ordinary commercial banks 
since the activities of the former are primarily 
local or regional. Those mortgage banks whose 
a'Set? or liabilities overlap the newly established 
boundaries shall be placed under administrators 
who will proceed along the lines of the general 
rules established above for the treatment of other 
properties. 

Industi ial and municipal bonds .—It is suggested 
that the same pattern suggested for the exchange 
of shares be applied. 

Propi rty of insurance com panics .—It is recom¬ 
mended that the liquidation of the insurance inter¬ 
ests be handled in the same manner as the exchange 
of shares. 

Trade Relations 

In general, the principle underlying the trade 
relations of the territory should be directed toward 


making the greatest use of the resources of the 
region for European welfare. In order to ensure 
the prosperity of the Ruhr-Rhineland territory the 
basic document placing it in trust should provide 
for its inclusion in international and regional trade 
agreements in conformance with accepted liberal 
commercial policies. More specifically, provision 
should be made for the possibility of its inclusion 
in any customs union with its neighbors, such as 
France. Belgium, Luxembourg and the Nether¬ 
lands. which may he established in the future. 

Trade with Germany should be placed upon the 
same general basis as trade with other countries 
subject only to the limitations imposed on German 
trade by the peace treaty. Because of proximity, 
however, it may be necessary to provide for espe¬ 
cially strict border control in order to prevent 
large-scale smuggling of proscribed commodities 
which would easily thwart disarmament measures. 
If the area is to be oriented away from dependence 
upon Germany and if repenetration by Germany is 
to be avoided, it is highly important that no special 
privileges be extended to Germany because of past 
historical relations. 

Customs duties may be imposed by the Interna¬ 
tional Governing Commission in accordance with 
the accepted liberal commercial policies to be de¬ 
veloped by the United Nations. Receipts from all 
customs duties on goods intended for local con¬ 
sumption should be included in the budget of the 
territorv. No tariff on German railwavs or wa- 
terways which might directly or indirectly dis¬ 
criminate to the prejudice of the transport of the 
personnel or products of the territory should he 
permitted. 


CHAPTER III 

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRITORIAL DETACHMENT 


Effects on Detached Area 

The success of the detachment of the Ruhr- 
Rhineland area as a disarmament measure is de¬ 
pendent upon the establishment of a sound and 
stable economy in the area itself. If the policies 
pursued in separation are such as to cause the loss 
of the production of the area to the rest of Europe 
and to create a low standard of living in the area 
itself, the aim of using the resources of the terri¬ 
torv to strengthen the general economy of Europe 
will be defeated. 


It is impossible at present to determine the ex¬ 
tent of war damage inflicted upon the area, the time 
and assistance that will be required for rehabili¬ 
tation. and the level of industrial capacity that will 
remain after the application of disarmament 
measures and the satisfaction of reparations 
claims. It must be assumed, however, that if the 
United Nations agree upon the necessity for de¬ 
taching this territorv from Germanv in order to 
preserve peace, they will make certain that the as¬ 
sistance requisite for reconstruction is forthcoming 
and that the development of industry after dis- 


21 











armament is governed by regard for the needs of 
the area and the contributions it can make to the 
European economy as well as by concern for con¬ 
tinuing security. 

Adequate employment opportunities and the de¬ 
velopment of foreign trade sufficient to supply es¬ 
sential imports are two important considerations 
in assessing the needs of the territory. 

The international regime should not be expected 
to maintain adequate employment opportunities 
for a population of around 15 million, such as was 
supported by an economy based upon a production 
of 19 million tons of steel. Some of this surplus 
population may automatically be drawn off by the 
deindustrialization program, and some will be 
eliminated by the provision for removal of all Ger¬ 
mans who had resided in the area less than five 
years prior to 1939. The ban upon former Nazi 
leaders will remove still others. The reduction of 
the population to a normal peacetime level be¬ 
cause of reduced employment opportunities would 
be a distinct social and political, as well as eco¬ 
nomic, advantage. 

A considerably lessened industrial establishment 
than existed in the swollen prewar and wartime 
period would probably be found to offer employ¬ 
ment opportunities that would maintain a normal 
peacetime population of the area at a standard of 
living on a par Avith that of adjacent countries to 
the west. 

The question of markets will be a vital one, in¬ 
asmuch as the area has relied upon imports for 
about half of its food supplies and for a large 
proportion of its industrial raw materials. In 
normal times there will undoubtedly be a market 
for the coal and coke produced in the territory, as 
a number of European countries have been depend¬ 
ent upon it in the past to keep their blast furnaces 
in operation. In fact, one of the arguments pre¬ 
sented for the detachment of the area is that the 
importance of Ruhr coal to the industrial welfare 
of certain other countries is so great that to leave 
its distribution in German hands is to hinder their 
economic development. 

The possibility that the territory can develop 
an export trade adequate to supply its import re¬ 
quirements might be assumed on the following 
bases: 

1 

Markets formerly supplied by this area 
when it was a part of Germany will probably 
be open. (In 1936 this area contributed about 
39 percent of total German exports, about 71 


percent of German exports of primary iron 
and steel products, and 92 percent of Stein- 
kohle and Steinkohle coke and briquettes ex¬ 
ports by value.) 

2 

The development of the industrial potential 
of other European countries, envisaged as 
necessary to reorient the European economy, 
should increase the buying power of those 
countries, thus opening markets not hitherto 
existent. 

3 

Although it would be inadvisable to reestab- 
1 ish the close economic ties with Germany that 
formerly existed, Germany should be per¬ 
mitted to trade with the detached area. 
Safeguarded by regulations to prevent viola¬ 
tion of disarmament objectives, trade with 
Germany could be a significant part of the 
foreign commerce of the area and in time of 
depression a valuable aid in sustaining its 
economy. 

The experience of the internationalized Saar of¬ 
fers an example of economic conditions that might 
be realized in the Ruhr-Rhineland under trustee¬ 
ship to the United Nations. Except during the 
depression of the early 1930’s, a satisfactory level 
of employment and productivity obtained in the 
Saar throughout the 15 years of its sojourn under 
the auspices of the League. The people of the 
area, though they did not admit it. were better 
off in general than those of the neighboring na¬ 
tions. In spite of many handicaps such as infla- 
tion, first in Germany and then in France, the 
Saar Territory had no financial difficulties. It 
went through the world depression in better con¬ 
dition than any other industrial area and was re¬ 
turned to Germany free from debt and with money 
in the bank. This was due in large part, if not 
entirely, to its inclusion in the French customs 
union and its practically free trade with Germany. 

Under the program outlined in this study, the 
Ruhr-Rhineland territory would profit by ar¬ 
rangements of the sort that have been cited as con¬ 
tributing toward the welfare of the Saar during its 
period of internationalization. It would be in¬ 
cluded in any customs union established among 
the countries to the west, a situation that would 
be advantageous in turning the territory eeo- 
nomically toward the west and weakening its ties 
with Germany. On the other hand, it would 
probably find a ready market in Germany in so 


22 


far as trade with Germany could be permitted 
without redevelopment of economic interdepend¬ 
ence. 

Further, the management of its major industrial 
resources would be in the hands of a public cor¬ 
poration. created to further the welfare of the area 
and to operate its industries in the general interest 
of the United Nations. 

So constituted, the Ruhr-Rhineland could be¬ 
come a smoothly functioning and prosperous eco¬ 
nomic unit, contributing importantly to the 
economic welfare of Europe as a whole. 

Effects on Europe 

One of the purposes of the industrial disarma¬ 
ment program is to make certain that Germany 
does not regain the position of economic dominance 
in Europe she enjoyed formerly. This in itself 
implies a reorientation in the direction best cal¬ 
culated to prevent the re-emergence of the condi¬ 
tions that have made it possible for Germany 
to wage two major wars within fifty years. 

A first step in changing the industrial face of 
Europe would be the relocation of the plants re¬ 
moved from Germany and from the detached area 
as reparations. It is assumed that assignment 
of such property will be based upon an individual 
nation's ability to make efficient utilization of the 
property assigned. Thus, it would appear logical 
that some of the excess steelmaking capacity of 
the Ruhr-Rhineland would go to the steel-making 
countries of Western Europe—France. Belgium, 
and Luxembourg. It has also been suggested that 
it might lie profitable to develop steel production 
in Norway, which occupies a midpoint between 
the source of Swedish iron ore and Ruhr coal. A 
similar distribution of other surplus industrial 
plant would permit expansion in still other fields 
by the recipient countries. 

As has been noted earlier, the great concentra¬ 
tion of heavy industry in the Ruhr-Rhineland was 
occasioned chiefly by the availability of coal, used 
as a raw material and for fuel and power. The 
development of relocated basic industry can be 
accomplished more successfully if coal and coke 
from the Ruhr continue to be available. Although 
the Ruhr in 1037 supplied only 5.5 percent of the 
total coal consumed in Europe, it was much more 
important as a source of supply for certain indi¬ 
vidual countries. For example, in 1037 coal from 
the Ruhr represented 52.7 percent of total coal 
consumption in Italy. 20.1 percent in the Nether¬ 
lands. 17.8 percent in Belgium and Luxembourg. 


4<i percent in Yugoslavia. 13.5 percent in Hungary. 
5(5.5 percent in Greece, and 11.6 percent in Switzer¬ 
land. France received only 5.5 percent of her 1037 
coal consumption from the Ruhr, but >he was de¬ 
pendent upon this and other areas, notably the 
Saar, for about three-eighths of the coal >he con¬ 
sumed in the period 1028-37. Since industry in 
these countries depends so largely upon imported 
coal, the advantage of a measure that would permit 
greater exploitation, rather than restriction of op¬ 
eration. of one of the major sources of coal in 
Europe becomes obvious. Internationlization of 
the Ruhr-Rhineland and its inclusion in regional 
and international trade agreements should enable 
an equitable distribution of its coal and coke pro¬ 
duction to the countries for which it is a vital 
requirement. 

Some advantage to the countries of Western 
Europe should also accrue from freeing the com¬ 
munications system of the territory from German 
control in that trade within the region would be 
facilitated. 

The territory presumably will compete in for¬ 
eign markets with other European countries pro¬ 
ducing the same type of commodities. In a rising 
market, such as is likely during the period of re¬ 
construction. competition should not create con¬ 
flicts of a serious nature. In a period of economic 
deflation, however, the danger arises that the inter¬ 
nationalized territory would be squeezed out of 
available markets by the larger economic units to 
the west. The effect of such an eventuality upon 
the economy of the territory could be calculated 
to encourage irredentist agitation and cause dis¬ 
sension among the members of the United Nations. 

The countries of Western Europe probably have 
most to fear from a re-emergence of a strong Ger¬ 
man war potential. They also have most to gain 
from the separation of the Ruhr-Rhineland from 
Germany, though their interests conflict with each 
other and would conflict with the interests of the 
separated area. Administration of the territory 
by an international authority appears to offer the 
best medium for the amicable settlement of differ¬ 
ences. If earnest efforts are made to safeguard 
the welfare of the area and to integrate it into the 
economy of the region, its existence as a separate 
entity is likelv to be tenable and its contributions 
to the total European economy considerable. 

Effects on Germany 

The Germany remaining after the separation 
of the Ruhr-Rhineland and the territory east of 


«i?o737 : -Hi —4 


23 


the Oder-Xeisse Rivers—the latter already a fait 
accompli —will have an area of roughly 130,000 
to 138,000 square miles and, upon the anticipated 
return to the Reich of the German peoples of 
detached areas to the east. Czechoslovakia, and 
Hungary, a population of around 55 million. She 
will have lost a major proportion of her coal re¬ 
sources, particularly those of higher grade, as well 
as the greater part of her iron and steel and other 
basic industrial capacity. 

Tt is idle to say that the remaining Germany 
would be reduced to “agricultural status.” Trun¬ 
cated Germany could not exist as a strictly agri¬ 
cultural economy. In the best prewar period, 
before guns began to take the place of butter, the 
Germany of 1037 boundaries was not more than 
about 80 percent self-sufficient in food. Trun¬ 
cated Germany will have lost one of her greatest 
food deficiency areas—the Ruhr-Rhineland—and 
presumably most of its population, but she will 
also have lost the considerable agricultural re¬ 
sources of the separated eastern area and will have 
acquired around 15 million additional population. 
Under the most favorable conditions of increased 
settlement on farms, reclaimed acreages, or im¬ 
proved agricultural production, it is not likely 
that she will become completely self-sufficient in 
food, and most certainly she will not be able to 
produce surplus foodstuffs in quantities sufficient 
to provide for imports of other vital materials she 
lacks. Germany will have to maintain an indus¬ 
trial establishment of some dimensions in order 
to live. 

Her hope of maintaining such an establishment 
will depend primarily upon two factors: her abil¬ 
ity to utilize her remaining resources and the ex¬ 
tent to which she is permitted to utilize them. 

Estimates based entirely upon previous devel¬ 
opments of the resources that will be left at the 
disposal of truncated Germany cannot be relied 
upon as indication of the only possibilities for the 
future. By fuller exploitation of her remaining 
resources and by the development of new tech¬ 
niques and processes, Germany might be able to 
achieve a much higher level of industrial produc¬ 
tion from these resources than obtained when she 
was under no pressure to utilize them to the fullest 
extent. 

Truncated Germany would retain less than two 
percent of her former reserves of SteinkoMe , or 
possibly not more than six billion metric tons. 
Her situation would be more fortunate in respect 
to brown coal, of which remaining reserves would 
total approximately the equivalent of 13 billion 
metric tons of SteinkoKle. She would retain 


roughly two-thirds of the reserves of iron ore that 
were contained within her 1937 boundaries, 
around 69 percent of her former forest reserves, 
her major resources in lead and zinc, and almost 
all of her extensive potash deposits. 

In 1938, out of a total production of 195,000,000 
metric tons of brown coal, better than 134,000,000 
metric tons, or almost 69 percent, were mined near 
Leipzig or southeast of Berlin, most of it in terri¬ 
tory that would remain with the Reich. The in¬ 
crease in production from the 1934 level of about 
137,000,000 to the wartime level of 250,000,000 
tons illustrates how Germany found it possible 
to speed up brown coal production in preparation 
for war. It is not known whether or not this coal 
can be utilized in blast furnace operations; how¬ 
ever. for most other purposes Germany finds her 
brown coal usable. Germany has used brown coal 
for the manufacture of coke for many years. In 
the coal year ending March 1944, 8.5 million 
metric tons of brown coal coke were sold, more 
than half of it to industry. Wherever coal is 
coked, coal-tar products are recovered. Although 
Germany probably would not be able to export 
coal, she would have sufficient supplies to permit 
extensive industrial operations. 

Only a little more than one-third of German 
iron ore reserves are in the Ruhr-Rhineland. Total 
Silesian reserves in 1938 were estimated at about 
2 million metric tons of Grade B ore, out of total 
German reserves of about 720 million tons. The 
reserves within truncated Germany would be con¬ 
siderable. The Salzgitter-Peine deposits devel¬ 
oped by the Hermann Goring Werke were the 
leading German domestic source of supply in the 
late 1930’s, with an output in 1939 of 4.5 million 
tons of ore, approximately 1.5 million tons of 
metal content. There is some evidence that at¬ 
tempts were made to develop domestic resources 
of iron ore in the region north of the Harz Moun¬ 
tains. Much of this ore, however, is of very low 
grade and special methods of treating it have to 
be devised. The Hermann Goring W erke, con¬ 
structed near Braunschweig and using ore of this 
quality, planned for the production of 2 million 
tons of pig iron and the same amount of steel. 
Actual production never met these figures; in 1943 
production was only 840,000 tons of steel or less 
than half of what was planned. This develop¬ 
ment, however, indicates that Germany might be 
able to exploit her low-grade ore more fully in 
case of necessity, though some importation of coal 
for blast furnaces might be necessary. 

With these supplies of coal and ore and her other 
mineral and forest resources, truncated Germanv 

1 V 


24 


would have the base for considerable industrial 
activity. She might, for example, be able to pro¬ 
duce as much as -1 million tons of crude steel, a 
quantity estimated to be sufficient to meet the mini¬ 
mum civilian requirements of the Germany of 1937 
boundaries. This could be the foundation for a 
fairly extensive development of light industry. 

The extent to which she will be permitted to 
utilize these resources will depend upon the leeway 
that can be allowed industrial development in Ger¬ 
many proper because of the added security af¬ 
forded by the separation of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
territory. It is the position of this study that Ger¬ 
man potential for waging war will be so greatly 
reduced by the loss of the industrial resources and 
facilities of the Ruhr-Rhineland and the territory 
east of the Oder-Neisse that industrial controls 
proposed for total Germany after occupation 
might be adjusted to permit the German economy 
to compensate, along safe lines, for the loss of these 
territories. 


I 

, 


There a re many industrial field- which Germany 
might safely be permitted to develop. These have 
been enumerated as building construction and al¬ 
lied industries, woodworking, consumer goods in¬ 
dustries. textile- and textile fibers, certain chemi¬ 
cal industries, and handicraft and small business. 
In addition, the development of new technology, 
opening up entirely new peacetime industries, is 
not unlikely in the future. Any restrictions which 
would limit the supply of materials essential to 
these ‘'safe*' industries could probably be relaxed. 
There are also industries which, though contribut¬ 
ing indirectly to a war potential, are not in them¬ 
selves dangerous if the broad industrial base for 
military production is lacking. The production 
limitations proposed for such commodities as op¬ 
tical goods, small machine tools, and the materials 
for certain plastics might be eased if such easing 
did not endanger the >uccess of the disarmament 
program. 

It is not the purpose of this study to determine 
the nature or the extent of the modifications of the 
program that would be necessitated by the inclu¬ 
sion of territorial separation as a part of the pro¬ 


gram. A careful weighing of many factors must 
enter into decisions regarding these adjustments. 
The basic questions to be answered are these: What 
kinds of industrial activity can be permitted with¬ 
out fear that they will lead to rearmament ? What 
level of industrial activity will be required for the 
maintenance of at least a minimum subsistence 
level in truncated Germany ( 

Another factor that will be of considerable im¬ 
portance in relation to the standard of living 
within rump Germany will be that of foreign mar¬ 
kets. German trade practices in the immediate 
prewar and war years were so directed toward her 
own selfish ends that her reputation in trade, as 
well as her loss of prestige through military defeat, 
may well hinder the renewal of commercial rela¬ 
tions with other countries. She will also have 
been forced to relinquish the cartel and syndicate 
arrangements by which she formerly kept markets 
open. Furthermore, increased industrial capacity 
in other countries will permit them to supply their 
own domestic markets, formerly -upplied by Ger¬ 
many. and to replace Germany as a source of sup¬ 
ply for other markets. 

The chief hope that Germany will be able to 
develop the trade relations essential to meet her 
requirements for food-tuffs lie> in the possibility 
that huge agricultural surpluses will exi.-t in many 
countries within a few years, and Germany will 
become a desired trade partner because of her 
ability to absorb such surpluses. 

Unless new technological developments such as 
the u>e of atomic energy radically change the foun¬ 
dations of industrial activity in the future, the 
permanent separation from Germany of the de-ig- 
nated territories will have completely changed the 
nature of her industrial economy. Heavv indus- 
trial operation will be possible only to a limited 
extent, though extensive activity in the light indus¬ 
tries could be supported. The effect of these 
changes may be a general lowering of the standard 
of living in truncated Germany. It is believed, 
however, that at least a minimum subsistence level 
will be possible. 


CHAPTER tv: 

SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 


In view of the prominence of the general West¬ 
ern tradition of the rights of national self-deter¬ 
mination and of the special intensity of nationalis¬ 
tic patterns in Germany, it is to be expected that 


the initial German reaction to any proposal to 
separate from her political control any such vital 
part of Germany as the Ruhr-Rhineland would be 
one of violent indignation. It should be expected 

25 



that this sentiment would he shared by virtually 
all elements of the German population, including 
the most “liberal” and friendly to the democracies. 
The initial result would hence he a severe setback 
to Allied efforts to eradicate the German will to 
make war and to reintegrate the German people 
with Europe as a whole. 

From this point of view, as distinguished from 
that of Germany’s physical capacity to make war. 
the advisability of separation depends upon the 
possibility of overcoming this initial setback and 
of turning the evolution of German attitudes into 
a new course which would reverse the initial tend¬ 
ency. There is a real possibility that, under 
the program of internationalization proposed, Ger¬ 
man attitudes might be redirected over a long 
period of time if during that period the proper 
combination of influences is brought to bear. 

The attitudes of a large population are not sim¬ 
ply a matter of the ad hoc reactions of people to 
their immediate situations, or of what the}’ have 
been taught to believe. Attitudes are a function 
of these factors, plus the influence of the social 
structure in which people are organized. The 
change of attitudes cannot be accomplished in any 
simple sense by “re-education.” if by that is meant 
merely bringing intellectual and cultural influ¬ 
ences to bear. Only if the social structure is 
changed can there be hope for a firmly founded 
system of new attitudes which would not be likely 
to be upset by any passing change of the situation. 

Internationalization of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
would place a significant number of Germans out¬ 
side of the physical boundaries of Germany proper 
and would sever the economic, political, and insti¬ 
tutional ties between the detached and the trun¬ 
cated areas. There would thus he created a situ¬ 
ation favorable to the change of the basic social 
structure as well as to the reception of outside in¬ 
fluences. 

Fortunately, German society in this area has 
aspects favorable to the processes of readaptation. 
In the first place, certain of the elements of recent 
German society are less accentuated in the Ruhr- 
Rhineland than in other parts of Germany. It 
lacks the Junkers , one of the foundations of Prus¬ 
sian militarism. In the Rhineland the nobility 
will doubtless present serious social problems, but 
it is not specifically militaristic in the same sense 
as the Junkers. Furthermore, separation of this 
territory from Germany and the severance of insti¬ 
tutional ties will reduce the susceptibility to the 
influence of the Junkers and other elements of a 
militaristic nature which may wane more slowly 
in Germany proper. 

26 


The first essential of any attempt to influence an¬ 
other society is the establishment of the requisite 
position of prestige, in which the United Nations 
has made a beginning by the victory of arms. This 
in itself is not adequate to ensure influence beyond 
the forceful suppression of opposition. In taking 
over the separated territory, the United Nations 
could, however, enhance its prestige in other re¬ 
spects. Internationalization of the area, rather 
than annexation by another nation, would consti¬ 
tute adherence to stated principle which would win 
respect if the action were clearly defined to the 
people of Germany and to those of the United Na¬ 
tions as being in the general interest. If. in addi¬ 
tion. the Allies are clear and strong in their policy, 
firm, impartial in justice, and careful to give op¬ 
portunities and not merely to suppress, they can 
confidently expect in time to achieve respect which 
does not stem only from their capacity to use force. 

Obviously, elements of the population sympa¬ 
thetic to United Nations policy will be wanted in 
positions of influence. For solid contribution to 
the success of the international regime, these per¬ 
sons must also have prestige, not only with the 
governing authorities but, more important, with 
their own people. Neglect of this simple rule prob¬ 
ably accounts for more of the failures of “foreign 
rule” than any other single factor. Only when it 
is certain that they have or can acquire leadership 
among their own group ought Germans to he en¬ 
trusted with responsibility, and determination of 
their prestige should not he left to the ad hoc 
judgments of foreign administrators but should 
be made the subject of scientific testing, for which 
the techniques are available. 

Although the German population could not for 
a long period of time be given genuine democratic 
representation in the government of the territory, 
their political reorientation could begin at once 
with the reestablishment of local administration 
as it existed under the Weimar Republic—local 
committees, councils, and assemblies reffainine: the 
authority they possessed before the introduction 
of the Fuhrerprinzi'p. Separation should also 
prove propitious for rooting out the Prussian type 
of rigidly hierarchical civil service. The Govern¬ 
ing Commission ought at an early stage to set up 
a careful study of civil service methods with a 
view to introducing enough difference from the 
traditional German model to lead to definite 
change, but not so much as to constitute such an 
immediately drastic break that the German masses 
would no longer be responsive. These matters are 
of great importance, since without giving German 
elements an important and increasing share of ad- 


ministrative responsibility, a genuine reorientation 
of the German population is scarcely conceivable. 

Economic reorientation of the area would be 
equally desirable. Through liberal policies to¬ 
ward labor and sincere efforts to raise the standard 
of living of the general population, the Govern¬ 
ing Commission and the International Public 
Corporation could do much to influence social 
change. The new regime should also bring about 
the dissociation of the industrialists and the biir 
business group from their historic alliance with 
the military and the old type of bureaucracy. 
Weakening of the relative position of the old busi¬ 
ness oligarchy should promote the growth of 
small decentralized business. An increase in the 
numbers engaged in small business—if the group 
enjoyed close connections and equivalence of sta¬ 
tus with professional groups and with the leader¬ 
ship of a revitalized trade union movement— 
would strengthen the middle class and contribute 
to social stability. 

Such changes as these will affect the attitudes 
of the population of the area. Separation and 
internationalization of this territory might event¬ 
ually also have a salutary effect upon the popula¬ 
tion of Germany proper. Since the additional 


security gained from separation would make 
possible less drastically restrictive controls upon 
the rest of Germany, a better opportunity would 
be provided for the development of a peaceful, 
consumer-minded economy there. Furthermore, 
a successful international regime within the sepa¬ 
rated area might further the social reorientation 
of truncated Germany, though this would be de¬ 
pendent upon the two conditions of the establish¬ 
ment of high prestige of the governing authority 
and widespread knowledge within Germany pro¬ 
per concerning the status and conditions of the 
territory. 

Finally, successful internationalization might 
exert an influence in diverting the political struc¬ 
ture of Europe away from that of a system of 
“blocs" competing for power. The firm establish¬ 
ment in the heart of Europe of an area interna¬ 
tionalized for the purpose of maintaining Euro¬ 
pean security and serving the general good of a 
European economy should put a tremendous check 
upon the competitive maneuvering of national 
states. In this respect the internationalization of 
this area would serve larger ends than the dis¬ 
armament of Germany. 


appendix: 

BASIC GEOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 
RUHR-RHINELAND 


Foreword 

The area designated in this study as the Ruhr- 
Rhineland is one of the most highly industrialized 
regions of Europe. The presence of important nat¬ 
ural resources, particularly an abundance of high- 
grade coal well suited to metallurgical uses, and 
the location near one of Europe’s greatest inland 
waterways, have been important factors in bring¬ 
ing about the concentration of heavy industry in 
the area. In the prewar years this was the most im¬ 
portant industrial area in Germany, contributing 
more than any other section to the German war 
potential. 

Air attack and invasion and the dispersal of 
plant have resulted in the destruction or removal 
of many of the manufacturing installations of the 
area and have, at least temporarily, reduced the 
productive capacity, though not the potential ca¬ 
pacity, of the mines. Recent information from 
Germany indicates that dispersal of plants as a 


part of the German plan for greater efficiency of 
production and for protection against attack was 
very extensive. War damage was also heavv in 
many parts of the region. Productive capacity 
may be much less than in the prewar years. 

Data presented in this appendix are, therefore, 
reliable only for metal and mineral reserves or. in 
the case of manufacturing industries, for the his¬ 
torical periods to which the data apply. In addi¬ 
tion. many of the statistics are of necessity approx¬ 
imate. since the area was not a separate adminis¬ 
trative unit and German statistics had to be ad¬ 
justed to the arbitrary delimitations set for the 
purposes of this study. 

This description of the geographic and economic 
characteristics of the Ruhr-Rhineland does not 
purport to be definitive. It does, however, indi¬ 
cate in general the potentialities of the area. 

The information contained in this appendix 
came from numerous sources. Where no specific 
reference is noted, the information was supplied 


27 



by the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Economic 
Administration. 

I. Boundaries of the Territory 1 

The extent of the territory considered for possi¬ 
ble separation from Germany has not been deter¬ 
mined. In order to establish a basis for the com¬ 
pilation of statistical data on the region, how¬ 
ever, it was necessary to fix definite, though tenta¬ 
tive delimitations (see Map, Territory designated 
for Possible Separation from Western Germany). 
The boundaries used in this study were settled 
upon with consideration for the functions of the 
administrative units (see Map No. 6245), the 
extent of industrial unity, and the functions of 
the main lines of communications. 

The Ruhr-Rhineland is defined as including all 
of Rheinprovinz (Rhine Province), nearly all of 
Westfalen (Westphalia), Saarland (the Saar), 
Pfalz, and a part of Hessen (Hesse). The area 
comprises the entire left bank of the Rhine in¬ 
cluded in the German boundaries of 1937, which 
consists of Pfalz in Land Bayern (Bavaria), 
Saarland, and of a small part of Land Hessen and 
a large part of Rheinprovinz. The area east of 
the Rhine is composed of the remainder of Rhein¬ 
provinz and all of Westfalen except the Kreise 
of Tecklenburg on the northern border of the 
province, of Halle, Herford, Bielefeld, Lubbecke 
and Minden on the northeast, and of Hoxter and 
Warburg on the east. 

The basic administrative units in Germany are 
the Gemeinden (communes) and the Kreise (coun¬ 
ties). Each commune has the character of a pub¬ 
lic corporation in that it can own property, and 
usually does own such facilities as public utilities, 
schools, and recreational establishments. The 
boundaries of a commune are, as a rule, more func¬ 
tional than those of any other German political 
unit and its splitting might have inconvenient 
consequences. In the case of a Landgemeinde 
(rural commune) farm buildings might be sepa¬ 
rated from their land, and in that of a Stadtge- 
meinde (town or city commune) urban facilities, 
such as water, gas, power, sewage disposal, fire 
protection, communications, or school districts 
might be disrupted. In Rheinprovinz and West¬ 
falen the Amstbiirgermeisterei (township or par¬ 
ish) performs many of the functions carried out 

1 Most of the information contained in this section was 
taken from FEA Document No. 170155— Consequences of 
the Major Transfers of German Territory: a Preliminary 
Report. R & A No. 2914, Office of Strategic Services, 
May 1, 1945. 


elsewhere by the communes and is the most impor¬ 
tant political unit in these provinces. The Kreise 
(counties) are of two types: the Landkreis or rural 
county and the Stcultkreis or urban county. An 
urban county always comprises one commune, 
while a rural county is made up of several 
communes. Counties also can own property and 
frequently do own and administer their own roads, 
welfare institutions, etc. Most detailed statistics 
in Germany are based on county units. While it 
is not as closely knit from a social or economic 
point of view as a commune, dividing a rural 
county would split administrative districts, such 
as those for supervision of local schools, health 
and security, etc., and might cut off parts of a 
county from its urban center with its markets, 
higher schools, etc. 

Certain large urban centers or clusters in this 
region have developed so intricate a complex of 
interrelated industrial, commercial and transport 
functions that any frontier cutting through them 
would drastically disrupt their economy. Out¬ 
standing examples of this interdependence in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland are the industrial districts of the 
Ruhr and the Saar and such large cities as 
Cologne and Ludwigshafen. 

II. General Characteristics 2 

Topography 

Most of the Ruhr-Rhineland region is hilly 
consisting of the Middle Rhine Highlands, but 
the northern portion includes a part of the Great 
Northern Lowland and the southern part a small 
strip of the T pper Rhine Plain. The Rhine runs 
diagonally from southeast to northwest across all 
three regions. The lands of the Great Northern 
Lowland are level or gently rolling and are im¬ 
portant crop, pasture and forest lands. The por¬ 
tion of the Upper Rhine plain within the area con¬ 
sists of fertile flood plain and river terraceland, 
most of it intensively cultivated. The rolling up¬ 
lands of the Middle Rhine Highlands are sepa¬ 
rated by several deep valleys running roughly 
from west to east. While most of the upland is 
covered with forests, there are vineyards on some 
of the valley slopes and rather intensive cultiva¬ 
tion of mixed crops in the valleys, in Koblenz 
Basin, and in the Low Hill Land of Rhenish-Hesse. 
Abundant rainfall and winter snows in the higher 
parts of this region swell the many streams drain¬ 
ing down the slopes toward the Rhine and its 
tributaries. 

2 Most of the general information contained in this sec¬ 
tion was taken from R A A Report No. 2914, OSS. 


28 




Agriculture and forestry 

The total area of Rheinprovinz. Westfalen. Hes¬ 
sen. Pfalz, and Saarland amounts to 5.981.022 
hectares. 3 The agricultural land in use in this area 
in 1937 amounted to 3.559.823 hectares, or nearly 
59 percent of the total area. Plowland currently 
in use constituted 38.5 percent of the total area, 
meadows and pasturelands 16.7 percent, orchards, 
vineyards, and small household gardens 3.7 per¬ 
cent. and forests and wood lots 31.5 percent. 4 From 
11.8 to 12.3 percent of Germany's total timber land 
was in the Ruhr-Rhineland region. Rheinprovinz, 
Pfalz and Hessen had 50.455 hectares under 
vines—01.7 percent of the total vineyard area of 
Germany—and this area is one of the greatest 
surplus wine producing regions of Germany 4 
From here wine is shipped to all parts of Germany 
and to foreign countries. Table 1 shows the dis¬ 
tribution of land in agricultural use and in forest 
and woodlots in the provinces of the region and 
in Germany as a whole. 

Considerable use of fertilizers, advanced tech¬ 
nical methods and excellent soils contribute to the 
region’s high productivity which is well above 
the average for Germany. 

The Ruhr-Rhineland is. nevertheless, one of Ger¬ 
many’s great food deficiency areas. Although the 
more intensively cultivated districts produce a 
surplus, it is not sufficient to meet the demands 
of the densely populated industrial areas. Dur¬ 
ing the immediate prewar years the region pro¬ 
duced only about 50 percent of its food require¬ 
ments. as compared with the 80 to 83 percent pro¬ 
duced by Germany as a whole. 5 The Saar and 
the Ruhr depend to a greater degree on food sup¬ 
plies from outside than does the rest of the ter¬ 
ritory. The Saar obtains the bulk of its supply 
of grains, potatoes and rye and wheat flour from 
the Palatinate and Ludwigshafen-Mannheim 
area. Some fruits, vegetables, and wine are also 
supplied from this area, while beer is obtained 
from the industrialized centers of the Ruhr and 
Rhineland. The Ruhr draws heavily on the Rhine¬ 
land for many agricultural products. The follow¬ 
ing table gives the approximate percentages of 
foodstuffs supplied to the Ruhr by the area west 
of the Rhine in relation to total food supplied to 
the Ruhr in 1937 : 


3 One hectare=2.471 acres. 

4 Rtatistisches Jahrbuch fiir das Deutsche Reich. Berlin, 
1938. These figures are for all of rhe five provinces men¬ 
tioned—a somewhat larger area than the Ruhr-Rhineland 
as herein defined. 

5 Fox - eign Economic Administration. Office of Food Pro¬ 

grams, October 1945. 


Percentage 
supplied to 

Commodity 1 the Ruhr by 

the area west 
of the Rhine 


Vegetables_ 50 

Fruits_ 14 

Potatoes_ 12 

Edible fats (excluding butter)_ 50 

Other animal and vegetable oils_ 50 

Rye and wheat flour_ 40 

Refined sugar_ 67 

Wine_i 65 

Other processed foods_ 46 


Source: R & A Report Xo. 2914. OSS. 

The Ruhr also obtains some foodstuffs from the 
area to the east and north. Some bread grains, es¬ 
pecially rye. and vegetables are supplied from the 
fertile Munster Bay and probably from the Her- 
ford Basin. The most important commodity 
shipped to the Ruhr from this area, however, is 
milk. 

Efficient cultivation of the region is handicapped 
by the smallness of its farms in the southern part, 
where the average size ranges from one to five 
hectares. In the north the size increases to an 
average of 100 hectares. 

Population 

The population of the Ruhr-Rhineland region in 
1939 was roughly 14.790,000. or about 21 percent of 
the officially announced 1939 census figures for the 
Reich of 1937 boundaries. Approximately 6,212,- 
000 of these persons were west, and 8.578.000 east 
of the Rhine. 6 The average density of population 
in 1937 was 731.4 per square mile as compared 
with 381.55 for Germany as a whole and with 
713.4 for Belgium. More than 38 percent of the 
people in the area lived in cities with populations 
of 100.000 or more. In the industrial core of the 
region—the Ruhr valley extending eastward from 
the Rhine for 4(1 miles to Dortmund and contain¬ 
ing 14 cities of over 100,000 people—the density 
before the war was 3.300 per square mile. 1 

The salient feature of the economy of the area 
is the relatively greater importance of industry 
and the relatively smaller importance of agri¬ 
culture as compared with the remainder of Ger¬ 
many, as may be seeen in Table 2. About one-half 
of the gainfully employed in the area were engaged 
in industry and handicrafts as compared with not 
finite 40 percent for the remainder of Germany. 

6 Foreign Economic Administration. Manpower Division. 
May 1945. 

7 Office of War Information. Document Xo. E 552. 


29 
















TABLE 1 


Principal Crops, Orchards, Vineyards and Forest Land of the Listed Provinces and of All Germany, 1937 


(in hectares) 



Westfalen 

Rheinprovinz 

Tfalz 

Hessen 

Saarland 

Altreich 

Principal grains 

Legumes. _ 

Root crops _ 

Truck gardens 

Commercial crops ... 

Fodder _ . __ 

460, 606 
11, 699 
166, 310 
2, 964 
4, 517 
66, 969 

529, 133 
7. 023 
260, 417 
13, 253 

5, 140 
123, 086 

101, 045 
1, 396 
69, 603 
3, 706 
3, 721 
29, 291 

168, 590 
2, 380 
105, 832 
6, 254 
2, 081 
40, 999 

33, 918 
720 
25, 872 
628 
104 
10, 287 

11, 349, 530 
449, 802 
4, 496, 719 
132, 724 
149, 481 
2, 134, 151 

Total plowland currently under cultiva- 
vation _ 

Orchards 

Vineyards 

734, 193 

3, 308 

955, 019 

8, 507 
15, 343 

212, 312 

1, 534 
18, 360 

331,116 

3, 505 
16, 749 

72, 607 
713 

3 

19, 408, 527 
107, 491 
81, 711 

Total land in agricultural use 

Forest and woodlots _____ 


1, 248, 182 
535, 818 

1, 432, 872 
722, 429 

292, 407 
223, 128 

470, 923 
240, 506 

115, 439 
57, 263 

28, 724, 103 
12, 913, 965 

Total area 

2, 021, 558 

2, 447, 737 

552, 039 

768, 973 

191, 315 

47, 024, 450 


Source: Slnlistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche. Reich, Berlin, 1938. 


TABLE 2 


Occupational Distribution of Gainfully Employed Left Bank of 
the Rhine, Plus Greater Ruhr and the Remainder of Germany, 
1939 


Categories 

Left bank of 
Rhine plus Ruhr 

Rest of Germany 

Number 

(000) 

Percent¬ 
age of 
total 

Number 

(000) 

Percent¬ 
age of 
total 

Agriculture, forestry, fishing. 

1, 227 

18. 0 

9, 621 

29. 2 

Industry and handicrafts_ 

3, 441 

50. 4 

13, 063 

39. 6 

Trade and transport 

1, 207 

17. 7 

5, 644 

17. 1 

Public and private service.. 

636 

9. 3 

3, 432 

10. 4 

Household service 

313 

4. 6 

1, 209 

3. 7 

Total . 

6, 824 

100. 0 

32, 968 

100. 0 


Source : R & A Report No. 2914, OSS. 


In the period from 1921 until the last free Ger¬ 
man election in March 1933, the Catholic Party 
(Zentrum) elected more delegates to the Reichstag 
than any other political party, averaging 34.7 rep¬ 
resentatives (out of 127 from the area) per elec¬ 
tion. Next were the National Socialists with 20.3, 
the Social Democrats with 17.5 and the Commu¬ 
nists with 16.8 representatives per election. No 
other party averaged more than 6 per election. 
In March 1933, the Nazis received the largest vote 
ever polled by a single party in one election and 
sent 47 delegates to the Reichstag from this area. 
However, in all the districts of the region, except¬ 
ing the Palatinate, the Nazi vote was only from 
30 to 40 percent of the total vote, as compared with 
a national average of 43.9 percent. 

Mineral and Metal Resources 


Table 13 shows the number of gainfully em¬ 
ployed and the value added by manufacture by 
industries in the area and in Germany. 

Most of the people of the region are German¬ 
speaking and of German nationality, though a 
small group of Poles in the Ruhr may have re¬ 
tained their native language and citizenship. The 
population is predominantly Catholic, except in 
the Palatinate and Hesse and in most urban dis¬ 
tricts of the Ruhr where Protestants are in the 
majority. To the south, east, and north in Rhein- 
provinz east of the Rhine and in Westfalen there 
is a broad continuous belt predominantly Catholic. 
With few exceptions, the adjoining districts be¬ 
yond the belt are 70 percent or more Protestant. 


COAL 

The industrially important mineral and metal 
resources of the Ruhr-Rhineland are coal and iron, 
lead and zinc ores. Coal is the most important 
economic asset, not only of this region but of all 
Germany, constituting the principal foundation 
of the German industrial system. Upon the coal 
mines of the region—the most important of which 
are in the Ruhr, the Saar, and the Aachen dis¬ 
tricts—are based the country’s major iron and 
steel, chemical, and machinery and metalworking 
industries. 

The three major coal fields are estimated to con¬ 
tain reserves of about 233 billion metric tons of 
Steinkohle or 80.8 percent of total known and 


30 




































































probable reserves to a depth of 2.000 meters. The 
Ruhr coal field alone contains about 74 percent of 
German reserves, while those of the Saar and the 
Aachen region contain 3.1 and 3.6 percent re¬ 
spectively. 8 

The main types of Steinkohle in all these fields 
are Magerkohle (semi-anthracite). Fettkohle (bi¬ 
tuminous coking) and Gaskohie and Gasfamm- 
kohle (gas coal). Up to 70 percent of all coke 
produced and therefore most coal-tar derivatives 
come from Fettkohle . which is also important for 
other industrial uses. The other types of coal are 
used chiefly for heating, power and gas production. 

The distribution of the Steinkohle reserves of 
the region is shown in Table 3. 

TABLE 3 


Estimated Known and Probable Reserves of Steinkohle in the 
Ruhr, Saar, and Aachen Fields and in Total Germany, 1935 

(IX MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS) 



Known to 
depth of 
1.000 
meters 

Total, in¬ 
cluding 
known and 
probable to 
a depth of 
2,000 meters 

Ruhr _ 

55, 100 
10, 413 

9, 205 

213, 600 
10, 500 
9, 205 

Aachen 

Saar - . _ _ _ 

Total 

74, 718 

233, 305 

Total German 

87, 330 

288, 721 


Source: Coal Deposits in Germany. Prepared by Geological Survey, 
United States Department of the Interior, for the Solid Fuels Division, 
Quartermaster Corps, United States Army, March 1944. 


The coal mined in the Ruhr-Rhineland region 
is of high quality. The best coking coal of the 
Saar, however, is inferior to that of the Ruhr. 
Some of the Aachen beds have been worked so 
long that the only commercially minable coal re- 
maining is Magerkohle . some of which ranks as 
the equal of the Ruhr Magerkohle. 

The only important brown coal deposit in the 
region is near Cologne, between the Aachen and 
Ruhr fields. Reserves in this field are estimated 
at 17.3 billion metric tons, or about one-third of 
the total known German reserves. Brown coal 
is an unconsolidated type of lignite with a low 
heating value. Two tons of average German bi¬ 
tuminous coal have the utilizable value of 7.5 to 


8 Coal Deposits in Germany. Prepared by Geological 
Survey. United States Department of the Interior, for the 
Solid Fuels Division, Quartermaster Corps, United States 
Army. March 1944. 


9 tons of brown coal depending on whether the 
brown coal is used directly or in the form of bri¬ 
quettes. and on the region from which it comes. 
Brown coal, however, is important as a fuel, for 
the production of electricity, and as a raw material 
for the chemical industry. Brown coal deposits 
are generally close to the surface of the earth and 
are, therefore, easily mined. A part of the brown 
coal in the Cologne region is mined from open pits 
with large machines. 

IROX ORE 

The iron ore deposits of the Ruhr-Rhineland 
are estimated at about 98 million metric tons or 
about 14 percent of total German resources. The 
largest fields of the region, which are also the most 
productive, lie in the Siegerland-Wied district. 
A number of smaller fields are scattered through 
the area. German iron ore. however, is of poor 
quality. Even the best of it would be classified, 
by ordinary standards, as medium grade. The 
annual output of the Ruhr-Rhineland deposits 
represents only a small fraction of its requirements. 

LEAD AND ZIXC 

The region contains fairly important lead and 
zinc reserves in numerous scattered locations. The 
estimated recoverable metal in ore reserves (1936) 
was 699.300 tons of lead and 4.009,940 tons of zinc. 
Before the war, the yield of these deposits repre¬ 
sented 16 percent of German zinc consumption 
and 13 percent of German lead consumption. In 
1937 production in terms of metal content was 36.- 
460 tons of zinc and 27.668 tons of lead or 22 and 
35 percent, respectively, of total German produc¬ 
tion. The most important fields are Maggen, 
Ramsbeck and Ems east of the Rhine. (For a 
graphic presentation of the location of resources 
in the region see Map Xo. 6284.) 

III. Mining and Manufacturing 

Coal Mining 9 

Coal. Germany’s most valuable raw material, en¬ 
abled the country to obtain most of the other raw 
materials that it lacked. Coke from the Ruhr was 
exchanged for iron ore from Lorraine: products 
of the German chemical industry which was 
founded on coal-tar, a byproduct of coking opera¬ 
tions, were exported to help pay for such mate¬ 
rials as the metal alloys needed for steel making: 
exports of machinery made from steel provided 
the foreign exchange used in part for the importa- 

8 Most of the information contained in this section was 

taken from FEA Report Xo. EIS-21: Coal Production and 
Distribution in Germany. October 5. 1944. 


31 
















tion of cotton, wool, woodpulp, and foodstuffs; 
and so on. 

Germany has also been successful in utilizing 
coal to provide substitutes for lacking industrial 
raw materials. Coal is, for example, the source 
of synthetic liquid fuels and has contributed great¬ 
ly toward the production of synthetic fixed nitro¬ 
gen, synthetic rubber, synthetic fibers, chemicals 
for explosives, and numerous other products that 
have made it possible for a country otherwise poor 
to challenge the armies of most of the rest of the 
world. 

Germany is the largest coal producer of Conti¬ 
nental Europe with the possible exception of the 
European section of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Most European countries are importers 
of coal. Before the war Germany stood second 
only to England as a source of their supply. Ger¬ 
man exports of coal (in terms of Steinkohle) in 
1938 were 35,290,000 metric tons out of a total pro¬ 
duction of 229,507,000 metric tons. 

Most of Germany’s Steinkohle is mined in the 
Ruhr, Saar and Aachen coal fields of the Ruhr- 
Rhineland. A considerable proportion of the 
brown coal is also produced in this region. Table 
4 shows the 1938 Ruhr-Rhineland production of 
Steinkohle and brown coal in the major coal fields 
and its relation to total German production. 

TABLE 4 

Production of Steinkohle and Brown Coal in the Major Coal 
Fields of the Ruhr-Rhineland in 1938 and Its Relation to Total 
German Production 



Production (in thou¬ 
sand metric tons) 

Percentage of 
total German 

Steinkohle 

Brown coal 

Stein- 

kohie 

Brown 

coal 

Ruhr 

127, 284 


68. 0 


Saar 

14, 393 


7. 7 


Aachen 

7. 754 


4. 1 


Ruhr-Rhineland_ 

149, 431 

57, 590 

79. 8 

29. 5 


Source : FEA Report Xo. EIS-21 : Coal Production and Distri¬ 
bution in German!/. October 5, 1944. 


In 1930 the Steinkohle mining, coke and bri¬ 
quettes industry of the Ruhr-Rhineland employed 
333,925 persons or 79.0 percent of the total num¬ 
ber employed in this industry in Germany. Brown 
coal mining and briquettes manufacture employed 
15,029 persons or 18.3 percent of the total number 
so employed in Germany. In the same year the 
value of exports of Steinkohle and of Steinkohle 
coke and briquettes amounted to RM 339,053,000 


or 92.3 percent of the total value of German ex¬ 
ports of these commodities, and the value of ex¬ 
ports of brown coal briquettes was RM 16,118,000 
or 96.1 percent of total German exports of this 
commodity. 10 

German production of coal increased as the 
Nazis prepared for war. During the war the out¬ 
put of Steinkohle fell, and remained for some time, 
below the 1938 level. It was, however, with diffi¬ 
culty. brought back to about the prewar level. On 
the other hand, brown coal production was raised 
by about a third in all fields, because production 
of brown coal requires less labor in general and 
also less skilled labor than the production of Stein¬ 
kohle. 

At the time of the collapse of Germany it was 
found that there had been a catastrophic decline in 
the production of coal. However, the damage was 
mainly to surface facilities and is rapidly being 
repaired. 

Not only was the Ruhr-Rhineland the chief cen¬ 
ter of German Steinkohle production, but it was 
also one of the main coal consuming areas of Ger¬ 
many. In 1938 the Ruhr alone consumed nearly 
25 percent of Germany’s total production of Stein¬ 
kohle , coke and briquettes, and 37 percent of total 
German consumption of these products. 

The metallurgical and synthetic oil industries, 
the electric power plants and the railroads were 
immense consumers of coal in the area. Nearly 
all of the electric power produced in the Ruhr- 
Rhineland was generated with coal. Of the ther¬ 
mal generating capacity * 11 installed in plants over 
10,000 kw. in size in 1943, 65.9 percent used Stein¬ 
kohle and 29.1 percent used brown coal. 12 The 
Ruhr is one of the main areas of concentration of 
synthetic oil plants, which are dependent upon lo¬ 
cal supplies of coal. All but one of these plants 
use Steinkohle. No reliable figures are available 
on the synthetic oil production or capacity in the 
area. New capacity was being built up to the last 
days of the war. 

Owing to the presence in the region of the best 
German coal for the manufacture of metallurgical 
coke, the hulk of the German coke and coal-tar 
plants are located there. (See Map No. 6284.) 
More than 80 percent of German metallurgical 
coke is obtained from the Steinkohle of the area as 
shown in Table 5. 

10 Die Deutsche Industrie: prepared by Reichsamt fitr 
Wehrwirtschuftsjdavnug; published 1930. The figures are 
for all of Westfalen, Rheinprovinz, Pfalz, Hessen and 
Saarland. 

11 Hydroelectric capacity in the area was negligible. 

12 OSS R & A Report No. 2914. 


32 






















TABLE 5 


German Coke Production from Steinkohle, by Districts, 1938 

IX THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS i 



Production 

Percentage of 
total Germany 

Ruhr . 

Saar _ 

Aachen 

Ruhr-Rhineland 

33, 634 
3. 108 

1. 433 
38, 175 

77. 3 
7. 1 
3. 2 
87. 6 


Source: FEA Report Xo. EIS-21: Coal Production and Distinction in 
Germans/, October 5,1944. 


The gas which was a by-product of the coking 
process was used for both domestic and industrial 
purposes, more than DO percent being consumed by 
industry. In 1935, 62 percent of the total gas pro¬ 
duced in Germany came from the Ruhr. A <ya> 
* “ 

grid connects up most of the coke ovens of the 
Ruhr and constitutes the source of the ga~ supply 
of a considerable area. During the war a source of 
natural ga- was discovered in the area in the 
neighborhood of the Dutch border, and the gas was 
piped to Hills. 

The production of certain coal by-products in 
the Ruhr-Rhineland in 1937 was as follows: 



Production 
(in metric 
tons) 

Percentage 
of total Ger¬ 
man pro¬ 
duction 

Tar 

1. 377. 791 

86. 5 

Crude benzol _ 

453. 392 

85. 6 

Ammonium sulphate 

469, 209 





Most German coal mining enterprises are very 
large. In 1937. 55 percent of the Steinkohle and 
">2 percent of the brown coal came from mines hav¬ 
ing an individual output of more than a million 
tons a year. The total number of mining com¬ 
panies in Germany was about 260. but the great 
bulk of the output came from a very few com¬ 
panies. One company alone. Gelsenkircliener. ac¬ 
counted for Id percent of the total output in 1937: 
5 companies accounted for 50 percent: 13 compa¬ 
nies for 70 percent, and 21 companies for 90 per¬ 
cent. 

The majority of the mining companies are sub¬ 
sidiaries of the iron and steel combines, though a 
large part of their output is sold to the general 
market. In 1937. 61 percent of German coal was 
produced by combines: 54 percent was produced by 
combines in heavy industry. By 1943 the per¬ 
centage of the total output of coal and brown coal 


mined by combines had increased to 90 percent, 
with 70 percent in the hands of heavy industry 
combines. 

The Reich has much the most important bloc of 
interests in the German coal-mining industry. It 
was estimated at the end of 1942 that more than 
40 percent of the total Steinkohle and a consid¬ 
erable percentage of the brown coal mined in Ger¬ 
many came from mines wholly owned bv the Reich, 
by its subdivisions (primarily Prussia), and by 
combines in which the Reich was the sole or lead¬ 
ing shareholder. Some outstanding Steinkohlt 
mining enterprises in this category, which ac¬ 
counted for 45 percent of the production in the 
Ruhr-Rhineland. together with their output in 
1937 were: 

B ergwerksgeselheh a ft Hibernia A. G. : 10.229.- 
ooo metric tom from pits near Herne in the Ruhr. 

Saargruben A. G .: 13.365.000 metric tons. This 
company produced most of the coal coming from 
the Saar. 

Geict rkschaft Friedrich der Grosse : 1.221.000 
metric tons from pits at Herne. This company 
is a subsidiary of Ilseder Hiitte. an iron and steel 
corporation in which the Reich was a leading 
shareholder. 

Mines of Harpener Bergbau .1. G.: 9.149.000 
metric tons from pits in several parts of the Ruhr. 
Reported to be owned by Reichswerke "Hermann 
Goring." but may have been transferred to Flick 
interests. 

Bergbau A. G. Ewald-Konig Ludwig : 5.008,000 
metric tons from mines in the Ruhr. "Hermann 
Goring" held a majority of the stock. 

Gelsenkirchener Bergwerke A. G 26.644.000 
metric tons from a number of mines in the Ruhr. 
This company is wholly owned by Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke. controlled by the Reich. 

Concordia Bergbau A. G.: 1.568,000 metric 
tons from pits near Oberhausen in the Ruhr. 
Vereinigte Stahlwerke is a majority stockholder. 

See Ruhr Series Maps 7 (Direct Shipments of 
Coal, etc.) and 8 (Coal and Coke Exports). 

The Iron and Steel Industry 13 

Germany had the second largest iron and steel 
industry in the world. In 1938, the United Stater- 
produced 26 percent and Germany 20.6 percent 
of world output of steel. German production of 

M">r ..f the information contained in this section was 
taken from the report of the Technical Industrial Dis- 
armament Committee on the Iron and Steel Industries. 
May 23. 1945. and a part from the Economic Survey of 
Germany, Section H: The Metal Industries. Ministry of 
Economic Warfare, September 1944. 


33 




















steel was more than double that of Britain. 
Among the world’s iron and steel exporters Ger¬ 
many was second only to the Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic Union and appreciably ahead of the 
United States and the United Kingdom. Ger¬ 
man exports of pig iron, semifinished and finished 
steel in 1937, the peak year, amounted to 3,686,000 
metric tons. In the same year total imports of 
these products were 542,000 tons, pig iron and 
ferro-alloys accounting for 112,000 and 160,000 
tons respectively. In 1937 the industry employed 
385,584 persons or roughly 4.8 percent of the total 
number employed by German industry. 

The German iron and steel industry has as¬ 
sumed vast proportions, despite the fact that it 
has been far from self-sufficient in iron ore. Al¬ 
though Germany has deposits of the ore, it is of 
poor quality, and Germany has imported much 
of the ore used in her furnaces. Her iron ore im¬ 
ports from 1935 to 1938 averaged, in terms of iron 
content, 77.7 percent of consumption. However, 
the high output of domestic ore in 1937 was equal 
to about 70 percent of the ore consumed in 1932 
when Germany produced 3.9 million tons of pig 
iron. Domestic ore is mostly very low grade, its 
iron content averaging 33-35 percent as compared 
with an average of 60 percent for Swedish, 50 
percent for Spanish, and 45 percent for Norwe¬ 
gian iron ore. French ore is also low-grade, the 
average iron content being 33-37 percent. In 
1937, Germany produced 9,792,000 metric tons of 
iron ore (2,759,000 metric tons estimated iron 
content) and imported 20,621,000 metric tons 
(9,020,000 metric tons estimated iron content). 
In the same year the Ituhr-Rhineland produced 
1,950,000 metric tons of iron ore (601,568 metric 
tons iron content), or 19.9 percent of total Ger¬ 
man production, and consumed approximately 85 
percent of total German consumption. Of the ore 
consumed in Germany in 1937, 69.8 percent was 
imported, 34.3 percent from Sweden and Norway, 
23.8 percent from France, 1.4 percent from Spain, 
and 10.3 percent from other countries. Virtually 
all of the French ore imported into Germany in 
1938 was consumed in the Saar and the bulk of 
the Swedish and Norwegian ores in Rhenish- 
Westphalia. 

For a number of reasons, including its enormous 
supply of high-grade coal and its cheap and ex¬ 
cellent water transportation facilities, the Ruhr- 
Rhineland, especially the Ruhr, has become Ger¬ 
many’s greatest iron and steel producing area. 


(See Map No. 6284.) In 1938 it accounted for 
approximately 19,680,000 tons or 71 percent of 
total German crude steel, and approximately 
17,350,000 tons or 72 percent of total German pig- 
iron production. 14 In 1943 the crude steel output 
of the Ruhr-Rhineland was 14,992,400 metric tons, 
or 71.3 percent of total German (Altreich ) output 
in that year; 11,686,400 tons of the total for the 
area was produced in the Ruhr. Table 6 shows 
the distribution of German iron and steel capacity 
by areas in 1938, in thousands of metric tons. 


TABLE 0 


District 

Pig iron 
and ferro¬ 
alloys 

Crude 

steel 

Kolled and 
forged steel 

Rhenish-Westphalia 

13, 250 

16, 000 

10, 800 

Siegerland-Hesse 

800 

475 

600 

Saar 

2, 500 

2, 750 

2, 000 

Silesia 

275 

700 

550 

Saxonv. 


700 

500 

Southern Germany 
Northeastern and Central 

425 

550 

400 

Germany a 

3, 525 

4, 000 

2, 750 

Total 

20, 775 

25, 175 

17, 600 


a Including 2,000,000 tons of pig iron, 2,000,000 tons of crude steel, and 1,300,- 
000 tons of rolled products at the Hermann Goring Steel Works, Salzgittcr. 


Primary iron and steel products manufactured 
in the Ruhr-Rhineland in 1936 accounted for 
RM 996,900,000 in value added by manufacture 
or 10.5 percent of the total value added by mining 
and manufacturing in the area, and 85 percent of 
the value added by the industry in all Germany. 
The primary iron and steel products industry of 
the region employed 167,000 persons or 82.8 per¬ 
cent of all persons employed by that industry in 
Germany. The value of exports from the region 
amounted to RM 274,650,000 or 70.5 percent of the 
value of total German exports of these products. 15 

About 90 percent of the iron and steel capacity 
of Rhenish-Westphalia is located in an area some 
10 miles by 40 miles in the valleys of the Rhine and 
the Ruhr, stretching from Duisburg to Dortmund. 
Almost all of the steel plants have blast furnaces 
and produce their own coke. They are linked to 
the Ruhr gas and electricity grids, which supply 
consumers many miles from the Ruhr. All of the 
important iron and steel plants have their own 

u For derivation of these figures see Table 12. 

13 Die Deutsche Industrie. The figure on exports is for 
nil of Rheinprovinz, Westfalen, Pfalz, Hessen,, and Saar¬ 
land. 


34 




















engineering branches close at hand. Table 7 shows 
the importance of the Ruhr in the German coal 
and steel economy. 


TABLE 7 

The Place of the Ruhr in German Coal and Steel Economy, 1938 



Germany (Alt- 
reich) 

Ruhr 

Ruhr as 
percent 
of Ger¬ 
many 

Area sq. km_ 

470, 000 

4, 737 

1. 01 

Population _ _ _ 

66. 870. 000 

4. 246, 000 

6. 35 

Output of Steinkohle _ 

186, 179, 000 

127. 284. 000 

68. 37 

Output of coke _ . _ 

a 43, 511. 000 

a 33. 634, 000 

77. 30 

Output of pig iron 

b 20. 775. 000 

d 13, 250. 000 


Output of steel. 
Consumption of coal 
(Steinkohle coke and 

c 23. 000. 000 

- 16, 000, 000 


briquettes) 

152, 376, 000 

57, 000, 000 

37. 41 


» From Steinkohle. 

b Estimate. Includes low-erade ferro-alloys. 

« Estimate. 

•' Includes low-grade ferro-alloys. 

* Figures are for Rhenish-Westphalia. Includes cast steel. 


The principal iron and steel plants of the Saar, 
which are also near collieries and make their own 
coke, form the limits of a rough triangle, 20 by 
14 by 12 miles whose corners are Dillingen. Saar- 
briicken and Neunkirchen. They, too. are linked 
to gas and electricity grids. 

There are no figures available showing the prin¬ 
cipal uses of steel in the Ruhr-Rhineland. How¬ 
ever. owing to its high degree of industrialization, 
it may be assumed that the region consumed a 
large proportion of German finished steel produc¬ 
tion. especially for such uses as railroads and 
tramways; building; electrical engineering and 
power supply; collieries; and steel works main¬ 
tenance. 

A few large combines own most of the crude steel 
capacity of the Ruhr-Rhineland. Vereinigte 
Stahlwerke A. G.. Dusseldorf. owns a capacity of 
8 or 9 million tons, all but a very small proportion 
of which is in the Ruhr. Next in capacity is Fried¬ 
rich Krupp A. G.. Essen, with just over 2 million 
tons, of which 1.3 million is at Rheinhausen near 
Duisburg and the remainder in two plants at 
Essen. Other plants controlling about a million 
tons per annum are Hosch A. G.. Dortmund; Gute- 
hoffnungshiitte. Oberhausen; Klockner A. G.. 
Duisburg: Mannesmann Rohren-Werke A. G.. 
Dusseldorf; and the Otto Wolff Group of Cologne. 


The production of the principal steel enterprises 
in the territory in 1943 was as follows: 16 


Metric tons 

Vereinigte Stahlwerke_ 5, 786.100 

Friedrich Krupp A. G_ a 1. 549,000 

Mannesmann Rohren-Werke A. G_ 1, 100, 200 

Otto Wolff_ 918. 400 

Gutehoffnungshiitte, Oberhausen 

A. G_ 848. 900 

Ildseh-Koln-Xeussen A. G_ 809, 100 

Klockner Werke A. G_ !1 684, 000 


a Rough estimate since source gives production of concerns 
without a breakdown by individual plants. 


The following description of the war damage 
sustained by the >teel industry in the British zone 
of occupation recently has been published: “The 
extent of destruction in the Northwest has now 
been ascertained. Some 70 percent of the build¬ 
ings have been destroyed, but. as expected, dam¬ 
age to plant, though serious, has been less severe 
than to buildings. About 30 percent of the plant 
and machinery is beyond repair: a further 20 per¬ 
cent has sustained superficial damage and could be 
repaired within six months given the necessary 
labour and materials. In other words, half the 
steel producing capacity of the Northwest is vir- 
tuallv intact and—on the basis of estimates given 
in a memorandum by German industrialists and 
believed by experts of Military Government to be 
reasonably near the mark—could be put into oper¬ 
ation almost immediately." 

The Machinery and Metalworking Industries 17 

After 1900 Germany acquired a dominant posi¬ 
tion in the world as a producer of machinery, and 
during most of that period was second in impor¬ 
tance only to the United States. While production 
of machinery in the United States was more than 
double that of Germany before the war. a much 
larger share of United States production was de¬ 
voted to the manufacture of consumers’ goods. 
Certain types of producers' goods were manufac¬ 
tured in Germany in equal or even larger volume 
than in the United States. 

Germany's production of machinery was greater 
than that of all the rest of Europe combined, ex¬ 
cluding Great Britain. 

16 Reichsvereiniyung Eisen. 

17 A part of the information contained in this section 
was taken from FEA Report No. IXD-11. The German 
Machine Industry. May 1945, and from the Post-Surrender 
Treatment of the Aggregate of the German Machinery 
Industries from the Standpoint of International Secur¬ 
ity —Technical Industrial Disarmament Committee Re¬ 
port No. 14. June 27. 1945. 


35 



























During the period from 1935 to 1939 German 
capacity for the production of machinery was suf¬ 
ficiently large to enable it simultaneously to equip 
Germany with an overwhelming weight of arma¬ 
ment, to continue the manufacture of machinery 
for peacetime uses, and to maintain and even to 
increase machinery exports. 

The machinery industry was one of the most 
important of Germany’s basic industries. In 1936 
it employed more persons and added greater value 
by manufacture than the chemical and iron and 
steel industries combined, and its relative impor¬ 
tance in these terms increased between 1936 and 
1938. in 1936 the industry employed 13.7 percent 
of all industrial employees and accounted for 15.4 
percent of the total value added by manufacture 
in the Altreich. 

Germany has been, since 1931, the world’s larg¬ 
est exporter of industrial machines. In that year 
German exports were 34.2 percent of world ex¬ 
ports of industrial machinery, by volume. In 1938 
the value of German exports of all kinds of ma¬ 
chinery was 26.8 percent of the total value of all 
German exports. In 1936 the value of machinery 
plus metal goods exports was 31.4 percent of the 
value of all German industrial exports. 18 

The concentration in the Ruhr-Rhineland of 
large steel works, many of which include plants 
for the production of heavy machinery, has made 
this Germany’s most important heavy machinery 
district. (See Map No. 6284.) The area is also 
an important producer of lighter types of machin¬ 
ery such as machine tools, and of many types of 
iron and steel products. 

The machinery and metalworking 19 industries 
were the most important in the Ruhr-Rhineland in 
terms of their contribution to the total value added 
by mining and manufacture. In 1936 machinery 
contributed 7.6 percent and iron and steel products 

10.3 percent to the total as compared with 13.9 
percent contributed by the coal and coke and 10.5 
percent by the iron and steel industries. The value 
of exports from the region in the same year 
amounted to RM 248,406,000 for machinery, (in¬ 
cluding vehicles and electrical goods), and RM 
270,757,000 for iron and steel goods or 23.4 and 

69.3 percent, respectively, of the total value of 
German exports in these categories. The value 
added by manufacture by the machinery industry 

18 Die Deutsche Industrie. 

w Under machinery and metalworking the following Ger¬ 
man designations of industrial groups are included: the 
machine industry, including construction of apparatus and 
boilers; the iron and steel goods industry (less vehicle 
parts) ; the vehicle industry; the vehicle parts industry; 
the electrical machinery industry. 

36 


in the region amounted to 20.4 percent and that by 
the iron and steel products industry to 54.7 percent 
of the total for these respective industries in all of 
Germany. The total number of persons employed 
in these industries in the region was 437,876 or 
30 percent of total German employment in the 
same industries. 20 

The accompanying table gives the estimated dis¬ 
tribution, in terms of percentage of total Germany, 
of persons employed and of value of turnover in 
the various branches of the machinery and metal¬ 
working industries in the Ruhr-Rhineland. 21 



Employees 

Turn-over 

Machine Industry 

25. 1 

28. 6 

Iron and steel goods 

48. 4 

55. 2 

Vehicle industry 

10. 4 

11. 6 

Vehicle parts industry 

37. 5 

41. 1 

Electrical machinery industry 

11. 0 

13. 3 


THE MACHINE INDUSTRY 

All machinery producers in Germany were com¬ 
pelled to belong to the Wirtschaftsgruppe Maschin- 
enbau (Economic Group for Machine Construc¬ 
tion ). The total number of members of this group 
in 1937 was 4,000, of which 1,010, or 25.2 percent, 
were situated in the Ruhr-Rhineland. Their dis¬ 
tribution in some sections of the area and the dis¬ 
tribution of productive capacity (employment or 
turnover) are shown in the following table: 


District 

Number of 
firms 

Percentage of 
productive 
capacity 

Rheinprovinz east of Rhine 

198 

25 

Rheinprovinz west of Rhine 

419 

75 

Westfalen, small Ruhr _ 

178 

60 

Large Ruhr, minus small Ruhr_ 

137 

40 


The principal firms in the Ruhr-Rhineland en¬ 
gaged in the manufacture of machinery are listed 
in Table 8 in the order of the size of their capital¬ 
ization which is not necessarily in the order of 
their importance in the production of machinery. 
The first two are principally iron and steel and 
coal enterprises which manufacture machinery 
only as a sideline. 

The principal automobile manufacturing firm in 
the territory was Ford Werke A. G., capitalized 
at RM 32,000,000. 

w Die Deutsche Industrie. These figures on exports and 
employment are for Westfalen, Rheinprovinz, Pfalz, 
Hessen, and Saarland. Only a small part of Hessen, con¬ 
taining perhaps a quarter of its machinery industries, is 
within the territory designated as the Ruhr-Rhineland. 

21 These figures are for the exact area designated as the 
Ruh r-Rhi neland. 


























In 1086 the machine industry of the Ruhr-Rhine- 
iand manufactured nearly 30 percent of all ma¬ 
chines produced in Germany and employed about 
2 .5 percent of all persons employed by the German 
machine industry. Table 9 shows employment and 
turnover in the industry by districts of the Ruhr- 
Rhineland in 1936. 

table s 


Principal Manufacturers of Machinery in the Ruhr-Rhineland 


Firm 

Capital¬ 
ization 
(000 RM)° 

Remarks 

Friedrich Krupp A. G., 
Essen. 

160. 000 

Guns and armament, 
locomotives, gears, 
trucks and buses, 
agricultural ma- 
chinerv, tanks. 

Gutehoffn u ngshutte, 
Oberhausen. 

104, 000 

Blast-furnaces and steel 
mills, industrial plant 
and apparatus, steam 
turbines, pumps and 
air compressors, 
steam boilers and 
steel construction. 

Rheinmetall Borsig, A. 
G., Diisseldorf. 

75, 000 

Armament and guns, 
antiaircraft guns, 
stationary and 
marine-type steam 
power plants, com¬ 
pressors of large size 
for chemical indus¬ 
try, oil-refining 
plants and chemical 
plants, office ma¬ 
chines. 

“Demag” (Deutsche 
Maschinenfabrik, 
A. G.), Duisburg. 

42, 500 

Blast-furnace plants 
and complete steel 
mills, cranes and 
conveying plants, 
t urbo-eompressors, 
reciprocating com¬ 
pressors for highest 
capacities and pres¬ 
sures, compressed 
air machinery, gas 
generators, water-gas 
plant, synthetic oil 
plants. 

Klockner -Humboldt- 
Deutz A. G., Koln- 
Deutz. 

42, 500 

Diesel and gasoline 
engines, trucks and 
buses, crushers, ore 
and coal processing 
plant, smelting plant 
for non-ferrous 
metals, bridges and 
tanks. 

G. M. Pfaff A. G., 
Kaiserslautern. 

16. 000 

Sewing machines, 
armament compon¬ 
ents, machine tools. 

International Harves¬ 
ter Co., Xeuss o. 
Rhine. 

13. 500 

Farm machines, 
tractors. 

Schiess A. G., Diissel- 
dorf. 

12. 000 

Heavy machine tools. 


8 Capitalizations for this list were taken from the Handbuch der Deulschen 
A ktiengesellschaften. 


TABLE 9 

Estimated Employment and Turnover in the Machine Industry 
of the Ruhr-Rhineland, 1936 


Location 

Employ- Turn-over 
ment (RM 1.000) 

West of the Rhine: 

Rheinprovinz west of Rhine 
Hessen west of Rhine 

22, 000 
2. 200 
10. 900 
3, 200 

188, 000 
18. 100 
80. 700 
19. 100 

Pfalz _ 

Saarland 

TotaL 

38. 300 

305. 900 

East of the Rhine: 

Rheinprovinz east of Rhine 
Westfalen, small Ruhr 

Large Ruhr, minus small Ruhr_ 

Total 

66, 000 
21. 800 
14, 600 

566, 000 
167, 000 
111, 000 

102, 400 

844, 000 



All of the heavy machine tool manufacturers, 
but comparatively few of those producing ma¬ 
chine tools of average size, and all of the firms 
specializing in the manufacture of underground 
mining equipment were in the Ruhr-Rhineland. 
All but one of the principal producers of steel 
works machinery were in the area. 

While the region contained onlv a few of the 
major producers of textile machinery, the large 
number of small producers in the region brought 
its production to 25 percent of total German 
output. 

Three of the six most important German manu¬ 
facturers of steam boilers were within the terri¬ 
tory and all producers of modern steam boilers in 
Germany were dependent upon such products of 
the steel mills of the Ruhr as high pressure boiler 
drums, alloy steel boiler tubes, etc. The area's 
production of steam locomotives was small. 

The territory contained a number of important 
manufacturers of prime movers, such as steam tur¬ 
bines and reciprocating steam engines, the princi¬ 
pal one being Siemens Sclmckert-Werke in Miihl- 
heim. Germany's second largest manufacturer of 
turbo-alternators. Only one of the major pro¬ 
ducers of internal combustion engines was within 
the territory. 

All except two of the manufacturers of large 
high-pressure compressors, upon which the Ger¬ 
man synthetic chemical industries are based, were 
in the region, as were also most of the manufac¬ 
turers of high-pressure chemical apparatus and 
equipment. 

THE ffiOX AND STEEL GOODS INDUSTRY 

The distribution of the iron and steel goods in¬ 
dustry in the Ruhr-Rhineland paralleled that of 

37 






























the machine industry. Table 10 shows employ¬ 
ment and turn-over in the industry in the various 
districts of the region. 


TABLE 10 

Employment and Turn-over in the Iron and Steel Goods Industry 
of the Ruhr-Rhineland, 1936 


Location 

Employ¬ 

ment 

Turn-over 
RM 1,000 

West of the Rhine: 

Rheinprovinz 

H essen 

Pfalz 

Saarland 

23, 400 

1, 100 

3, 000 
15, 400 

175, 000 
6, 400 
20, 200 
36, 000 

Total _ 

32, 900 

237, 600 

East of the Rhine: 

Rheinprovinz 

Westfalen small Ruhr _ 

Large Ruhr, minus small Ruhr. 

70, 100 
52, 000 
34, 600 

525, 000 
460, 000 
306, 000 

Total _ _ . .. 

156, 700 

1, 291, 000 


TIIE VEHICLE INDUSTRY 

Motor vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles, and air¬ 
planes are included by the Germans in the vehicle 
industry. While only a fraction of the automo¬ 
bile industry was in the territory, a considerable 
part of the vehicle parts industry was located in 
the Ruhr. The combined output of Ford, Krupp, 
and Klockner-Humboldt probably represented all 
of the region's production of vehicles. 

THE ELECTRICAL MACHINERY INDUSTRY 

Only a small part of Germany’s electrical ma¬ 
chinery industry is within the territory. 

All of the foregoing data refer to the German 
machinery and metal-working industries as of 
1936-37. From 1936 to 1942 production capacity 
increased greatly, especially in the machine tool 
and chemical equipment branches, and in the metal 
goods and vehicles branches which converted to 
the manufacture of armament. While the capac¬ 
ity of the territory increased during this period, it 
seems likely that the percentage of its capacity in 
relation to that of all Germany decreased, owing to 
the fact that most new armament plants were 
erected outside the territory to remove them from 
easy range of British bombers. In the period from 
1942 to 1945 bomb damage and plant dispersal no 
doubt contributed to reduce the production capac¬ 
ity of the territory and its share of the total ma¬ 
chinery and metalworking capacity of Germany. 
It is likely, however, that a large portion of the 
plant as it existed in 1942 remains. If this proves 


to be the case, the capacity of the territory may 
well be far higher than in 1936-37. 

The Chemical Industry 22 

The German chemical industry has played a 
major part in the development of Germany’s in¬ 
dustrial power. Before 1914 German scientists 
led the world in the discovery and development 
of organic synthesis, and German exports of dye¬ 
stuffs and pharmaceuticals were an important 
source of foreign exchange. 

I. G. Farben is by far the largest of the German 
chemical concerns. Just before the outbreak of 
the war, it controlled perhaps 85 percent of the 
German chemical industry, and by its predominant 
position could exercise effective control over the 
whole of chemical production in Germany. 

In 1935 the value of German chemicals produc¬ 
tion was RM 3.7 billion. It was second in im¬ 
portance only to that of the United States which 
had a value of RM 6.8 billion. 

In 1936 Germany exported 26 percent of world 
exports of chemicals, while Great Britain and the 
United States, the next in order of importance 
of chemicals exports, accounted for only 15 per¬ 
cent and 14.1 percent, respectively. 23 In the same 
year chemicals exports represented 11.7 percent 
of the total value of German industrial exports. 24 
In 1937 the three most important types of chemi¬ 
cals exported from Germany were heavy chemicals, 
pharmaceutical products, and dyes and intermedi¬ 
ates, ranking in the order given. Together these 
types accounted for over half of the total value 
of German chemicals exports, which was RM 889.1 
million. However, in terms of percentage of value 
of world exports, the most important German 
chemicals exports were dyes and intermediates, 
pharmaceuticals, and photochemical products. 
Germany exported 53.9 percent, 38.2 percent, and 
35.3 percent, respectively, of total world exports 
of these products. 23 

In 1936 the German chemical industry employed 
2.2 percent of all persons employed in industry in 
Germany, paid 3.4 percent of the wages and sala¬ 
ries, and accounted for 4.5 percent of the value 
added by manufacture. 24 

The Ruhr-Rhineland accounts for an important 
part of German production in the following major 
branches of the chemical industry: coal-tar prod- 

22 A part of the information contacted in this section 
was taken from Economic Survey of Germanic Section J: 
The Chemical Industry . Ministry of Economic Warfare, 
October 1944. 

28 Die Chemisclie Industrie im Deutschen Reich 1939-40. 
Vol. X. Verlag Hoppenstedt & Co., Berlin. 

24 Die Deutsche Industrie. 


38 






















nets, sulfuric acid, alkali, fixed niti gen,' calcium 
carbide, dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals. The pri¬ 
mary reason for the concentration <>f chemical 
plants in the region was probably the proximity 
of major industrial consumers. In 1936 the chemi¬ 
cal industry of the region 25 employed 63,743 
persons or 35.2 percent of the total number <»f per¬ 
sons employed in the industry; it exported prod¬ 
ucts to the value of RM 260.268.000 or 4 v .i' percent 
of the value of total German exports of chemi¬ 
cals: and it accounted for 34.4 percent of the value 
added by manufacture of chemicals in Germany. 
The industry accounted for 5.5 percent of the 
value added by mining and manufacture within 
the area, in this respect ranking fifth in importance 
among the region’s industries. 

COAL TAR 

Germany first achieved supremacy in the field 
of chemicals through the development of products 
based upon coal and coal-tar. The presence of coal 
in the Ruhr-Rhineland accounts for the prewar 
concentration of coal-tar distillation plants in this 
region. Coal-tar crudes and intermediates from 
the Ruhr * 1 s ped for further processing 
throughout most of Germany, but particularly ti¬ 
the Frankfurt Main-Ludwigshafen area. The 
principal German tar-distilling company is the 
Ge*eTlschaft f»/‘ T> ervenrt rtung G. m. b. H.. which 
was founded by the coke-producing interests <>f 
the Ruhr, and has plants at Duisburg-Meiderich, 
Rauxel and Alsdorf-Aachen. Since about 1930, 
this company in its two chief works at Meiderich 
and Rauxel alone, has accounted for more than 
half of the tar distilled in Germany. There are 
several other distillation plants in the Ruhr- 
Rhineland: in fact all but one of the large Ger¬ 
man distillation plants are in thi> area. In 1937 
the production of tar in the region wa> 1.377.791 
metric tons or 86.5 percent of total German pro¬ 
duction. 

DTESTtTFS 

The commercial development and manufacture 
of synthetic dyestuffs form an important and prof¬ 
itable section of the German chemical industry. 
Before the war, world production of dyestuffs was 
about 236.000 metric tons; Germany headed the 
list of producing countries with an output <>f some 

69..metric tons, of which roughly ..metric 

tons valued at RM 150,.. were exported. 26 

** Die Deutsche Industrie. The figures are for all of 

I Westfalen, Itheinprovinx, Pfals, Hessen and Saarland, a 
somewhat larger area than that with which this report is 
concerned. 

“Economic Surrey of Germany. Section J: The Chetni- 
cil Industry. Ministry of Economic Warfare. October 
11414. The year is not given. 


Coal tar is the most important source of the 
primary products used in the manufacture of syn¬ 
thetic dyestuffs, the chief of these being benzene, 
naphthalene and anthracene. In the preparation 
"f dyestuffs from the primary products, large 
quantities of heavy chemicals are consumed. 

I. G. Farben had a monopoly of dyestuffs pro¬ 
duction in Germany. A large part of its capacity 
for producing dyestuffs and intermediates was 
located in the Ruhr-Rhineland in large plants at 
Lndwigshafen, Leverkusen, and Uerdingen. 

PHARMACEUTICALS 

Tlie techniques involved in the manufacture of 
synthetic drugs and of synthetic dyes are closely 
related, and the raw materials for both are derived 
from coal tar. 

Bayer, a branch of I. G. Farben. is by far the 
largest and most important lucer of pharma¬ 
ceuticals in Germany. Roughly 7" percent of its 
products were exported. It?- largest plants are 
at Elberfeld and Leverkusen in the Ruhr-Rhine¬ 
land. Another important pharmaceutical manu¬ 
facturing firm in the region is Knoll A. G. in 
Lndwigshafen. 

^ULFURIC ACID 

There was a heavy concentration of plants pro¬ 
ducing sulfuric acid in the area, especially in the 
Ruhr. The L G. Farben plant at Leverkusen was 
probably the largest producer in Germany, as of 
1940. The minimum annual realizable capacity 
in the Ruhr-Rhineland at the en-1 of 1944. a> stated 
by the Reich Planning Board, was approximately 
828,800 metric tons in terms of >U .- : This is 
not necessarily the maximum realizable in peace¬ 
time when proper materials are available, and ac¬ 
tual capacity, therefore, may well have been larger. 
The overall actual capacity of Germany 
(Altreich) at the end of 1944 was probably 
• 3,000,.metric tons monohydrate. 

ALKALI 

The principal alkalis are soda ash and caustic 
soda. Salt is the chief raw material required in the 
production of alkali. The principal German pro¬ 
ducer of alkali is the Dt to Solvay-Weric*, com¬ 
bine. It> plant at Rheinberg is the largest pro¬ 
ducer in the Ruhr-Rhineland. with an annual 

capacity of 230,(.tons of soda ash. The second 

most important combine in the industry is L GL 
Farben. It> plant at Ludwigshafen-Oppau is be- 

17 The document from which this figure was taken came 
from the GeneralberoUmachtigte fur Sonderfragen der 
Chemischen Erzeugung ( “Gebechem”). 


39 





lieved to have an annual capacity of 100,000 tons. 
In addition there are four other important plants 
in the area. None of Germany’s salt mines or 
works is in the Ruhr-Rhineland. 

In 1943, the total German capacity for alkali 
production was 1,042,000 tons of Na a O. In the 
same year the capacity in the Ruhr-Rhineland was 
339,000 tons of Na,0, or 32.5 percent of German 
capacity; this represented 44.5 percent of the soda 
ash capacity, and 6 percent of the caustic soda ca¬ 
pacity of Germany. 

FIXED NITROGEN 

Germany derives some chemical nitrogen from 
by-product ammonia most of which is produced 
in connection with coke ovens. Somewhat more is 
produced in calcium cyanamide plants, but the 
bulk of this chemical is produced as ammonia in 
high-pressure synthesis plants. 

German synthetic nitrogen capacity is largely 
in the hands of the I. G. Farbenindustrie which 
manufactures the chemical in several plants, the 
two largest of which are the Oppau and Leuna 
works. The Oppau plant in the Ruhr-Rhineland 
had a pre-bombing capacity of 250,000 metric tons 
of nitrogen. I. G. Farben also owns the only 
cyanamide plant in the region, the A. G. furStick- 
stoffdunger at Knapsack, which had a capacity in 
excess of 30,000 metric tons nitrogen. The capacity 
of the other nitrogen plants in the area, all of 
which are in the Ruhr, amounted in 1944 to at 
least 290,000 tons. A list of these plants and their 
capacities in terms of nitrogen follows: 28 


Bergwerksgesellschaft 
Hibernia A. G. 
Herne, Wanne- 
Eickel. 

VEBAG 

In excess of 42,000 
tons. Total for the 
three VEBAG 
plants at least 
90,000 tons in 1944. 

Hydrierwerk Scholven 
A. G. Recklinghaus- 
en-Scholven. 

VEBAG 

52,000 tons but part 
used for synthetic 
oil after 1935. 

Gew. Friedrich der 
Grosse, Herne- 
Sodingen. 

VEBAG 

See above. 

Bergbau A. G. Ewald- 
Konig Ludwig, Oer- 
Erkenschwick. 


Estimated to be at 
least 25,000 tons. 

Gew. Victor Stick- 
stoff- und Benzin- 
werke, Castrop- 
Rauxel. 


70,000 tons. 

Bergbau A. G. Loth- 
ringen, Bochum- 
Gerthe. 


About 30,000 tons. 

Ruhr-Chemie A. G. 
Holten-Sterkrade. 


About 75,000 tons. 


28 Foreign Economic Administration, Industry Division. 


The chemical nitrogen capacity in the Ruhr- 
Rhineland in 1944 was more than 500,000 metric 
tons of nitrogen, or about one-third of the total 
estimated German potential capacity. 

CALCIUM CARBIDE 

In 1944 Knapsack had a calcium carbide ca¬ 
pacity of about 310,000 metric tons and Hiils, also 
in the area, of 200,000 metric tons. These two 
plants had almost a third of the total capacity of 
the Altreich. 

OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 

Leverkusen, Ludwigsliafen, Cologne, Knapsack, 
Krefeld, and Dusseldorf produce a large variety 
of other chemical products—phosphate fertilizers, 
chlorine, ethyl alcohol, solvents and plasticisers, 
plastics, paints and varnishes—but no data are 
available showing either the volume or value of 
the output. 

The Textile Industry 29 

Before the war the German textile fiber and 
textile industries, although dependent upon im¬ 
ports for the major part of their raw material, 
were very extensive and important. According to 
the 1939 census, the number of workers who re¬ 
ported themselves as engaged in textile fiber proc¬ 
essing and textile weaving exceeded one million. 
Germany was the largest consumer of textile fibers 
on the European continent, with the exception of 
the United Soviet of Socialist Republics. 

After 1935 Germany imported the major part of 
the raw fibers of all kinds, except rayon and rayon 
staple fiber, that she processed. 

In the Ruhr-Rhineland are some of the most 
important textile centers of Germany, including 
Munchen-Gladbach, Rheydt, Krefeld, Aachen and 
Wuppertal, and many other smaller textile cen¬ 
ters. (See Map No. 6284.) Before the war the 
textile industry of this region ranked second only 
to that of Saxony, Germany’s leading producer. 

In 1936, the textile industry in the region em¬ 
ployed 217,800 persons or 23.8 percent of the total 
number of persons employed in the German textile 
industry. The value added by manufacture was 
RM 723,400,000 or 25.5 percent of the value added 
by the industry in all Germany; and the value of 
its exports amounted to approximately RM 130,- 
000,000 30 or 20.9 percent of the value of total Ger¬ 
man exports of textiles. 

29 Some of tlie information contained in this section was 
taken from the Economic Survey of Germany, Section N: 
Textiles and Clothiny. January 194"). Ministry of Economic 
Warfare, and from the OSS It & A Report No. 2914. 

30 Die Deutsche Industrie. Figure is for all of Rhein- 
provinz, Westfalen, Pfalz. Hessen and Saarland. 


40 

















The textile industry ranked fourth in impor¬ 
tance in terms of value added by mining 1 and manu- 
facture in the region, accounting for 7.6 percent. 
It ranked second only to mining in the number of 
persons employed, and below machinery and metal 
goods, chemicals and mining products in value of 
exports. 

Electric Power 31 

The Ruhr-Rhineland is the most important elec¬ 
tricity producing and consuming area in Germany. 
(See Map No. A-6324.) The region is estimated 
to contain 7.023,000 kw of installed generating 
capacity, and it> total 1943 output is estimated 
roughly at 26,230,000.000 kwh. With 6.107.000 kw 
installed in plants over 10,000 kw in size, this area 
contains 31.6 percent of total German capacity in 
plants of that size. 

TABLE 11 


Installed Generating Capacity and Estimated Electricity Pro¬ 
duction of Plants over 10,000 kw in Size, 1943 



Installed 

capacity 

(thousand 

kw) 

Percentage 

of 

German 

total 

Production 

(million 

kwh) 

Saar _ _ 

320 

1. 7 

1. 376 

Ruhr _ 

3. 355 

17. 4 

14. 448 

West of Rhine (excluding 
Saar) 

2. 132 

11. 0 

9. 116 

East of Rhine (excluding 
Ruhr)_ 

300 

1. 5 

1. 290 

Ruhr-Rhineland 

6, 107 

31. 6 

26. 230 

All Germany _ 

19, 300 

100. 0 

86, 000 


Source : OSS K & A Report Xo. 2914. 

The region is 90 percent self-sufficient in elec¬ 
tricity supply, importing only 1.5 to 2 billion kwh 
of hydroelectric current from the southern surplus 
areas of the Reich. Although the high tension 
network of the region is part of the electric trans¬ 
mission system of Germany, production and con¬ 
sumption are fairly well localized within the area. 
About 5,953.000 kw or 97.5 percent of the capacity 
installed in plants over 10,000 kw in size is thermal 
capacity; hydroelectric capacity amounts to only 
200.000 kw. The chief sources of energy for gen¬ 
erating thermoelectric power are the bituminous 
coal of the Ruhr and the Saar and the brown coal 
from west of Cologne. Of the installed capacity 
in plants over 10.000 kw. 3.924.000 kw or 65.9 per¬ 
cent are bituminous coal fired; 1.731,000 kw or 


31 Most of the information contained in this section was 
taken from OSS R & A Report No. 2914. 


29.1 percent are brown coal fired: and 298.000 kw 
or 5.0 percent are fired with by-product gas. 

In addition to a number of small stations under 
10 mw in size, the area contains 31 generating sta¬ 
tions exceeding 50 mw in size with total installed 
capacity of 3.727 mw and 90 stations between 11 
and 50 mw in size with total installed capacity of 
2.380 mw. 

The main public undertakings in the Ruhr- 
Rhineland are the Rheinisch- Westfaelischeg Elek- 
tricitatswerk A. G. (RAVE), with headquarters 
at Essen, the Rhainisches Electriritatsweek im 
B ran. nkohlen eerier .1. G. (REAY). with headquar¬ 
ters at Cologne and the Yereinigte Elektricitdts- 
tcerke Westfalen A. G. (A'EAA*). with headquar¬ 
ters at Dortmund. REAA~ supplies practically the 
whole of its output to RAA’E. though the two com¬ 
panies are not financially affiliated. The RAA'E 
and A'EAA" are the owners of the greater part of 
the main transmission lines in the area. Of the 
total generating capacity 45.3 percent is installed 
in plants for public supply, that is public utilities, 
while 54.7 percent is installed in plants owned and 
operated by industrial enterprises for their own 
use. 

Of the total power consumed in the Ruhr-Rhine¬ 
land. it was estimated that in 1943, >>6.6 percent 
was consumed by industry, while domestic and 
small business consumption amounted to 7.6 per¬ 
cent. traction to 5.4 percent and agricultural to 
0.4 percent. 

IV. Transportation and Trade 

T reimportation 32 

The Ruhr-Rhineland has the densest transport 
network of rail, water and road systems in Ger¬ 
many. Through the center of the region flows 
the heavily travelled Rhine with its well-inte¬ 
grated system of tributary rivers and canals. 
Along both sides of the river are major north- 
south routes which increase at the numerous river 
crossings. 

Transport facilities within the area are engaged 
principally in bringing raw materials into the 
Ruhr and the Saar, and carrying away their coal 
and manufactured products. 

RAILROADS 

The principal rail lines in the region are part 
of a well-developed system managed and operated 

32 The information contained in this section was taken 
from OSS R & A Report No. 2914. 


41 





















by the German National Railroad. Prior to the 
war the capacity of the main lines was high, stand¬ 
ards of maintenance were excellent, and equipment 
was sufficient to carry the volume of traffic offered. 
(See Map No. 6307.) 

The Ruhr has a concentration of rail lines un¬ 
surpassed anywhere else in Europe. From the 
Ruhr, lines stretch out to all parts of Germany as 
well as to the Netherlands and Belgium. 

The Saar, like the Ruhr, has excellent rail con¬ 
nections with the surrounding territory, though 
there are fewer lines and the volume of traffic on 
these lines is considerably less. 

WATERWAYS 

From the head of navigation at Basel on the 
Swiss border, the Rhine flows for 432 miles 
through German territory to Emmerich, where it 
enters the Netherlands. An all-German maritime 
connection is provided by the Dortmund-Ems 
Canal from the Ruhr to Emden (see Rhine Series 
Map No. 2). 

The Marne-Rhine Canal, which is connected 
with the Saar Coal Canal, flows into the Rhine at 
Kehl. At Mannheim, the Ruhr is joined by the 
Neckar, which is navigable by the standard 1,200- 
ton Rhine barges to Heilbronn. The Main River, 
which empties into the Rhine at Mainz, is its great¬ 
est affluent. It has been regulated for major ship¬ 
ping as far up as Wurzburg, and is connected with 
the Danube by the old Ludwig Canal. The Rhine- 
Herne Canal and the Lippe-Seiten Canal are cut 
through the Ruhr coal field to bring Ruhr coal 
down to the Rhine and thence to the great mills 
of the Rhineland area. They also form the con¬ 
nection between the Rhine and the Mittelland 
Canal System, which links all the great north- 
south water arteries of Germany and provides a 
continuous water route from Western Germany to 
the Oder River. 

Commercially, the Rhine is one of the greatest 
inland waterways in Europe. The lower Rhine 
carries as much traffic as all the rest of the Rhine 
and the Rhine-Ruhr complex is one of the greatest 
inland shipping centers in the world. In 1937 the 
ports of this area handled more than a third of 
the total port traffic for all German inland water¬ 
ways; the Duisburg-Ruhrort area alone accom¬ 
modated about the same amount of water-borne 
shipping as did Hamburg, Germany’s chief ocean 


port. Large quantities of iron ore from Lorraine 
and of coal from the Ruhr and Saar, as well as 
grain, were carried on all sections of the river. 
The traffic on the lower Rhine from the Ruhr to 
the border was extremely heavy. Coal and manu¬ 
factured goods were destined for the Netherlands 
and thence for other foreign countries by sea. 
Upstream traffic originating in the Netherlands 
was also very heavy. It consisted principally of 
iron, copper, lead, zinc and manganese ores, coal 
and grain. Belgian ports have never attained the 
importance of the Dutch ports as transshipment 
points for Rhine-borne commodities. 

ROADS 

The Ruhr-Rhineland is connected with the rest 
of Germany by a dense network of national high¬ 
ways. Roads crossing the western border into the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and France 
are fairly numerous, particularly from Aachen to 
the north and in the Saar area. 

Interregional and Foreign Trade 33 

The Ruhr-Rhineland has a surplus of coal and 
manufactured products and is deficient in most 
other raw materials and in food. Its trade is, 
therefore, very active. Over the highly developed 
transport network of the region great quantities 
of goods are exchanged with the rest of Germany 
and with foreign countries. 

Very little information is available on the trade 
of the Ruhr-Rhineland with other parts of Ger¬ 
many but, in general, the character of this inter¬ 
regional commerce can be determined. Central 
Germany received some supplies of coal from the 
region. A large part of German machinery pro¬ 
duction was located in Central Germany, and this 
and other industries undoubtedlv absorbed a sie- 
nificant part of the Ruhr-Rhineland’s production 
of primary iron and steel. On the other hand, sur¬ 
plus iron ore from Salzgitter and foodstuffs from 
the northwestern and north central sections were 
an important part of Ruhr-Rhineland imports. 

In 1936 the value of industrial exports from the 
Ruhr-Rhineland amounted to RM 1,810,881,000 or 
39.2 percent of total German industrial foreign ex¬ 
ports. The value of the chief exports of the re- 

' Most of the information contained in this section was 
taken from Die Deutsche Industrie and from FEA Docu¬ 
ment No. 131034, Interregional Trade in Germany. R & A 
Report No. 2170, Office of Strategic Services, September 8, 


42 



gion and their relation to total German exports of 
the same commodities were a- follow- in 1936: ‘ 


Products 

Value 
(000 RM 

Percent 
of total 
German 
exports 

Steinkohle and Steinkohle coke and 
briquettes. 

339. 653 

92. 3 

Primary iron and steel product- . 

274 • 

70. 5 

Iron and steel goods 

270. 757 

69. 3 

Chemicals 

260. 26S 

48. 2 

Machinery (including vehicles and 
electrical good- 

248. 406 

23. 4 

Textiles. 

130. 000 

20. 9 

Stone and earth product-... 

19. 236 

43. 3 


The region’s dependence upon imports was ex¬ 
treme. More than four million tons net of food¬ 
stuffs. or aproximatelv 50 percent of it- food re¬ 
quirement-. had to be brought into the area in 1936. 
The region produced only a small percentage of 
it- consumption of iron ore. In 1938 the Saarland 
imported 5.056.1 m Hi tons of iron ore from France, 
while 8,110,000 toil'- from Sweden and Norway and 
20,634,1 111,1 tons from other countries were imported 
for plants in the west < >f Germany, most of which 
were in the Ruhr-Rhineland. The region de- 
pended on outside sources for approximately 95 
percent of it- consumption of textile fibers in 1936. 
In addition, the area imported leather and wood 
and wood products. 


4 Deutsche Industrie. The figures are for all of Rhein- 

jirovinz, Westfalen. Pfalz. Hes-en and Saarland. 


TABLE 12 

Production in Certain Basic Industries for Specified Years 
in the Ruhr-Rhineland. in total Germany, and Ruhr-Rhine¬ 
land as percent of total Germany 

(IX THOUSAND METRIC TON'S 







Ruhr- 

Rhine- 

Product 


Year 

Ruhr- 

Rhineland 

Total 
Germany 1 

land as 
percent 
of total 
Germany 


Steinkohle _ 1938 149.431 186.179 79.8 

Brown coal_ 1938 57. 590 194. 978 29. 5 

Coke_ 1938 38. 174 46. 775 81. 6 

Iron Ore_ : 1937 1. 950 9. 790 19. 9 

Zinc Ore (metal con¬ 
tent_ 1937 36 166 22 

Lead Ore (metal con¬ 
tent)_ 1937 28 79 35 

Pie iron_ 1938 : 17.350 - 20.775 ; 72 

Steel_ 1938 ‘19.620 5 * 25. 175 J 71 

Alumina_ 1943 4 380 *550 _ 

Aluminum_ 1943 65 225 28. 8 

Sulfuric acid_ 1937 893 2.0-50 42.8 

Products of wood prod¬ 
ucts industries_ 1936 • 282 1.499 IS. S 


Total Germany is defined a# the Germany of 1937 boundaries. 

- Estimate. Includes low grade ferro-alloys 

: Estimat®. It is assumed that the total pig iron production in all the 
territories designated for separation amounts to about 70-75 percent and the 
steel production to roughly TtH-e percent of total German production. A 
more exact estimate of the proportion of production in these areas is impossible 
because the production of certain plants within them is unknown. 

* This is 3 ve-y rough estimate. Owins to the Lack of a figure for produc¬ 
tion in 193S on the Wesi Bank of the Rhine a figure for 1944 was used. The 
133S production level was probably much higher. The figure on Rhenish 
Westphalia includes cast steel. 

: Capacity. Production is estimated at about 23.000.000 tons. 

* Capacity. 

' Includes Austria. 

5 Figure is for Westphalia. Rheinprovinz, the Palatinate. Hesse and the 
Saar. 


































TABLE 13 


Value Added by Mining and Manufacturing and Gainfully Employed in Industry: Ruhr-Rhineland and all Germany; Value Added by 
Each Industry Group as Percentage of Total Value Added in Ruhr-Rhineland; Value Added by Each Industry Group in Ruhr- 
Rhineland as Percentage of Total Value Added by Same Group in All Germany -1936 


Categories 

All Germany 

Ruhr-Rhineland 

Value added by 
each industry 
group as per¬ 
centage of total 
value added in 
Ruhr- 
Rhineland 

Value added by 
industry group 
in Ruhr-Rhine¬ 
land as percent¬ 
age of total 
value added by 
same group in 
all Germany 

Value added 
(in millions) 
of RM) 

Gainfully 

employed 

(thousands) 

Value added 
(in millions 
of RM) 

Gainfully 

employed 

(thousands) 

Mining _ _ . 

2. 235 

565. 7 

1, 318. 5 

359. 3 

13. 9 

58. 5 

Liquid fuels 

245 

34. 6 

64. 9 

7. 1 

. 7 

26. 5 

Primary iron and steel products 

1, 174 

201. 6 

996. 9 

167. 0 

10. 5 

85. 0 

Primary nonferrous metal products_ 

536 

74. 8 

160. 3 

24. 2 

1. 7 

30. 0 

Foundries, ferrous and nonferrous 

711 

173. 6 

297. 4 

66. 0 

3. 1 

41. 8 

Iron and steel wares _ _ _ 

1, 790 

440. 0 

979. 5 

212. 8 

10. 3 

54. 7 

Machinery 

2. 615 

556. 6 

726. 0 

141. 3 

7. 6 

27. 8 

Fabricated structural steel _ _ __ _ 

558 

146. 4 

131. 9 

31. 3 

1. 4 

23. 6 

Vehicles _- ... . __ 

836 

166. 5 

97. 1 

16. 7 

1. 0 

11. 6 

Electrical engineering .. _ 

1, 503 

294. 2 

188. 9 

32. 6 

2. 0 

12. 6 

Precision and optical instruments . 

368 

97. 1 

16. 2 

4. 4 

. 2 

4. 4 

Nonferrous metal and allied products 

771 

223. 1 

134. 0 

35. 9 

1. 4 

17. 4 

Stone and earth 

1, 231 

406. 2 

304. 9 

83. 1 

3. 2 

24. 7 

Ceramics and glass _ _ _ _ _ _ 

493 

161. 1 

102. 9 

22. 6 

1. 1 

20. 9 

Saw mills . . _ 

316 

107. 5 

35. 0 

11. 1 

. 4 

1 1. 1 

Wood products _ . . _ ... . 

721 

256. 3 

135. 3 

43. 9 

1. 4 

18. 8 

Chemicals . ... 

1,534 

181. 0 

527. 1 

56. 5 

5. 5 

34. 4 

Che mo-tech nicaL . - 

742 

85. 0 

218. 2 

19. 2 

2. 3 

29. 4 

Rubber and asbestos _ . . 

270 

57. 1 

43. 8 

8. 6 

. 5 

16. 2 

Paper, paperboard, wood pulp 

462 

99. 9 

73. 7 

15. 8 

. 8 

15. 9 

Printing, paper processing_ 

1, 001 

283. 6 

174. 1 

47. 2 

1. 8 

17. 4 

Leather _ . _ _ _ 

647 

196. 0 

157. 4 

50. 2 

1. 7 

24. 3 

'•.Textiles _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 

2. 840 

911. 7 

723. 4 

217. 8 

7. 6 

25. 5 

Apparel . _ _ 

754 

229. 7 

120. 6 

42. 7 

1. 3 

16. 0 

Oils, fats, fodder. _ _ _ _ _ _ 

403 

38. 0 

125. 4 

9. 7 

1. 3 

31. 1 

Alcohol 

229 

29. 4 

47. 3 

4. 7 

. 5 

20. 7 

Food processing 

2, 962 

549. 7 

571. 4 

98. 9 

6. 0 

19. 3 

Utilities 

1, 972 

163. 8 

410. 9 

32. 0 

4. 3 

20. 8 

Building and miscellaneous_ 

4, 267 

1220. 0 

614. 6 

172. 2 

6. 5 

14. 4 

Grand total 

34, 186 

7, 950. 2 

9, 497. 6 

2, 032. 9 

100. 0 

27. 8 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Con1 Deposits in Germany. Geological Survey, 
United States Department of the Interior, for 
the Solid Fuels Division, Quartermaster Corps, 
United States Army, March 1944. 

Die Chemische Industrie im Deutschen Reich , 
1939-IfO. X Auflage, A-B Verhig Hoppenstedt 
and Company, Berlin. 

Die Deutsche Industrie , Reichsamt fiir Wehr- 
wirtschaftsplanung, 1939. 

The Economist (London) : 

“Germany’s Frontiers.” Vol. CXLY, No. 
5211, pp. 33-34. July 10, 1943. 

“Between Rhine and Oder.” Vol. CXLVII, 
No. 5276, pp. 478-480, October 7, 1944. 



“The German Problem.” Vol. CXLVIII, No. 

5296, p. 301, March 10, 1945. 

“ Fhe German Problem—II: An Independ¬ 
ent Rhineland?” Vol. CXLVIII, No. 5299, 
pp. 335-336, March 17, 1945. 

“The German Problem—III: Germany in 
Europe.” Vol. CXLVIII, No. 5300, pp. 
366-368, March 24. 1945. 

“The German Problem—IV : The Moderate 
Policy.” Vol. CXLVIII, No. 5301, pp. 
403-404, March 31, 1945. 

“Ruhr-Steel—I.” Vol. CXLIX. No. 5325. pp. 

376-377, September 15, 1945. 

“Ruhr-Steel—II.” Vol. CXLIX, No. 5326, 
pp. 423-424, September 22, 1945. 


44 































































Charles B. Eddy (Chairman of the Greek Refu¬ 
gees Settlement Commission). Greece and the 
Greek Refugees. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
London, 1931. 

“Exchange of Minorities and Transfers of Popu¬ 
lation in Europe from 1919.” The Bulletin of 
International Mews. Yol. 21, No. 15. July 2*2, 
1944. (Published Fortnightly by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, London.) 

FEA Documents: 

Xo. 6624.2. Economic Intelligence Weekly. 
June 7. 1945. 

Xo. 131034. Inter regional Trade in Germany. 
R & A Report Xo. 2470. Office of Strategic 
Services. September 8, 1944. 

Xo. 170155. Consequences of the Major 
Transfers of German Territory: A Pre¬ 
liminary Report. R & A Report Xo. 2914. 
Office of Strategic Services, Mav 1. 1945. 

Xo. 172819. The Economic Characteristics 
and Interdependence of the Possible Zones 
of Occupation in Germany. Office of Stra¬ 
tegic Services, August 3, 1945. 

FEA Reports: 

Xo. EIS—21. Coal Production and Distribu-s 
tion in Germany. October 5. 1944. 

Xo. IXD-1. Industrial Economics Hand¬ 
book: Germany; Part I: Significant Data 
on the Prewar Economy. March 26. 1945. 

Xo. IXD-11. The German Machine Industry. 
May 1945. 

Xo. PC-1. Extra-territorial Effect of Eco¬ 
nomic Measures Taken by the Occupying 
Powers in Germany: Problems of Recogni¬ 
tion and Enforcement in the Neutral 
Countries. May 1945. 

Herman Finer. The TV A: Lessons for Interna¬ 
tional Application. International Labour Of¬ 
fice. Montreal, 1944. 

Stephen P. Ladas. The Exchange of Minorities — 
Bulgaria. Greece, and Turkey. The Macmillan 
Company. Xew York, 1932. (Published under 


the auspices of the Bureau of International 
Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe 
College.) 

David E. Lilienthal, TV A: Democracy on The 
March. Harper and Brothers Publishers. Xew 
York and London, 1944. 

Ministry of Economic Warfare, Economic Sur¬ 
vey of Germany: 

Section D: Fuel. Power and Public Utility 
Services. December 1944. 

Section H: The Metal Industries , September 
1944. 

Section J : The Chemical Industry. October 

1944. 

Section X: Textiles and Clothing. January 

1945. 

Henry Morgenthau (Chairman of the League of 
Xations Committee for the Reconstruction of 
Greece) in collaboration with E. Strother, An 
International Drama. Jarrolds Publishers 
London Ltd. 

H. J. Baton. “Truncation as a Means of Prevent¬ 
ing German Aggression" (address delivered at 
Chatham House on December 12. 1944). Inter¬ 
national Affairs, Yol. XXI. Xo. 2. April 1945, 
pp. 180-195. ( Published quarterly by the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs.) 

Population Readjustment in the Tennessee Yedley. 
TV A leaflet. 

Statistiches Jahrbuch fitr das Deutsche Reich, 
Berlin. 1938. 

The Potsdam Declaration. July 17. 1945. 

Technical Industrial Disarmament Committee 
Reports: 

Xo. 14. The Aggregate of the German Ma¬ 
chinery Industries. June 27. 1945. 

Xo. 15. The German Iron and Steel Indus¬ 
tries. May 23. 1945. 

The United Nations Charter. June 1945. 

Sarah Wambaugh. The Saar Plebiscite. Harvard 
University Press. 1940. 

Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision. Harper 
and Brothers, Xew York and London, 1944. 


MINORITY STATEMENT 


While it is agreed that the permanent separa¬ 
tion of the Ruhr-Rhineland from Germany and 
the removal of its industrial resources from Ger¬ 
man control would in itself greatly reduce the 


German war potential, the acceptability of this 
measure as a part of a total disarmament program 
is subject to question. Opposition to its inclusion 
in the program centers upon the desirability of 


45 



separat ion :is n disarmament measure and ii | m*ii 
(In* necessity l<>r including it in tin* iivim' nil pro 
^ra in. 

Desirability of Separation 

I In* cri((*rin (*slahlishcd nl (In* outset for (In* 
studies on (i<‘rninn disnrmnini'iil slated lliai (In* 
<‘<•0110111of Genuam should lie directed and ad 
ministered through controls dial: 

(//) An* simple and not unnecessarily coin 
p I e x. 

(/>) Are feasible of applied!ion and com 
plianee. 

(r) (’uuse (lie leas! burden to the Allies. 

(<!) Require a minimum of depemlenee 
upon such measures id' (ieruian eooperalion 
as si a I isl iea I report ing, el e. 

(< ) Leave opportunity, wherever consist 
enl with die primary objective of security 
from future (ieruian agression, for the Ger 
man people to achieve a minimum subsistence 
level. 

Separation of die Ruhr Rhineland is opposed 
as a disarmament measure as failing to meet t best* 
criteria. Although the actual act of transfer of 
this territory could he accomplished without in 
surmountable diHicully, the adjustment to vomit 
I ions caused by I he separat ion, as well as t he main 
lenanee of the area as a separate economic entity, 
presents problems of far greater magnitude than 
those foreseen as accompanying a disarmament 
program which excludes this measure. 

I'opulotion 

As the majority report admits, the treatment of 
tbe (ierman populnt ion of tbe area raises problems 
not easy to solve. There appears to be agreement 
in most quarters that removal of the population 
would be necessary if annexation of the territory 
by a neighborin'; nation or nations were carried 
out. This agreement results from recognition of 
the impossibility of assimilating millions of Ger 
mans, < n to t lie populnt ions of Franco, Bel 

gium, and or tin* Netherlands- the logical annex 
ing lint ions , the certaint \ that the annexed areas 
would constitute an irr> di ntiun for Germany, and 
the probability that reunion with (Ierman) would 
some day be ell’ected if the (Ierman population 
remained in t he annexed area. 

The assumption of the majority report that it 
would be safe to retain the population if interna 
tinuni administration were imposed appears to 
rest upon a distinction made between resistance to 
separat ion from t he remainder of the (ierman pop 


illation and resi I a lice to a ini i hit ion b\ the pop it 
lat ion of another country, (he funnel hemp con 
sidei'(*d less formidable than the latter. II, how 
ever, the implicnt iom of tin di linclion are ex 
aniined, (I h • \ clearli imply a greater continuity 
of culture and \\\/f<iii.se/i<nnni</ under interna 
lional control than under annexation. And in 
a detailed picture of the administration ol the 
area under international control (iis'imiing relen 
lion «d' the (ierman population) it become ap 
parent that such coni i n 11 i I y is inevitable it the 
ad i n i n ist ra t ion is to lie bill nil lie and reason a I lie. A 
change in language cannot seriously be proposed, 
for example. Bill with the retention ol the (ier 
man language, the area will retain its (ierman 
character, and its population will think ol itself 
as (ierman and will be so considered by Germain 
proper. Fmler sim'Ii eircumsl a lives the prospects 
that irredentist sent inients will dwindIc and even 
t mi lly die are not too hopeful. 

Phis brief examination of the perils inherent 
in relent ion of I lie (ierman populnt ion under cither 
annexation or international administration seems 
to point to the necessity for its evacuation. But 
evacunt ion of the populnt ion raises the quest ion of 
replacement. If annexation were carried out, the 
area could conceivably be rcpopulalcd by persons 
transferred from the annexing countries (with 
compensatory transfers to those countries of mi 
grants from Southern and F,astern Furope, espe 
cin I In Italy and Greece), or if the area were 
internationalized, a new population might be 
created by permit t ing iinmigrat ion from all Allied 
countries. However, the problem of social co 
herenee in such a population as would thus be 
created is a serious one. Furthermore, the grave 
dilliculties attendant upon evacuating and repine 
ing t he (ierman populnt ion and the economic and 
social hardships which the entire (ierman popu¬ 
lation will experience if crowded into truncated 
(iermany must not be minimized. 

Kfft'vt upon truncated (ronnant/ 

It has not been adequately demonstrated that 
the (iermanv remaining after separation of the 
Ruhr Rhineland would have siillieient resources 
lor national existence. Assuming intermitionali 
zation ot the detached territory and little or no 
immigration of citizens who exercised the ri'dit of 
option for return to the truncated area, it is not 
certain that the truncated area would be able to 
develop an economy capable of sustaining a popu¬ 
lation of around 5 a million. As the majoritv re¬ 
port admits, the remaining Germany will have 


46 



to import foodstuffs and other vital materials, but 
the report does not show how. lacking: the impor¬ 
tant resources of the Ruhr-Rhineland, the rump 
area could establish a balance of trade that would 
pay for the needed imports. 

If this territory is separated and it then be¬ 
comes apparent that a functioning German econ¬ 
omy cannot be established without it. the United 
Nations would he placed in the position of watch¬ 
ing the starvation of some proportion of the popu¬ 
lation. of supplying relief over an indefinite period, 
or of restoring the lost territorv to Germanv. 

. administrative feasibility. 

Annexation of the territorv bv a neighboring 
nation or nations is opposed by the minority as 
by the majority and for much the same reasons. 
However, while internationalization offers distinct 
advantages as a means of administering the de¬ 
tached territory, it entails difficulties, not emp- 
phasized by the majority report, which must be 
given consideration in evaluating territorial sepa¬ 
ration as a disarmament measure. The success of 
the total disarmament program will, obviously, 
depend upon the continued unity of the United 
Nations. To imply doubt that such unity can be 
achieved and maintained in the long run is to ques¬ 
tion the possibility of accomplishing the perma¬ 
nent disarmament of Germany. However, the 
forces for unitv will surelv he greater in the occu- 
pation period and at the time of writing the final 
peace treaty, when individual economic interests 
are subordinated to the great community interest 
in disarmament, than they would be in the post¬ 
occupation administration of a detached Ruhr- 
Rhineland. when the disarmament factor would 
not be continuously apparent and the individual 
economic interests of the participating nations 
would be threatened by the interests of the area. 
Certain factors inherent in the situation of terri¬ 
torial separation would tend to lead to disagree¬ 
ment among the administering nations and at the 
same time would make disunity particularly dan¬ 
gerous. 

Because the economic interests of the adjacent 
non-German nations would conflict with those of 
the separated Ruhr-Rhineland. it might prove dif¬ 
ficult for representatives of those nations to reach 
agreement, in their position on the administering 
bodv. concerning the kind and level of industrial 
activity to be permitted in the trust area. Yet 
upon such agreement would depend the establish¬ 
ment of a sound economy in the area and the use 
that could be made of its resources for the rest of 
Europe. 


Since so large a share of Germany's natural re¬ 
sources and industrial facilities are concentrated 
in the Ruhr-Rhineland. the question of the foreign 
trade balance is less crucial than it would be in 
truncated Germany. Constant vigilance would be 
required, however, to protect the area's interests 
in world trade. Otherwise, it would be called upon 
to produce at peak levels only in periods of ex¬ 
panding trade, while in periods of depression the 
tendency would be for customers of the area to 
rely upon their own national production. 

Even the routine administration of the territory 
would be certain to lead to disagreements of 
greater or lesser seriousness. Yet retention of all 
or most of the German population would make 
mandatory a display of perfect unity among the 
participating Allies. The slightest sign of strain 
or disagreement, however petty the issue, would 
play into the hands of the German population, both 
of the detached area and of Germany proper, and 
would he skillfully exploited. The result of any 
apparent disunity among the Allies would inevi¬ 
tably be an effort on the part of the German popu¬ 
lation to elicit concessions from either party to 
the dispute in return for demonstrations of sup¬ 
port. Furthermore, the temptation to the con¬ 
tending Allie> to >eek such support by making 
otherwise unwarranted concessions to the German 
population would represent a constant hazard to 
the continued tenability of separation. 

It is to be expected that the Germans will make 
full use of such divisive tactics in regards to any 
other measure of control that may be imposed upon 
them. Since, as i> admitted by the majority, sep¬ 
aration of territory would provoke great resent¬ 
ment among the Germans, it should be recognized 
that their efforts to attain revision of this measure 
will be particularly intense. 

Necessity for Separation 

The majority report contends that separation 
should be used, not as a substitute for other meas¬ 
ures of control, but as a supplementary measure to 
give added security in the post-occupation period. 
It is assumed by the minority, however, that the 
total program, including military, scientific, insti¬ 
tutional. and external security controls, will be 
put into effect in so far as possible during the 
period of occupation and that continuing controls 
and supervision of Germany will be written into 
the treaty restoring sovereignty to Germany at 
the end of that period. Under these cireum- 


47 


stances, no need would exist for a policy of sepa¬ 
ration, with the difficulties and risks which make 
it an undesirable disarmament measure. 

Separation as a Sanction 

It is recognized, however, that this territory 
would play a tremendous role in the re-emergence 
of a German war potential in the event that Ger¬ 
many's aggressive tendencies persisted and could 
not he deterred by the post-occupation controls laid 
down by the final treaty. The United Nations 
would undoubtedly choose to pursue any course, 
short of war, however drastic or how full of risks, 
that offered promise of checking renewed German 
aggression. 


It is, therefore, suggested that separation of ter¬ 
ritory be considered as a second line of defense, a 
measure to be applied as a sanction in case Ger- 
many is found to be willfully violating any of the 
terms of the final treaty of which violation has 
been defined as constituting an act of war. At 
such a time and under such circumstances, detach¬ 
ment of this territory would be acceptable and 
advisable. 

If it becomes necessary to resort to this policy, 
the program for the treatment of the area proposed 
in the majority report is believed to represent, in 
general, the course most likely to ensure continued 
security. At that time the matter of retention of 
the German population might be reconsidered in 
(he light of existing conditions. 


\ 


U. S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1945 






























^7 


FREE 



OSNABRUCK ( 

X S M E L L E 


Tecklenburg 


Regiorunosbextri Osnobrudi it 
supervised by the Reichsstott- 
hoher in Oldenburg. 


irgsteinfurt 


| Pet mold] 


Coesfeld 


Warendorf 


Borken 


Bocholt 


Ludinghausen 


^Bockum 


’aderborn 


Wetel 


.ippjtadt 


Wanno- 
/v Eickel 


lunen 


'ladbecki 


Cottrop 

Rauxel 


r Gelsenkirchen 


Dinslaken 


Boren 


Herne 


Unna 


.Oberhausen 


Warburg 


tldern 


Bochum 


Moers 


ittenscheid 


Brilon 


Arnsberg 


Iserlohn 


Kempen 


Krefeld - 
Uerdingen 


.WOLF 


Wollhagen 


Korbach 


iLudenscheid 


> SK 

Munchen- 

Gladbach 


Remtcheid 


Solingen 


revenbroich 


mkenberg 


Erkelenz 


Berleburg 


Gummertboch 


Bergisch Gladbach 


Geilenkirchen 


Biedenkopf 


Siegen 


Siegburg 


Marburg 


Dillenburg 


• Aachen 


AHenkirchen 


Westerburg 


Wetzlor 


Ahrweiler 


Monschau 


Schleiden 


, Weilburg 


Neuwied 


>ntabaur 


Usingen 


Budingen 


Doun 


Sank! Goarshausen 


Hanau 


Bad Schwalbach 


Kochem 


Wiesbaden 


fenbach 


Alrenau 


Frankfurt 
am Main 


ASCHAFFENBURG 


Mainz. 


Rudesheim 

k 


Bitburg 


Aschaffenburj 


Wittlich 


Bernkastel-Ki 


Gross-Gerau 


Dieburg 


| Darmstadt] 


Bad Kreuznach 


Kirchheimbolanden 


Saarburg 


Rockenhausen 


Wadern 


i Frankenthal\ 


ZIG-WAD 


LudwigshaferP 


Sankt Wendel 


Merzig 


Kaiserslautern 


Neustadt an 
der Weinstrasse 


Zweibrucken 


I Sankt Ingbert 


Landau) 


PROVISIONAL EDITION 


GERMANY 

WESTERN BORDER REGIONS 

ADMINISTRATIVE 


52* 


DIVISIONS 


July 1. 1944 information is shown only within the 1937 German boundary 


MjLES 


GREAT 

BRITAIN 


N El M. 


MAP AREA 


f y 

i POLAND 
R M A N Y -> 

Sc V ? 

C 0»„ vs.! 

V c " o s t 

j -- 


£ V ^~-V ^AU STRIA ? HUNGARY / 


' u * s — 7 s 

1 

v p „ -f 

\ /X V 

Y 

lj, WIEDENBRUCK J 

Awi»d»nbrOck f s' - V I ^ 


HAGEN 


FRITZLAR- 

HOMBERG 


ZIEGENHAIN 


50' - 




N 


Saarlautern f 


Boundaries 

Pre-war 1937 International 


Land Preussen (Prussia) 

Provinz (Province) 

Regierungsbezirk (District) in Prussia 
Kreis, Stadtkreis (SK) 

Other Land (State) Boundary 


RELIABILITY OF DATA 


Quantitative * Qualitative Data 

R Reliable 

QR Generally Reliable 
U Unreliable 
Coverage of Data 
C Complete 
I - incomplete 
Location of Oat* 

R- Accurate 

NE - Not entirety Accurate 
OA Onfy Approx. Accurate 


QUANTTTAT1V* DATA The jettejSW._ u (_*? 

DoeuKiion iiimtici. hypsometric d»u. roe » 

QUA ITT ATI VI DATA The letter* R. OR. and U are an eetimete of Ihe reliability of 


Soorlond ond Pfolz form WEST- 
MARK. The office of Reichsstott- 
holter of Wastmark combines the 
offices of the Reichskommissorof 
Soorlond ond Regierungsprd- 
tident of Pfolz. 


— — — Other District Boundary 
• ••••••• Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk 

(Planning Authority of the Ruhr Coal District) 

Capitals 

iDetmoldl Land (State) 

★ Provinz (Province) 

Koln Regierungsbezirk (District) 

Kleve Kreis, Stadtkreis (SK) 

Capitol of lond Preuuen is in Berlin 


FREE 


LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH, OSS 


670737 0 -65 (Inside back cover) No. 2 





























































































































































BALTIC SLA 


GREAT 

BRITAII 


POLAND 


GERMANY 


CZECHOSLOVAK! 


FRANCE 


HUNGARY 


AUSTRIA 


SWITZ. 


ITALY 


YUGOSLAVIA 


BALTIC SEA 


Minden 


ISNABRUCK 


GREAT 

BRITAII 


POLAND 


GERMANY 


Gronau 


Bad Oeynhausen 


iQchtrup 


Emsdetten 


CZECHOSLOVAK! 


lorghorst 


FRANCE 


HUNGARY 


AUSTRIA 


SWITZ. 


Greven 


ITALY 


YUGOSLAVIA 


BIELEFELD 


MUNSTER 


Coesfeld 


Guterslon 


lijmegen 


Emmerich 


Bocholt 


irborn 


Lippstadt 


^Datteln 

A'3 RECKLINGHAUSEN 


Kamen 


CASTROP- 

RAUXEL 


;°J —i 

■•AH®® 


HERNE 


■ Gerthe 


GELSENKIRCHEN 


Altenessen 


BOCHUM 


OBERHAUSEN 


WATTEN- 

SCHEID 


Hattingen 


Kempen 


ISERLOHN 


/XREFELCFS 

UERDINGEN 


latingen 


iRummenohl 


IUPPERTAL 


Schwelm 


'IERSEN 


DUSSELDORF 


iDulken 

MUNCHEN 
. GLADBACH 


Ronsdorf 


LUDENSCHEID 


.ennep 


NEUSS 


RHEYDT 


SOUNGEN 


luckeswagen 


Wermelskirchen 


Bursheid 1 


.Grevenbroicl 


irmagen 


•E’ 'ERKUSEN 


Bergheii 


Bensburg 


ieisweid 


.Basweiler 


Alsdorf 


■Eschweiler 


j Marburg 


Duren 


Cobalt 

Nickel 


Mechernich 


VERVIERS 


GIESSEN 


Manganese 


Mangonese 


KOBLENZ 


Iraubach 


Manganese 


FRANKFURT 


WIESBADEN 


MAINZ ^ 

AHlQl 


Manganese 


Manganese 


lad Kreuznach 


IdarOberstein 


LUXEMBOURI 


Frankenthal 


LUDWIGSHAFE1 

AHIo] 


KAISERSLAUTERN 


Lambrecht 


lillingen 


Neustadt 


Speyer' 


NEUNKIRCHEN 


lomburg 


£Waldfischbach 


St. Ingbert 


Thaleischweiler 


'VPIklingen 


'Zweibrucken 


Rodalben 


Bleiskastel 


Irebach 


Landau 


lauenstein 


Pirmasens 


'mi 

V.'.V 
•’ ■ 


mk 




PROVISIONAL EDITION 


LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH. OSS 


FRANCE 


Hanau 


CONFIDENTIAL 


HERFORD 


Lemgo 


RELIABILITY OF DATA 


DATA 

QL’AN. 

QUAU 

LOC. 

INDUSTRIES 


GRC 

A 

MINERAL 

DEPOSITS 


RC 

NE 

Yoal 

dtPTH CONTOUR 

R 1 


* 

^INDUSTRIAL 

/REGIONS 



OA 














QC’ANTTTATJV* DATA The letter* X, 
of the Ate’s ouenlilttive <J«tt the dele 
ooouiet^n statistic*, hypsomatnc iJete, 
QUAITTATTV* DATA The letter# ft. Q 


Quantitative A Qualitattva Data 
ft - Reliable 

OR - Generally Rohm Me 
U ■ Unreliable 
Coverage of Data 
C Complata 

I • Incomplete 

Location of Data 
A ■ Accurate 

NE • Not Entirety Accurate 
OA • Onfy Appro*. Accurate 
<iH, end U ere en estimate of the reliability 


GERMANY-WESTERN BORDER REGIONS 

MINERAL RESOURCES 
AND INDUSTRY 


MINERAL DEPOSITS 

| BROWN COAL 


ITUMINOUS COAL (In the 
reater Ruhr Bituminous Coal 
Region indicates area of most 
productive mining) 


Area of known and partially 
exploited coal deposits in the 
Greater Ruhr Bituminous Coal 
Region 


IRON ORE 

yy. POTASH AND 
vv, MINERAL SALTS 

OTHER METALORES 
(identified on map) 


■ 1300 meter depth-contour of coal in the Greater Ruhr 
Bituminous Coal Region 

INDUST R I ES 


of major 
importance 

of secondary 
importance 

■ 

0 

IRON AND STEEL 

• 

® 

OTHER METALLURGY (including light metals) 

▲ 

A 

MACHINERY AND METALWORKING 

H 

m 

CHEMICAL 


© 

COKE AND COAL TAR 


© 

SYNTHETIC OIL AND REFINING 


m 

TEXTILES 

A 

A 

CLOTHING AND SHOES 


INDUSTRIAL REGIONS 


BOUNDARY OF INDUSTRIAL REGION 
-— BOUNDARY OF INDUSTRIAL SUB-REGION 

A Greater Ruhr Industrial Region 

A-1 Munchen-Gladboch Textile Sub-region 
A-2 Ruhr Valley Heavy Industry Sub-region 
A'3 Ruhr Coke and Chemicals Sub-region 
A-4 Wuppertal Textile Sub-region 
A'5 Dimeldorf-Solingen Light Machinery 
ond Metal working Sub-region 
fe Koln (Cologne)- Leverkusen Industrial Region 
C Aachen Industrial Region 
D Saar Industrial Region 

- Selected Railroad (Double-track or more) 

10 _15_20_25 


MILES 
10 15 


670737 0 - 45 (Inside back cover) No. 3 












































































































































THE RUHR: DIRECT SHIPMENTS OF COAL,COKE AND BRIQUETS, 1937 


PROVISIONAL 


Ruhr Series Map 7 

CONFIDENTIAL 







S 

D 


■'A. 


..on of Geography and Carloaraphjr, March 1945 I585G 


"V 


Xj 




■> SWITZERLAND 




—i— 

125 


IOO Mi 
_| 

I Km. 


Prepared in 































































! HE RUHR: COAL AND COKE EXPORTS, 1937 
FRANSH1PPED FROM NETHERLAND AND GERMAN PORTS 

PROVISIONAL 


Prepared in the Department of State, Division of Geography and Cartography, March 1945 1651 G 


0 5,000 10,000 

thousands of metric tons 




coal 


Less then 100,000 tons 
<t- 


COKE 


/ Break in column of flow indicates 
combination of German end Neth- 
ertend tonnage transhipped to 
individual countries 


LTV 


2 Bunker coal through German ports 
undifferentiated 


SCALE 

•oo 


ZOC M 


■CC 




300 Km 


V. 








'V 






V 




44° 


/ P 


J6* 




i i t j iviap 

CONFIDENTIAL 


































































































CONFIDENTIAL 



670737 0 - 45 (tnalda back cowr) No. 6 


CONFIDENTIAL 


LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH. OSS 






































































































































































































































PROVISIONAL EDITION 


FREE 



LITHOGRAPHED IN THE REPRODUCTION BRANCH. OSS 


.T0TJ7O- AS on,*. ** 


































































































,s -V/eggLC. 


'Amsterdam' 


OsnabrucK 


Utrecht 

R. 


lunster 


Wesel 

Walt 


,Dortmund 


vftnheim v, 

'Duisburg 

D'u'sseldorf 


Kassel 


Antwer 


Yugge 


Bruxelles 


Aachen 


iWesseling 


Koblenz 


Mainz^ 

(inc Gustovsburg and 
Weisenau) 


^Luxembourg 


Ludwigshafen 


Mulhouse 


Rhine Series Map 2 


RHINE RIVER SYSTEM 

WATERWAYS AND PRINCIPAL PORTS 




Duisburg - Hamborn 


Rotterdam 
Vlaardingen 

Dordrecht 


Horn be r q^_jRheinhausen 
Wa I su m 


C= 5 > 


l 5 ? 


Noordzee C. 


Heilbronn 


Keh 


Wa terway Depths 

(as of 19 3 7) 

- 3.0 Meter depth and over 

— 2.5 M - 3.0 M 
«= 2.0 M. - 2.5 M 

- Less than 2.0 M 

Unnavigabl e 
***— Canals 

• Projected waterways 
-International boundaries 

Scale I 2,800,000 

0 50 100 Km 


Miles 


Erfurt® 


Leipzig 


Frankfurt yD 


$ X S 

/ \ wu p bur g 

in* 


Nurnberg 


TRAFFIC OF PRINCIPAL 
RHINE PORTS, 1935 

(Metric Tonnage) 
'downstream 


■jbe & 


= 1,000,000 t 


Ports 


Basel 

Strasbourg 

Kehl 

Korlsruhe 

Mannheim 

Ludwigshafen 

Mainz 

Fronkf urt 

Wesselmg 

Koln 

Dusseldorf 
Rhine-Ruhr P 
Duisburg 

Hambor 

Homberg 

Rheinhousen 

Walsum 

Amcterdam 

Rotterdam 

Vlaardingen 

Dordrecht 

Antwerpen 

Gent 

Bruxelles 



Entering 



Clean ng 


Total\\. 

from down 
st r eom 

from up 
stream 

total 

upstream 

downstream 

total 

traffic 

746 ,162 


746,162 


65,371 

65,371 

811,533 

3,274,595 

30,921 

3,305,516 

59,333 

2,010,043 

2,069,376 

5,374,892 

1,361,376 

16,723 

1,378,099 

199,949 

231,978 

431,927 

1,810,026 

2,290,678 

32,968 

2,323,646 

5,592 

255,188 

260,780 

2,584,426 

3,880,647 

244,171 

4,124,818 

92,856 

619,095 

711,951 

4,836,769 

2,442, 140 

237,691 

2,679,831 

27,970 

1,131,170 

1,159,140 

3,838,971 

1,108,388 

192,912 

1,301,300 

7,932 

543,983 

551,915 

1,853,215 

1,823,745 

49,402 

1,873,147 

10,595 

236,120 

246,715 

2,119,862 

13,820 

15,765 

29,585 

2,459,477 

100 ,74 2 

2,560,219 

2,589,804 

828,233 

360,889 

',189 ,122 

1,256 ,751 

334,011 

1,590,762 

2 ,779,884 

874,596 

475,778 

1,350,374 

424,816 

371,075 

795,891 

2 ,146,265 

8,049,006 

3,217,743 

1 1,266,749 

4 ,551,917 

12,963,397 

17,515,314 

28,782,063 

5,348,554 

2,818,660 

8,167,214 

3,457, 336 

11,1 58,595 

14, 615,931 

22,783,145 

70,141 

45,822 

115,963 

76 2,300 

978,217 

1,740,517 

1,856,480 

1,794,951 

168,480 

1,963,431 

85,155 

388,705 

473,860 

2,437,291 

835,360 

184,781 

1 ,020,141 

247,126 

437,880 

685,006 

1,705,147 


1,054,495 

1,054,4 9 5 

400,654 


400,654 

1,4 55,149 


1 1,230,737 

11,230,737 

10,867, 142 


10,867, 142 

22,097,879 


256,103 

256,103 

1, 107, 781 


1, 107,781 

1,363,884 


137, 308 

137,308 

20,842 


20,842 

158,150 


3,834,189 

3,834,189 

2,549,039 


2,549,039 

6,383,228 


563,392 

563,392 

662,412 


662,412 

1,225,804 


64 3,917 

643,917 

113,082 


113,082 

756,999 


. Dan 


Reported completed 

t94t Mlinchen, 


).r~' 




M 1 _ 




Compiled and drawn in Ge., Jan. 13,1943 



































































































































































































































































































































